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FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW

INTRODUCTION

From humble beginnings,1 federal substantive criminal law has
grown to prohibit a wide range of conduct, including much that state
criminal laws also proscribe.2 This expansion, commonly called federalization, has recently attracted substantial academic criticism.3 Some
1. Under the Constitution, Congress has explicit power to criminalize only counterfeiting,
see U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 6; "Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations," id. cl. 10; offenses committed on federal property, see id, cl. 17; and
treason, see id. art. III, §3, ci. 2. Although the First Congress soon criminalized other conduct,
such as obstruction of justice in federal courts, see Crimes Act of 1790, 1 STAT. 112, until the
Reconstruction era, federal criminal law was limited to "punishment of acts directly injurious to
the central government." L.B. Schwartz, FederalCriminalJurisdictionand Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 L,v & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 65 (1948). See also DwiGrr F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS,
CoURTS, AND CRMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829 (1985).

2. Some have estimated that there are now over 3000 separate federal crimes. See, eg.,
REPORT OF TmE FED. Ors. STUDY Comm. 106 (1990) [HEREINAFrMR REPORT] (citing 3000 fig-

ure). See also United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1382 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (referring to
"more than 700 crimes in the federal criminal code"), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997). Many of
these federal crimes duplicate existing state criminal offenses. See, eg., Sarah Sun Beale, Too
Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define ProperLimits for Federal CriminalJurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997-98 (1995) (listing overlapping federal and state crimes); infra
notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
3. Three recent Symposia address the topic. See Symposium: Federalismand the Criminal
Justice System, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 757 (1996); Symposium: The FederalRole in CriminalLaw,
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 15 (1996); Symposium: Federalizationof Crime: The
Roles of the Federaland State Governments in the CriminalJustice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965
(1995). See also Symposium: Rethinking Federal CriminalLaws, 1 BUFF. CRim. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997); Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on
Saving the FederalJudiciary From the Federalizationof State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 503
(1995); Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the FederalCourts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 681
(1992); Wiliam W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalizationof the Administration
of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETsoN L. REV. 651 (1994); H. Scott Wallace, Compulsive
Disorder:Stop Me Before I FederalizeAgain, PROSECUTOR, May-June 1994, at 21; H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to FederalizeIs a Road to Ruin, Crum. JUST., Fall 1993, at 8 [hereinafter Road to
Ruin]; Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good Assessing Federalizationof Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1994); Greg Hollon, Note, After the Federalization Binge: A
Civil Liberties Hangover, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 499 (1996); James M. Maloney, Note,
Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The Constitutionalityof FederalRegulation of Intrastate
FirearmsPossession,62 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1795 (1994). Government officials have also devoted
attention to federalization. See, eg., Rende M. Landers, Reporter'sDraftfor the Working Group
on the Mission of the Federal Courts,46 HASTINGS LJ. 1255 (1995). For earlier discussions of the
proper scope of federal criminal law, see John S. Baker, Nationalizing CriminalLaw: Does Organized Crime Make It Necessary or Proper?, 16 RUTGERS LJ. 495 (1985); Craig M. Bradley,
Racketeering and the Federalizationof Crime, 22 AM. CRim. L. REv. 213 (1984); Robert Eugene
Cushman, The NationalPolice Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MNN. L.
REv. 289 (1919); Roger J. Miner, FederalCourts, FederalCrimes, and Federalism,10 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. Poi'Y 117 (1987); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization
of IntrastateCrime, 15 Auz. L. REv. 271 (1973); William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty, Federalism and National Criminal Law: Modernist ConstitutionalDoctrine and the Nonrole of the
Supreme Court, 26 Am. Clum. L. REv. 1740 (1989); Camille Kenny, Comment, FederalCriminal
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critics bemoan the federal government's intrusion into matters historically left to the states. 4 Others denounce the burden on the federal
judiciary of an increasing criminal caseload. 5 However, there has
been far less attention devoted to what may be the most troubling
consequence of federalization: the dramatically disparate treatment of
similarly situated offenders, depending on whether they are prosecuted in federal or state court. 6 This Article addresses that consequence and contends that equal protection doctrine has a role to play
in preventing unprincipled disparity.
Jurisdiction:A Case Against Making FederalCases, 14 SETON HALL L.R v. 574 (1984). Not all
agree that federalization deserves the attention it now receives. See G. Robert Blakely, Federal
CriminalLaw: The Need, Not ForRevised ConstitutionalTheory or New CongressionalStatutes,
But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive Discretion,46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175,1176 & n.4 (1995)
(concluding that "[w]e should not be talking about 'federalization' and characterizing Symposium on federalization as "a tragic waste of intellectual resources").
4. See, ag., Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, ProsecutorialDiscretionand the Federalization Debate, 46 HASTNGS LJ.967, 968 (1995) (noting that some critics "believe that some of
the recently enacted federal crimes inappropriately infringe on federalism interests by taking
matters traditionally of local concern out of the hands of local officials"); Schwarzer & Wheeler,
supra note 3, at 664-65 (summarizing contentions of critics).
5. See, eg., Beale, supranote 2, at 983-91 (describing the "most visible cost" of federalization as "the burden imposed on the relatively small federal judicial system"); Gorelick & Litman, supra note 4, at 968 (noting critics' concern that federalization "will swamp the federal
courts with 'local' crimes, thereby preventing them from fulfilling a traditional role of adjudicating distinctively federal matters"); REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (describing "the long-expected
crisis of the federal courts" caused in part by "the expanded federal effort to reduce drug trafficking."). Not all observers agree that federalization has created unmanageable burdens for the
federal judiciary. See Rory K. Little, Myths and Principlesof Federalization,46 HAsrnNms L.J.
1029, 1034, 1038-47 (1995) (describing claims of crisis in federal judicial caseload as a "myth");
Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 3, at 672-85 (discussing arguments on both sides). Cf. Dennis
E. Curtis, Comment, CongressionalPowersand FederalJudicialBurdens, 46 HASTNGS L.J. 1019,
1024-25 (1995) (proposing an increase in the size of the federal judiciary).
6. Although Professor L.B. Schwartz recognized, almost half a century ago, that the
growth of federal criminal law could cause disparate treatment, see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 7172, almost all of the recent treatment of federalization focuses on other issues. See Little, supra
note 5, at 1037 ("The current critique of the federalization of crime can be described as encompassing four general types of concerns: (1) workload, (2) open forum, (3) dignity, and (4) federalism concerns."); Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 3 (discussing federalization debate without
mention of disparity in treatment). Government efforts to address federalization are similarly
deficient. See Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use
When Consideringthe Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 46 HASTINcs LJ.1277,1277 (1995) (government's two major concerns are caseload of federal courts and federal/state relations). Professor Beale has addressed the issue of disparate treatment. See Beale, supra note 2, at 982, 9961004. See also Hollon, supra note 3 (discussing disparate treatment); Kenny, supra note 3, at 576
(noting "inherent unfairness to a defendant who loses the increased protections his state constitution may afford when he is brought into federal court"). Professor Beale identifies disparate
treatment and increased burdens on the federal judiciary as the principle adverse consequences
of federalization. See Beale, supranote 2. She proposes shifting litigation of federal offenses to
the state courts as a solution. See id. at 1008-15; see also Mengler, supranote 3, at 535 (presenting a similar proposal). Beale recognizes that transfer of prosecutions to the states will not alone
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As a result of the growth of federal criminal law, much criminal7
conduct is now subject to federal as well as state prosecution.
Although the states prosecute the majority of offenders whose conduct violates both state and federal law, federal prosecution is not uncommon. 8 Because of differences between federal and state criminal
justice systems, an offender will often fare worse if prosecuted in federal court rather than state court. He9 may be detained pending trial
when he would have been released if charged in state court,' 0 denied
discovery allowable in state court," and confronted with evidence that
would have been suppressed in state court.' 2 If convicted, a federally
end disparate treatment. As a result, she also calls for "uniform standards.., to determine which
categories of cases will be subject to state rather than federal law." She proposes two means of
achieving that objective: "general federal enforcement of all cases falling within a statutory provision or the promulgation and enforcement of clear standards identifying classes of cases that
will be subject to general federal prosecution." Beale, supra note 2, at 1016. Both approaches
are consistent with the equal protection requirements that I discuss in this Article.
7. Prosecution by both federal and state authorities for the same conduct is infrequent.
See United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that "successive prosecutions
for the same conduct remain rarities"); Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions:
A Model ForConcurrent FederalJurisdiction,543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.& Soc. Scr. 72,77
(1996) (Department of Justice prosecutes following state prosecution for same conduct fewer
than 150 times per year out of approximately 65,000 annual federal prosecutions). Despite the
fact that successive federal prosecutions constitute a minute portion of the federal criminal
caseload, two recent high-proffile federal civil rights prosecutions following state court acquittals-the federal trial of Los Angeles Police Department officers for using unreasonable force
while arresting Rodney King and the federal trial of Lemrick Nelson, Jr., for the killing of
Yankel Rosenbaum-have drawn considerable attention to the "dual sovereignty exception" to
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Dual sovereignty is a doctrine which allows one sovereign, such as
the federal government, to prosecute after another sovereign, such as a state, has already done
so. See, eg., Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney
King, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1995); Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King Trials and the Double
Jeopardy Clause: Some Observationson OriginalMeaning and the ACLU's Schizophrenic Views
of the Dual Sovereign Doctrine,41 UCLA L. REv. 693 (1994); Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REv. 609
(1994); Susan N. Herman, Reconstructingthe Bill of Rights: A Reply to Amar and Marcus's Triple
Play on Double Jeopardy, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1090 (1995); Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy
Wars: The Casefor a Civil Rights "Exception," 41 UCLA L. REv. 649 (1994); Yale Kamisar, Call
It Double Jeopardy, N.Y. Tnvm, Feb. 14, 1997, at 37. See generally Michael A. Dawson, Note,
PopularSovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281
(1992). Although federalization of criminal law increases opportunities for successive federal
prosecutions, the focus of this Article is different-the decision to prosecute some offenders in
federal court when they are eligible for state prosecution.
8. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
9. Because most federally-prosecuted offenders are male, see, e.g., U.S. SENTEN iN
COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT app. B (1994) (84.7% of convicted federal offenders are male),
throughout this Article I use the masculine pronoun to refer to offenders. I use the female
pronoun when referring to prosecutors and defense attorneys.
10. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
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prosecuted defendant is likely to receive a longer sentence 13 and to
serve far more of that sentence than he would if sentenced in state
14

court.

United States v. Palmer'5 provides a stark example of such fed-

eral/state court disparity. Palmer and Roberts were partners ina marijuana-growing operation at Palmer's residence.' 6 After police
arrested the men, the federal prosecutor assigned to the case chose
not to bring charges against Roberts, who, as a result, was prosecuted
in state court.' 7 The state court sentenced him to a fine of $1,000which was waived because Roberts was indigent-and assessed court
costs and fees of $176.'1 Palmer was considerably less fortunate. The
federal prosecutor brought charges against him. After Palmer was
convicted, the federal court sentenced him to a nonparolable ten-year
13. See infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. Similar issues can arise in other contexts. See e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996) (prosecution of
juvenile as an adult in federal court); Allison Boyce, Note, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial
Discretionand Walker v. State, 46 ARK. L Rnv. 985 (1994) (discussing choice between juvenile
and adult court); cf Jon J. Jensen & Kerry S. Rosenquist, Satisfaction of a Compelling Governmental Interest or Simply Two Convictions for the Price of One, 69 N.D. L. REv. 915 (1994)
(federal prosecution after conviction in tribal court).
15. 3 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1138 (1994).
16. A deputy sheriff arrested Roberts after discovering marijuana in his car during a traffic
stop. See id.
at 302. Another deputy told Roberts that if he cooperated, the deputy would make
efforts to prevent Roberts from being charged in federal court. See Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 5, Palmer(No. 91-30291). Roberts told the deputy about the marijuana at Palmer's residence. See Palmer, 3 F.3d at 302. Aware that the federal Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) was interested in Palmer, who had a previous federal conviction and was the subject of
an earlier DEA investigation, the deputies' supervisor notified a DEA agent. See id. The agent
in turn notified an Assistant United States Attorney, who indicated that "the federal government would be interested in prosecuting the case if more than 100 marijuana plants were found."
Id. The deputies obtained a search warrant for Palmer's residence and, along with a DEA agent,
executed the warrant, finding 258 marijuana plants and growing equipment. See Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 7, Palmer(No. 91-30291).
17. The federal prosecutor considered bringing charges against Roberts and rewarding him
for his cooperation simply by seeking a reduced federal sentence. When the federal prosecutor
learned that a deputy sheriff had induced Roberts' cooperation by promising to make efforts to
foreclose federal prosecution, see supra note 16, the federal prosecutor chose to not bring federal
charges at all. See Affidavit of Earl A. Hicks, at 2-3, United States v. Palmer (CR 91-030-JLQ).
18. See Palmer,3 F.3d at 305 n.3. Roberts also benefited from reduced state law charges in
state court. He could have been charged with manufacturing marijuana, in violation of WASH.
REv.CODE § 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii) (1985), but instead he agreed to plead guilty to possession of
over 40 grams of marijuana, in violation of WAsS. REv. CODE § 69.50.401(d) (1985). Although
both crimes carry the same statutory maximum sentence, the guidelines enacted as part of Washington's Sentencing Reform Act of 1991 treat the manufacturing charge as a more serious offense. See WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.320 (1988) (requiring imposition of longer sentence). See
also WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.94A.120(1), 9.94A.310 (1988).
HeinOnline -- 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 648 1996-1997
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term of imprisonment and an eight-year supervised release term, the
most lenient sentence that federal law allowed. 19
Cases like Palmer, in which partners in crime receive different
treatment because one is prosecuted in state court and the other in
federal court, are atypical. 20 However, comparably dramatic sentencing differentials and other disparities2 ' routinely occur when some offenders are prosecuted in state court and others, who may not be their
partners but have engaged in the same criminal conduct and are
otherwise similarly situated, are instead selected for federal prosecution and the often harsher treatment that it entails. Such disparate
treatment occurs nationwide on a daily basis when some defendants,
engaged in drug transactions, weapons offenses, or other crimes over
which there is overlapping federal and state criminal jurisdiction, happen to be among the unlucky ones selected for federal prosecution. 22
Despite the significant ramifications of the forum selection decision, there is little administrative direction or judicial oversight to
guide federal prosecutors in exercising their discretion to choose
among offenders eligible for federal prosecution. Although there
were valid reasons for the federal prosecutor to seek harsher treatment for Palmer than for Roberts, 23 the prosecutor could have made
the same selection decision without good reason, perhaps selecting
Roberts but not Palmer. Without fear of violating Department of Justice policy or risking judicial review, the federal prosecutor could have
flipped a coin to select who to prosecute in federal court and, consequently, who to subject to the possibility of a vastly more severe federal sentence. Neither the United States Attorney's Office that chose
19. See Palmer, 3 F.3d at 305 n.3. Palmer was sentenced under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) (1992), which requires a minimum nonparolable ten-year mandatory imprisonment term and an eight-year supervised release term for possession of 100 or more marijuana
plants with intent to distribute if the offender has a prior conviction for a drug trafficking crime.
The statute allows for imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. See id.
20. For other examples, see United States v. Vllchez, 967 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's departure from mandatory five-year sentence to reduce defendant's sentence
to three-year sentence that partner received in state court); United States v. Reyes, 966 F.2d 508
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 927 (1992) (two defendants possessed sawed-off shotgun;
federally prosecuted defendant received 57-month sentence, state-prosecuted defendant received 300-day sentence).
21.

See infra Part I.B.

22. See infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text.
23. Unlike Roberts, Palmer' refused to cooperate with law enforcement. See Palmer,3 F.3d
at 302. Palmer also had a prior conviction for marijuana trafficking, had been the subject of an
earlier DEA investigation, see id., and was growing marijuana at a residence where his two
young daughters lived. See Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 5, Palmer (No. 91-30291). These
differences between Palmer and Roberts did not warrant the enormous disparity in treatment.
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to prosecute only Palmer nor the Department of Justice has a policy
requiring prosecutors to have rational reasons for determining which
eligible offenders to prosecute in federal court?' Similarly, although
its consideration of Palmer's equal protection and due process challenges prompted the Ninth Circuit to characterize the prosecutor's
charging decision as "troubling" and to conclude that "[t]here is
something basically wrong with this type of exercise of prosecutorial
discretion," 26 the court refused to review the prosecutor's decision to
select only Palmer. Consistent with approaches that other courts have
taken, the Palmer court held that "separation of powers concerns prohibit us from reviewing a prosecutor's charging decisions absent a
prima facie showing that it rested on an impermissible basis, such as
gender, race or denial of a constitutional right."' 7
Even if courts refuse to enforce it, equal protection obligates
prosecutors to have a rational basis for distinguishing between offenders who are charged and those who are not. Both the letter and the
spirit of that command mandate that federal prosecutors have valid
reasons for distinguishing between offenders who are subjected to
harsher treatment as a result of federal prosecution and those who are
instead charged in state court. The Department of Justice should
amend its administrative guidelines to ensure compliance with equal
protection principles.
The judiciary's role in limiting federalization-induced disparity
also merits examination. One scholar has noted that, to date, "no participants in the current federalization debate suggest a change in [the]
doctrine" precluding judicial oversight of charging decisions absent
proof of intentional discrimination.? 8 Critical examination of the underpinnings of this doctrinal limitation reveals, however, that the possibility of judicial oversight should be a topic of debate. If the
24. The federal prosecutor assigned to the case told the trial judge that "our office does not
have a policy" governing whether offenders should be charged in state or federal court. Brief of
Defendant/Appellant at 9, Palmer (No. 91-30291). For a discussion of Department of Justice
policy, see infra Part III.A-B.
25. Palmer,3 F.3d at 305 n.3.
26. Palmer, 990 F.2d 490, 496 n.6 (9th Cir.), superseded, 3 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1138 (1994). The Ninth Circuit initially reversed Palmer's conviction, finding
that the trial court erroneously admitted a post-arrest statement that Palmer made. See id. at
493-95. It later amended its opinion, determining that the error was harmless and affirming the
conviction. See Palmer,3 F.3d at 303-05. The court removed the "basically wrong" sentence
from its amended opinion without explanation.
27. Palmer, 3 F.3d at 305.

28. Little, supranote 5, at 1082. Critics instead have recommended legislative and administrative solutions to federalization-related problems. See, e.g., JuD. CoNrn. OF THE U.S. COMM. ON
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Department of Justice does not require that its prosecutors make principled charging decisions, and if courts are confronted with evidence
that federal prosecutors' selection decisions may be wholly unprincipled, courts should rethink their reluctance to scrutinize those decisions. Although courts should, at most, conduct limited review that
would rarely afford defendants a judicial remedy, such oversight
would promote principled charging decisions.
Part One of this Article discusses legislative and judicial contributions to the expansion of federal substantive criminal law and its increasing overlap with state criminal prohibitions. This Part then
identifies some significant procedural and sentencing disparities between federal and state prosecution.
Part Two explores the constraints that equal protection doctrine
imposes on prosecutors' selection of offenders and contends that
equal protection requires charging decisions to be rationally related to
legitimate government objectives. Part Two also explains why the rational relationship requirement has particular significance for federal
prosecutors' decisions to select only some eligible offenders for federal prosecution when others are charged in state court.
LONG RANGE PLANNING, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR Tm FED. CmS., 23-27 (1995)

[hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN] (recommending congressionally imposed limits on jurisdiction
of federal courts); Beale, supra note 2, at 1015-18 (proposing prosecutive guidelines); Little,
supra note 5, at 1077-83 (proposing legislative and administrative guidelines); Mengler, supra
note 3, at 527-34 (recommending recodification and prosecutive guidelines). In the not-too-distant past, without focusing on the federalization-specific topic of federal prosecutors' decisions
to bring charges when state prosecution also is available, several scholars proposed that charging
decisions be subject to judicial oversight, more clearly defined administrative constraints, or
both. See, eg., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DIscRETnONARY JusricE: A PREuLmNARY INQUMY

(1971); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1971); Amy Grossman Applegate, ProsecutorialDiscretionand Discrimination in the Decision to Charge,55 TEMP. L.Q. 35 (1982); Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern,
Taming the Dragon:An Administrative Law for ProsecutorialDecisionMaking, 13 AM. CiuM. L.
Rnv. 473 (1976); Sarah J. Cox, ProsecutorialDiscretion:An Overview, 13 AM. CnmM. L. REv. 383
(1976); Donald G. Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor'sChargingDecisiow Enforcing
an Ideal, 49 GEo. WAsH. L. Rlv. 659 (1981); Daniel J. Givelber, The Application of Equal
ProtectionPrinciplesto Selective Enforcement of the CriminalLaw, 1973 U. ILL. L.J. 88; James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981). But cf.
Philip J. Cardinale & Steven Feldman, The FederalCourts and the Right to Nondiscriminatory
Administration of the CriminalLaw: A Critical View, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 659, 660 (1978)
(contending that any right to claim discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement of the law is "unsound in theory, misguided in policy, and self-defeating in practice"); William T. Pizzi, Understanding ProsecutorialDiscretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal
Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 Omo ST. LJ. 1325 (1993) (contending that
prosecutorial discretion is necessary given the characteristics of the American criminal justice
system).
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Part Three discusses the Department of Justice's prosecutive
guidelines and present practice and demonstrates that Department
policy not only fails to give federal prosecutors sufficient guidance to
guarantee compliance with the equal protection rationality requirement, but that it also promotes selection for undesirable reasons. Part
Three then proposes amendments to the Department's prosecutive
guidelines to rectify these problems.
Part Four raises the possibility of limited judicial oversight of
charging decisions in the event the Department of Justice does not
amend its policy. It suggests that the reasons for judicial reluctance to
review charging decisions generally apply with less force when courts
need only assess the rationality of federal prosecutors' decisions to
select some eligible offenders for prosecution under federal statutes
that duplicate state criminal prohibitions.
I. FEDERALIZATION AND DISPARITY
A.

FEDERALIZATION 2 9

Participants in the federalization debate commonly define the
process as simply the enactment of federal legislation that allows prosecution in federal court of offenses that the states can also prosecute. 30
Although this definition gives a general sense of the process, it focuses
exclusively on Congress' role, ignoring essential judicial contributions.
Both Congress and the courts have played a substantial part in the
expansion of federal criminal law.
1. Legislative Involvement
Not all federal criminal legislation gives rise to federalization concerns. First, some federal criminal laws govern conduct beyond the
29. For historical accounts of federalization, see, for example, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
775-779 (1983) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]; Baker, supra note 3; Beale, supra
note 6, at 1278-82; Bradley, supra note 3, at 261; Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The
Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTNGS LJ. 1135, 1137-45 (1995); Maloney,
AND JUSTCE

supra note 3.

30. See, eg., Little, supranote 5, at 1030 n.2 (."Federalization of crime' is a term of art used
... to describe congressional legislation that provides for federal jurisdiction over criminal conduct that could also be prosecuted by state or local authorities."); Chippendale, supra note 3, at
455 n.1 (stating that "federalization refers to the creation of federal offenses for criminal acts
amenable to state and local prosecution").
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territorial reach of state laws." Second, the subject matter of some
federal criminal prohibitions does not concern the states. Federal
criminal statutes that outlaw treason, 2 conspiracies to defraud the
United States, 33 and efforts to obstruct justice in federal courts3 4 prohibit conduct that harms the nation or federal government exclusively 35 and thus safeguard distinct federal interests that state laws do
not address.3 6
Third, some federal statutes prohibit conduct that is the same as
or similar to that which state law proscribes but, by definition, protect
distinct federal interests. For example, federal law criminalizes assaults on federal agents "while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.

37

State criminal law may prohibit

assaultive conduct generally, but the federal government has a unique
interest in preventing and punishing assaults on its agents while they
are performing official duties. 38 State laws that do not distinguish between the harm caused by assaults on private citizens and the harm
caused by assaults on federal agents do not safeguard that distinct fed-

eral interest. When such interests are present, the federal government
31. The constitutional grant of congressional power "[t]o define and punish... Felonies
committed on the high Seas," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, and to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" involving certain federal property, id. cl. 17, have enabled Congress
to provide for federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed within the "special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1994), which sometimes extends
beyond the jurisdiction of individual states. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 734 F.2d 1322,
1325 (9th Cir. 1983) (exclusive federal jurisdiction over crime committed on federal military
base), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1996).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1996).
34. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1996) (jury-tampering in federal cases); § 1510 (obstruction
of federal investigation); § 1512 (witness-tampering in federal cases); and § 1513 (retaliation
against witnesses, victims, or informants in federal cases).
35. See Schwartz, supranote 1, at 66-67 (describing "self-defensive" federal crimes as promoting "[i]mportant values in terms of prestige of the central authority").
36. "Distinct" or "unique" federal interests differ from "important," "significant," or "substantial" federal interests. The former terms denote federal interests that are different than
those protected by state laws; the latter terms express the importance of a federal interest,
whether or not states share that interest.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (1996) describes the prohibited activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1996)
lists the federal officers and employees protected by the prohibition.
38. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 683-84 (1975) (federal statute criminalizing
assaults on federal officers does not require that assailant know that the victim is a federal officer
because Congress may have wanted to provide a federal forum regardless of assailant's knowledge of victim's identity). See also Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 1746 (noting that although
states can prosecute counterfeiting as larceny by trick, "the interest of the United States-to
protect its currency froT debasement-is independent of, and not the same as the state's interest-to protect persons from a species of criminal fraud").
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has good reason to apply its own substantive and procedural rules and
to control the prosecution in its own courts, even though a state forum
may be available. 39 Although enactment of this third category of federal criminal statutes arguably falls within the definition of federalization because these prohibitions overlap with state criminal laws,4"
even critics of federalization agree that cases involving distinct national1 or federal interests are properly the subject of federal criminal
4

law.

In contrast, many federal statutes duplicate state laws by prohibiting the same or similar conduct and enabling federal prosecutors to
bring charges to protect interests no different than those that state
laws address. Congress routinely enacts such "duplicative" federal
legislation.42 For example, it has passed laws that prohibit drug

39. State criminal law may fail to address the distinct harm suffered by the federal government or the nation as a whole. For example, state law may impose a punishment that the federal
government would deem insufficient to deter and punish harms to distinct federal interests. See
Feola,420 U.S. at 684 (asserting that federal prosecution of assaults on federal officers may be
important to "insure uniformly vigorous protection of federal personnel, including those engaged in locally unpopular activity"). In addition:
If genuinely national interests are at stake, the controversies should not have to compete with local breaches of the peace crowding the calendar of a county court of quarter sessions. The judge who determines these controversies should be able to give them
the time and consideration appropriate to matters of such gravity. He should be a
specialist in devising solutions that grow out of an understanding of national objectives
and a national point of view. The exigencies of the Department of Justice are also to be
considered. It is easier to prepare cases for eighty-four district courts, now operating
under uniform rules of criminal procedure, than to conduct proceedings in thousands of
courts operating under scores of procedural codes.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 67.
40. See Little, supranote 5, at 1072-73 (questioning why murder of President should not be
prosecuted in state court).
41. See LONG RANGE PLAN,supranote 28, at 21 (stating that "[n]o one seriously disputes
that conduct directly injurious to or affecting the federal government or its agents" should be the
subject of federal law enforcement); Little, supra note 5, at 1036 (noting that federal crimes that
protect unique federal interests "are not the topic of current federalization critiques").
42. I use the term "duplicative federal legislation" to signify federal criminal statutes that
(1) prohibit the same or similar conduct as state criminal laws and (2) are susceptible to use as a
means of protecting the same interests as state criminal laws. Professor Schwartz uses the term
"auxiliary federal criminal law" to mean roughly the same thing. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at
70-73. I prefer the term "duplicative" because Schwartz's terminology suggests that the function
of the overlapping federal law is to assist the states. As I explain later, use of duplicative federal
laws can, in fact, achieve the opposite effect. See infra notes 269-70 and accompanying text. I
refer to federal statutes that prohibit conduct beyond the territorial or substantive reach of state
criminal laws and those that by definition protect interests distinct from those protected by state
law as "nondupicative."
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trafficking, 43 firearms offenses," certain forms of theft and embezzlement,4 5 arson,46 fraud committed by mail or telephone, 47 bank fraud,'
robbery and extortion,4 9 fraudulent use of credit cards,50 and auto
theft,5 1 all of which are subject to prosecution in state courts. Recently, Congress has added statutes that prohibit carjacking 2 and domestic violence,5 3 both of which are also within the purview of state
law.5 4 Although some duplicative federal crimes require proof of elements not present in the definition of state crimes, such as a connection to interstate commerce 5 or use of the mail,5 6 I demonstrate that
these elements do not ensure that prosecutions are limited to cases
involving unique or significant federal interests.5 7 To be sure, federal
prosecutors do employ duplicative federal statutes in cases that involve distinct federal interests, such as prosecutions of national and
international fraud and drug conspiracies, but they also can (and often
do) use them when no such federal interests are at stake. 8 In short,
there is nothing in the definitions of duplicative federal crimes that
necessarily distinguishes conduct that will subject an offender to state
criminal charges from conduct which gives rise to analogous federal
charges.5 9
43. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1996).
44. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-924 (1996).
45. See id. § 659.
46. See id. §844.
47. See id. §§ 1341, 1343.
48. See id. § 1344.
49. See id. § 1951.
50. See id. § 1644(a).
51. See id. § 2312.
52. See id § 2119.
53. See id. § 2261.
54. For additonal examples of duplicative federal laws, see Beale, supra note 2, at 979-80;
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Honorable John Gleeson, The Federalizationof Organized Crime: Advantages of FederalProsecution,46 HASTNGs LJ. 1095, 1095-97 (1995).
55. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1996) (theft or embezzlement from interstate shipments); id.
§ 1951 (robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce).
56. See id. § 1341.
57. See infra Part I.A.2.b.
58. See infra Part III.C.
59. Congress also contributes to federalization in other ways. For example, in response to
perceived crime problems, it passes criminal statutes susceptible to broad interpretation that can
be used to prosecute conduct different than that which gave rise to the legislation. See eg.,
NORMAN ABRAms & SARA SuN BEALE, FEDrERAL CRIMINAL.LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 51

(2d ed. 1993); Baker, supra note 3, at 500 (discussing "broadly drafted" federal criminal statutes). This phenomena is illustrated by criminal laws passed in response to concerns about organized crime and racketeering but which do not contain language limiting their application to
those crime problems. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 894 (1996) (antiloansharking statute); id. § 1951
(robbery and extortion). Congress further contributes to federalization by enacting federal
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2. Judicial Involvement
The enactment of duplicative federal criminal legislation is only
one step in the process of federalization. The judiciary has also contributed. First, it has interpreted the Constitution, particularly the
Commerce Clause, to give Congress substantial latitude to enact federal criminal legislation. Second, it has broadly construed the jurisdictional elements of federal criminal statutes, allowing application of
federal criminal legislation despite the absence of distinct or substantial federal interests.
a. Constitutionalinterpretation:Perez to Lopez: Because Congress lacks a general police power,60 it must rely on its specifically
enumerated powers to enact federal criminal law.6 ' Most commonly,
it relies on its power to regulate interstate commerce. 62 Without judicial blessing of congressional use of these powers, federalization
cannot occur. Historically, courts have bestowed such blessings; they
have routinely upheld duplicative federal criminal laws.
Most notably, in Perez v. United States,63 the Supreme Court upheld a federal criminal antiloansharking law prohibiting collection of
extensions of credit by extortionate means.64 Although enacted under
the Commerce Clause power, the antiloansharking statute does not
crimes with principal elements that are satisfied by proof of violations of state laws. See, e.g., id.
§§ 1961-62 (federal racketeering statute proven in part by demonstrating "racketeering activity,"
which includes violations of state laws); id. §§ 1956, 1957 (federal money-laundering statutes
proven in part by demonstrating "specified unlawful activity," which includes violations of state
laws); id. § 1952 (Travel Act prohibits certain travel connected to "unlawful activity," which can
be demonstrated by violations of state law).
60. See United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
29, at 779.
61. See Cushman, supranote 3, at 291.
62. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 29, at 779 (citing commerce power, power to tax, and
postal power as those used to expand federal criminal jurisdiction); Landers, supra note 3, at
1259 (expansion of federal criminal law "has been fueled by the Commerce Clause").
63. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). See generally Stem, supra note 3.
64. Although the Supreme Court did not cite the specific statute at issue in Perez, the lower
court opinion made clear that the defendant had been prosecuted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 894
(1970). United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073, 1074 (2d Cir. 1970), affd, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
Section 894 states in part:
Whoever knowingly participates in any way, or conspires to do so, in the use of any
extortionate means (1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or (2) to
punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 891(7) defines "[a]n extortionate means [as] any means which involves the use, or an
express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person."
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require "that the conduct sought to be regulated have any connection
whatever with commerce. ' 65 Furthermore, there was no proof that
Perez's loansharking activity-the use of threats to extort increasingly
large interest payments from a butcher who had borrowed money
from him-had any connection to interstate commerce.66 Despite
this, the Perez Court concluded that the statute was a constitutional
exercise of the commerce power and could be used to prosecute Perez
because its enactment was supported by congressional findings that
loansharking in the aggregate affected interstate commerce. 67 After
Perez, federal criminal legislation, like other federal regulatory legislation, benefited from the Court's view that "[e]ven if a particular individual's activity has no perceptible interstate effect, it can be reached
by Congress through regulation of that class of activity in general as
long as that class, considered as a whole, affects interstate
commerce."
Perez was an open invitation to Congress to federalize criminal
law. It enabled Congress to extend federal criminal jurisdiction to any
criminal activity that Congress found to have an effect on interstate
commerce, even where such effect was purely a result of aggregated
instances of local activity.6 9 Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter in Perez, noted that the majority's rationale applies to "almost all criminal
activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the streets. '70 Relying on Perez, lower federal courts have upheld legislation that allows federal
prosecutions for drug trafficking7 ' and related offenses, 72 participation
in illegal gambling businesses, 73 and possession of a machine gun,74
without a requirement that the government prove any connection to
interstate commerce.75
65. Perez, 426 F.2d at 1083 (Hays, J., dissenting).
66. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 147-48.
67. See id. at 154-57.
68. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
69. After Perez, one observer noted that "constitutional constraints on the growth of federal criminal law through the Commerce Clause are almost nonexistent." Baker, supranote 3, at
501.
70. Perez, 402 U.S. at 158 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1996).
72. See, e.g., iL§ 856 (establishment of drug manufacturing operation); id. § 863(a)(1) (sale
of drug paraphernalia).
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1996).
74. See id. § 922(o).
75. See, eg., United States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d 1548, 1555-56 (10th Cir. 1995) (drug
paraphernalia); United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (possession of machine
gun); United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1990) (growing marijuana); United
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Although Perez suggested that Congress has almost unlimited
power to enact federal criminal legislation under the Commerce
Clause, United States v. Lopez7 6 recently gave notice that there are
limits. In Lopez, the Court assessed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q), a federal law criminalizing the possession of handguns near
schools. 7 7 The statute, like the law upheld in Perez, did not require
the government to prove "that the possession be connected in any way
to interstate commerce. ' 78 By a 5-4 vote the Court determined that
Congress exceeded the powers granted by the Commerce Clause
when it enacted the statute. 79
In Lopez, the Court made clear that Congress could regulate a
targeted activity only if it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.8 o Other than this clarification of Commerce Clause doctrine,
however, the Lopez Court did not question the validity of earlier decisions upholding federal regulations at the outer edges of the commerce power, such as the antiloansharking law in Perez. Rather, it
found that the challenged gun law was different. Unlike other federal
regulations that survived similar challenges, "[s]ection 922(q) is a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
States v. Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1972) (intrastate drug trafficking);
United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 653,657-58 (3d Cir. 1972) (gambling); United States v. Becker,
461 F.2d 230, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1972) (gambling);.
76. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). For a discussion of Lopez, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 M cm L. REv. 674 (1995).
77. Enacted as part of the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, the statute was codified at
18 U.S.C. § 922(q(1)(A) when Lopez committed the offense. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. The
statute provided that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." A "school
zone" was defined as the grounds of or within 1,000 feet of the grounds of a school. See 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(25). Violations of the statute were punishable by a prison term of up to five
years, to run consecutive to any other term of imprisonment, and a fine. See id. § 924(a)(4).
Despite the possible length of the sentence, violations were deemed to be misdemeanors. See id.
Congress later recodified the statute at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1996). See infra note 84.
78. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
79. "The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. We hold that the Act exceeds the
authority of Congress '[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States .. ."' Id. (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
80. "[A]dmittedly, our case law has not been clear whether an activity must 'affect' or
'substantially affect' interstate commerce in order to be within Congress' power to regulate it
under the Commerce Clause.... We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law,
that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects'
interstate commerce." Id. at 1630 (citations omitted). For different perspectives on the meaning
of "substantial" in this context, see Merritt, supra note 76, at 677-82.
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those terms."'" In addition, unlike other federal gun laws that the
Court had determined to be proper exercises of the Commerce Clause
power, 2 "§ 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects ... [or has] an explicit connection with... interstate
commerce."83 Finally, the majority noted that there were no findings
in either the legislation or its legislative history that gun possession
near schools affects interstate commerce.84 Much of the battle between the majority and dissenting opinions in Lopez is fought over the
persuasiveness of these efforts to distinguish earlier decisions.85
81. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. The Court distinguished the ban on guns near schools
from regulation of commercial activities such as intrastate coal mining, intrastate extortionate
credit transactions, discrimination against potential customers at restaurants and hotels, and production and consumption of home-grown wheat-all federal legislation that the Court has upheld. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
It is not readily apparent why growing and consuming wheat is any more an "economic" or
"commercial" activity than gun possession. In dissent, Justice Breyer questioned that distinction.
He also contended that neither the race-based exclusion prohibited by the regulation in McClungnor the use of force criminalized by the antiloansharking statute in Perez were commercial
activities. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. For example, in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), the Court tacitly concluded
that former 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (repealed 1986), which prohibited felons from "receiv[ing], possess[ing], or transport[ing] in commerce or affecting commerce. .. any firearm," was a proper
exercise of the commerce power.
83. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The Lopez Court also stressed that the definition and enforcement of criminal law is a function over which states exercise primary authority. See id. at
1631 n.3.
84. See id. at 1631-32. Conceding that absence of legislative findings alone is not fatal, the
Court nonetheless remarked that such findings "would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no
such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye ....
Id. at 1632. Congress later amended
the statute, adding such findings. See id. at 1632 nA. The findings are now codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1) (1996). In Lopez, the Court considered only the constitutionality of the prefindings
version of the statute. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4.
85. For example, Justice Souter criticized the commerciallnoncommercial distinction as
similar to the now discredited distinction between direct and indirect effects on commerce. See
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asking whether majority opinion "does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself
almost 60 years ago. The answer is not reassuring."). Justice Souter also contended that because
federal commerce power is plenary, it cannot diminish in force merely because it touches an
area, like criminal law, which is traditionally a state concern. See id. at 1655. He also argued
that under rational basis review, the presence of explicit legislative findings may be helpful to the
Court but their absence cannot affect the constitutionality of the statute. See id. at 1655-56.
Justice Breyer added that there is no "principled distinction" between "commercial" and "noncommercial" activities that enables the Court to distinguish Lopez from earlier decisions. Id. at
1663-64 (Breyer, 3., dissenting).
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Although the case has received considerable attention, 6 at present it appears that Lopez will have little impact on federalization of
criminal law.87 Lower courts have almost uniformly distinguished Lopez rather than applying it to invalidate criminal laws passed pursuant
to the Commerce Clause.88 Because many duplicative federal criminal statutes contain the sort of jurisdictional element requiring proof
of a connection to interstate commerce that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
lacked, 89 they will survive Lopez.90 Of the few Commerce Clausedependent federal statutes that do not have such a jurisdictional element, the federal drug trafficking prohibition of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
is the most significant. 91 It too will weather Lopez. 9 Unlike possession of a gun near a school, drug trafficking is inherently commercial,

86. The day after the Supreme Court decided Lopez, the New York Times, Los Angeles
Tunes, and Washington Post ran front page stories about the decision. See High Court Kills Law
Banning Guns in a School Zone, N.Y. TMSds, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al; Supreme Court Rejects Federal School Gun Ban, L.A. TmmS, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al ("ruling with broad implications for
constitutional law and with potentially far-reaching impact on domestic social policy"); Ban on
Guns Near Schools is Rejected, Congress Exceeds Commerce Power, High Court Holds, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al (quoting Professor Glenn Harland Reynolds: "This is quite possibly
the most important decision for the decade in how the country does business."). The Michigan
Law Review devoted a symposium to Lopez. See Symposium: Reflections on United States v.
Lopez, 94 MxIiH. L. REv. 533 (1995); see also Adam H. Kurland, FirstPrinciples of American
Federalismand the Nature of Federal CriminalJurisdiction,45 EMoRY L.J. 1 (1996).
87. See Judge Louis H. Pollak, Symposium: Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Foreword, 94 MIc. L. Rnv. 533, 553 (1995) (stating that "there is less in Lopez than meets the
eye.").
88. See, eg., United States v. Gomez, 87 F.3d 1093,1095 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Since Lopez,
defendants have brought numerous Commerce Clause challenges to federal criminal statutes,
most of which have not succeeded."); Merritt, supra note 76, at 712-28 (discussing lower court
opinions).
89. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1994) (prohibiting theft from or of interstate shipments); id.
§ 844(i) (criminalizing arson of real or personal property "used in" or "affecting" interstate commerce); id. § 922(g) (prohibiting felons and others persons in restricted class from shipping or
transporting firearms in interstate commerce, possessing firearms in or affecting interstate commerce, and receiving a firearm that was shipped or transported in interstate commerce); id.
§ 1343 (prohibiting fraud by use of "wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or
foreign commerce"); id. § 1951 (prohibiting obstructing or affecting "commerce" by robbery or
extortion). See also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "at least" 25
criminal sections of federal criminal statutes contain the words "affecting commerce"); Merritt,
supra note 73, at 696 (asserting that many federal statutes require the government to prove a link
to interstate commerce). Although some federal statutes require only that the criminalized activity "affect commerce," "commerce" is defined to include interstate commerce and to exclude
commerce that is wholly intrastate. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (1996).
90. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
91. Federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected Lopez-based challenges to the federal
drug trafficking statute. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing cases).
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a factor the Lopez Court deemed critical to its constitutional analysis. 93 Also, like the constitutionally valid statute in Perez, and unlike
the invalid provision in Lopez, section 841(a)(1) is buttressed by congressional findings that even local possession and distribution of drugs
94
"have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce."
Nor does Lopez appear to bar future enactment of duplicative
federal legislation. In this regard, perhaps the most significant aspect
of Lopez is what the Court did not do: It did not cast immediate
doubt upon the continuing vitality of Perez, but instead it strained to
harmonize its ruling with its earlier decisions. 95 Thus, as long as a
regulated activity can be characterized as "commercial" or Congress
includes a jurisdictional element requiring proof of a connection to
interstate commerce in its legislation, it seems likely that Congress can
continue to federalize criminal law.96 This is particularly so if Congress buttresses the legislation with findings that the prohibited activity, in the aggregate, has a detrimental impact on interstate
commerce. 97 Ultimately, Lopez may have less impact on constitutional Commerce Clause jurisprudence than on statutory
interpretation.
92. See e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained and Other
Lessons In Learningto Love the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. Rlv. 679,740 (stating that approximately 40% of federal criminal cases are drug cases); Franklin E. Zimring &
Gordon Hawkins, Toward a PrincipledBasis for FederalCriminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 15, 19 (1996) ("Drug control has become the dominant business of
federal criminal justice."). For a list of other federal statutes that Congress enacted pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, but which lack explicit jurisdictional elements, see supranotes 71-74 and
accompanying text.
93. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31.
94. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (1996).
95. Lopez repeatedly cites Perez and distinguishes the antiloansharking law from the ban
on guns near schools. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-31; see also Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause and Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two Thieves, 543 ANNA S AM. ACAD. PotL &
Soc. Sci. 27,37 (1996) (noting that Lopez "did not overrule a single [Supreme Court] commerce
clause decision").
96. I use the term "likely" because the Court did not make clear the extent to which the
Commerce Clause makes any single factor that it discusses in Lopez either necessary or sufficient. For a thorough discussion of factors that may have played a role in the Lopez decision and
a means of addressing their importance, see Merritt, supra note 76.
97. Of course, Lopez may be only the Court's initial assault on Congress' liberal use of the
Commerce Clause, foreshadowing more severe restrictions in the future. However, such a development is unlikely. A significant expansion of Lopez could jeopardize certain economic and
antidiscrimination statutes passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause that have become fixtures
in American society. See, eg., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1964 preventing racial discrimination by restaurants, motels, and other privately owned places of public accommodation); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (minimum wage and maximum hour
HeinOnline -- 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 661 1996-1997

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:643

b. Statutory interpretationof jurisdictionalelements: Because jurisdictional elements requiring proof of some connection to interstate
commerce are common in federal criminal laws98 and because Congress may seek to insulate future legislation from Lopez-inspired invalidation by including such elements,9 9 the way in which courts
interpret those elements is critical to federalization of criminal law.
Restrictive interpretation, requiring proof that the conduct in a particular case has a significant connection to interstate commerce, could
operate to limit application of federal statutes to cases involving distinct or substantial federal interests. Although the Supreme Court has
given jurisdictional elements some content, 100 both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have construed them so liberally that
the statutes in which they appear apply to cases in which there are no
distinct or substantial federal interests.
Consider, for example, a jurisdictional element that apparently
would have saved the gun law in Lopez, one "which might limit its
reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally [would]
have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." 01

regulations to protect employees). Justice Thomas seems to be the only member of the Court
inclined to take the narrow Commerce Clause path. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1650 n.8 (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("I might be willing to return to the original [more restrictive] understanding [of
the Commerce Clause].... ."). Two members of the majority, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor,
clearly are unwilling to do so. See id. at 1634,1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (characterizing the
holding in Lopez as "necessary though limited" and noting that Heart of Atlanta, McClung,
Perez, "and like authorities... are not called in question by our decision today"). The remaining justices who signed the majority opinion appear more intent on warning Congress about the
future than rethinking the past. "Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps
down [the] road [to a general federal police power].., but we decline here to proceed any
further." Id. at 1634. See also Brickey, supra note 95, at 37 (describing the Lopez opinion as
"judicial saber rattling").
98. See supra note 89.
99. Indeed, Congress recently enacted a criminal prohibition identical to the one that the
Court struck down in Lopez except for the inclusion of a jurisdictional element, requiring that
offenders possess "a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign
commerce...." 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1996). See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act, Pub. L No. 104-208, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009, 369-70 (1997).
100. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) (rejecting interpretation of the Travel
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which prohibits interstate travel in furtherance of certain criminal activity,
to allow conviction of operators of an illegal lottery merely because customers traveled from
outside of the state to place wagers); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (interpreting
former 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) to require proof of some interstate commerce connection in
prosecutions for receipt and possession of a firearm by restricted classes of persons).
101. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631.
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Section 922(g), a principal federal firearms law 1" which makes it illegal for certain classes of persons such as convicted felons to possess or
receive firearms or ammunition, contains such an element. 10 3 It prohibits possession of only those firearms or ammunition "in or affecting
commerce," and receipt if the firearm or ammunition "has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."1 4 Both
the Supreme Court and lower courts have interpreted the "in commerce" language to require only that the firearm or ammunition have
traveled in interstate commerce at any time before the defendant receives or possesses it.105 Thus, federal law criminalizes firearm possession by prohibited persons except in the unlikely event that the gun,
the ammunition, and the gunpowder 10 6 are all manufactured in and
have never left the state in which the defendant possesses them.
102. Section 922(g) is the result of a merger of its predecessors, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1202(a)(b) and 18 U.S.C. §922(d), (g)-(h). The predecessor statutes were similar but not identical in
coverage. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 341-42 (describing differences). In 1986, Congress repealed
§ 1202 and created § 922(g) in its present form as part of the Firearms Owners Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102(6)(D), 100 Stat. 449, 452 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-495 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1349. See United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 583 (5th
Cir. 1989) (describing history of § 922(g)). For a thorough discussion of the history of federal
firearms legislation, see United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1348-60 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995).
103. Section 922(g) also prohibits fugitives from justice, drug users and addicts, persons adjudged mentally defective or committed to mental institutions, illegal aliens, persons dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces, persons who have renounced citizenship, and persons
subject to certain restraining orders from shipping, transporting, and possessing firearms or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce. See id. § 922(g)(2)-(8).
104. Although the "possess" clause of § 922(g) refers only to "commerce," not "interstate
commerce," courts interpret that clause to require a connection between possession and interstate or foreign commerce. See Wallace, 889 F.2d at 583; United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492,
493 (1st Cir. 1988).
105. In dicta in Bass, 404 U.S. at 350, the Court interpreted language in a similar federal
firearms statute, former 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a), which precluded felons and others from receiving a firearm "in commerce or affecting commerce," to allow conviction "if [the prosecution]
demonstrates that the firearm received has previously traveled in interstate commerce." The
Court acknowledged that "[t]his is not the narrowest possible reading of the statute .... Id. at
350-51. In Scarboroughv. United States, 431 U.S. 563,575 (1977), the Court held that a defendant violates § 1202(a) by possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce at any
time before possession. The Court recognized that this requires only a "minimal nexus" between
the possession and interstate commerce. Id. at 577. In Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212
(1976), the Court held that the prosecution can prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), a predecessor to § 922(g), by demonstrating that the defendant purchased a firearm that had moved in
interstate commerce at any time before his purchase, even if the movement was simply from the
manufacturer to the dealer who later sold the firearm. Lower courts have followed that lead
when interpreting § 922(g). See, eg., United States v. Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d 143,146 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1992); Wallace, 889 F.2d at 583-84; United
States v. McCarty, 862 F.2d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 1988).
106. The definition of "ammunition" includes "propellent powder designed for use in any
firearm." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(17)(A) (1994).
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Although the "in commerce" jurisdictional element means something,
it doesn't mean much. 10 7 The distinction between those persons
whom the statute reaches and those who fortuitously escape coverage
has nothing to do with any discernible federal interest. 0 8
The same holds true for another commonly used federal jurisdictional element: the requirement that some aspect of the criminal activity affect interstate or foreign commerce. 10 9 Relying on the
Supreme Court opinions interpreting "affecting interstate or foreign
107. See Pollak, supranote 87, at 549-50 ("The Lopez opinion does not discuss how easy it is
to add the necessary 'jurisdictional element,"' which may be seen as a "lawyers' gimmick."). The
prosecution could have satisfied such a jurisdictional element in Lopez. The parties stipulated
that a federal agent would testify that the gun had been manufactured outside of Texas. See
Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368. Thus, although the Supreme Court was sufficiently troubled by the implications of a federal prosecution of Lopez that it determined for the first time in almost 60 years
that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause powers, apparently it would have affirmed the
conviction had Congress included the virtually meaningless requirement that the government
prove that the gun traveled across state lines at any time before Lopez possessed it. But see
Merritt, supra note 76, at 696 n.88 (contending that the "in commerce" requirement is a meaningful standard).
108. See United States v. Morales, 902 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1990) ("What the federal
interest is in punishing the possession of a firearm by a person convicted of Illinois felonies
escapes us .... ."); Brickey, supra note 95, at 30 ("In commerce" basis for exercise of federal
jurisdiction "enables the federal government to assert criminal jurisdiction over virtually any
state crime by tacking on marginally relevant jurisdictional elements."); Merritt, supra note 76,
at 717-18 (describing link to interstate commerce as "tenuous" and "weak").
109. See generally Maloney, supranote 3, at 1796 ("The Commerce Clause has become, in
recent years, the foundation for an expanding federal criminal jurisdiction over intrastate activities, on the theory that such activities 'affect interstate commerce."').
The Supreme Court has also been generous when construing the "mailing" element of 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1996), the federal mail fraud statute, which Congress enacted pursuant to the
postal power granted by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. The statute, which criminalizes "scheme[s]
devised or intending to defraud or for obtaining money or property by fraudulent means" requires proof of "use or causing the use of the mall in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme." See
§ 1341; Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud- Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. Ray. 223, 226 (1992). In
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989), the Court held that the "in furtherance"
component of the mailing requirement is satisfied if "the mailing is part of the execution of the
scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time .. " Thus, the Court determined that the
statute applied to the defendant's sale of automobiles to retail dealers after he had "rolled back"
the odometers because it was essential to the scheme that the defrauded dealers would mail title
application forms to the state Department of Transportation after they had purchased the
automobiles. See id. Thus, mailings initiated by the victims after they had been defrauded were
sufficient to satisfy the "mailing" requirement.
Writing for four members of the Court in dissent, Justice Scalia contended that the mail
fraud statute was not meant to create "a general federal remedy against fraudulent conduct, with
the use of the mails as the jurisdictional hook," id. at 722-23, implying that the majority had done
just that. One commentator agrees that the Schmuck Court "effectively has taken the crime well
beyond its post-office origin. The Court has provided prosecutors with a more accessible statute
to use for crimes involving fraud." See Podgor, supra, at 262-63.
For more on the development of the mail fraud statute and its role as one of the first federal
crimes to duplicate state criminal prohibitions, see Miner, FederalCourts,supra note 3, at 120-21;
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commerce" as an expression of congressional intent "to exercise its
full power under the Commerce Clause,"110 lower federal courts have
held that proof of even minimal or tangential effects on interstate
commerce are sufficient to satisfy this element' in cases involving
robbery," 2 bribery and extortion," 3 arson," 4 racketeering,1 5 and
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 65; Wallace, Road to Ruin, supra note 3. See generally Jed S. Rakoff,
The FederalMail Fraud Statute (Part1), 18 Duo. L. RPv. 771 (1980).
110. Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985). See also Scarborough, 431 U.S. at
572. In Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), the Court interpreted the language
"[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce" in the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951, to "manifest[ ] a purpose
to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce
by extortion, robbery or physical violence." Id. at 215 (emphasis added). Although the italicized
language does not appear in other federal statutes, the Court has reached the same conclusion
when Congress uses the words "affecting interstate or foreign commerce."
111. Under Lopez, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, Congress can regulate an
activity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers only if the activity, if aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See supranote 80 and accompanying text. However, when
considering whether the facts in a particularcase satisfy an "affecting commerce" jurisdictional
element in a federal criminal statute, lower federal courts seem satisfied with minimal, as opposed to "substantial," effects. See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text. Lopez has
prompted some lower courts to rethink such a generous view of the jurisdictional element. See
infra note 120 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486 (10th Cir. 1994) (robberies of gas stations, restaurants, and food stores for amounts as little as $160 sufficient for federal jurisdiction
because they deplete assets that may have been used in interstate commerce); United States v.
Brown, 959 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1992) (robbery of small tavern that purchased goods from distributors who in turn purchased them from out-of-state); United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198 (7th
Cir. 1983) (robbery of jewelry store in which $2,000 of the total amount taken was proven to
affect interstate commerce); United States v. Caldarazzo, 444 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1971) (robbery
of jewelry salesman who was carrying property of various businesses involved in interstate commerce). See also Merritt, supra note 76, at 725 ("Courts have readily concluded that extortion or
robbery affects commerce whenever it targets a business purchasing supplies from other states,
serving customers in other states, or otherwise operating in interstate commerce."). But see
United States v. Quigley, 53 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 1995) (robbery of money to be used to purchase
beer not sufficient to show effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95
(5th Cir. 1994), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 1986 (1995) (robbery in which defendant took personal
car that victim used to attend business meetings and from which victim made business-related
telephone calls not sufficient).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 383 (1995)
(state judge's agreement to accept a bribe from an attorney who was working with FBI sufficient
for federal jurisdiction because if the attorney had not been working with the government, the
bribe would have depleted the law firm's assets that could have been used to purchase goods in
interstate commerce); United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1993) (state judge's acceptance of bribe was sufficient under theory of "depletion of assets otherwise available for
interstate purchases"); United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1991) (extortion threat
regarding disclosure of marital infidelity was sufficient because the defendant threatened to tell
the victim's employer who was engaged in interstate commerce); United States v. Frasch, 818
F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1987) (extortion from off-track betting parlor set up as government sting operation was sufficient because government operation purchased goods in interstate commerce);
United States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1983) (sheriff's extortion from deputy sheriffs was
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other criminal activity.1 1 6 As the Sixth Circuit noted in conjunction
with 18 U.S.C. § 1951, a federal statute with an "affecting commerce"
requirement: "Given the Hobbs Act's undeniably broad reach, the
sufficient because the victims were receiving federal funding); United States v. Price, 617 F.2d
455 (7th Cir. 1979) (extortion from a contractor was sufficient because he purchased copper wire
that had moved in interstate commerce).
114. See, e.g., Russell, 471 U.S. at 858 (arson of vacant rental property sufficient for federal
jurisdiction); United States v. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793
(1995) (closed commercial property that had received utility services from out-of-state company
sufficient); United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223 (7th Cir. 1994) (residence used for business
sufficient); United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994) (mobile home that received
electricity from interstate power grid sufficient); United States v. Tamer, 995 F.2d 1357 (6th Cit.
1993) (vacant rental property sufficient); United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1991)
(arson of residential property and vehicle sufficient due to minimal ties to victim's business);
United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1990) (residential property heated by out-ofstate natural gas sufficient); United States v. Medeiros, 897 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1990) (commercial
site used for law enforcement sting operation sufficient); United States v. Mayberry, 896 F.2d
1117 (8th Cir. 1990) (temporarily closed sawmill sufficient); United States V.Doby, 872 F.2d 779
(7th Cir. 1989) (residence containing rental unit sufficient); United States v. Shriver, 838 F.2d
980 (8th Cir. 1988) (bar closed due to earlier firebombing sufficient); United States v. Grossman,
608 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1979) (backhoe that had previously moved in interstate commerce and was
financed and insured by out-of-state companies sufficient); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198
(7th Cir. 1977) (local tavern sufficient).
Before the Supreme Court decided Russell, some courts gave the arson statute a more restricted reading. See United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107 (2d Cit. 1981) (no federal jurisdiction over arson of residential property); United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir.
1979) (no federal jurisdiction over firebombing of state judge's car). Post-Russell cases have
questioned whether those earlier decisions survive. See e.g., Shively, 927 F.2d at 808; Stillvell,
900 F.2d at 1107. But see United States v. Voss, 787 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1986) (post-Russell case
finding no federal jurisdiction over residential arson despite insurance coverage from out-ofstate company).
Some courts have concluded that Lopez requires a narrower view of the jurisdictional requirement in the federal arson statute. See infra note 120.
115. See e.g., United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir. 1988) (interstate telephone calls by prostitution ring to get credit card approval sufficient for federal jurisdiction even
though FBI operated credit card company); United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.
1981) (minimal effect on interstate commerce sufficient); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224,
233 (2d Cit. 1981) (asserting that the RICO statute "has an even more expansive jurisdictional
predicate than does" the federal arson statute).
116. See, eg., United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 670-72 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting requirement of substantial effect on interstate commerce for purposes of federal product-tampering
prosecution). See also United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538
(1996) (victim's use of ATM machine to obtain money to pay police officer to avoid arrest satisfied Travel Act requirement that facility in interstate commerce be used to facilitate extortion
even though transaction triggered an intrastate transfer of funds). In United States v. Grey, 56
F.3d 1219, 1223-26 (10th Cir. 1995), the court acknowledged that a minimal effect on interstate
commerce is sufficient to satisfy the "affecting interstate commerce" element of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956, the federal money-laundering statute, but found the evidence insufficient to meet that
low standard. In cases involving attempts to violate federal law, the mere "realistic probability"
of an effect on interstate commerce is sufficient for federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Shields, 999
F.2d at 1098; United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (6th Cir. 1990).
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United States could in theory prosecute virtually every would-be
thief... no matter how trivial the amount at issue."" 7 That comment
aptly characterizes the insignificance of such jurisdictional elements.
It is with regard to interpretation of such elements that Lopez
may have its most pronounced impact." 8 Lopez held that in order for
Congress to be able to regulate an activity by use of its Commerce
Clause power, the activity must "substantially effect" interstate commerce. 1 9 Because "affecting commerce" jurisdictional elements express the outer reach of congressional Commerce -Clause power,
courts may determine that the government must prove that the alleged criminal activity in individual cases has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce in order to satisfy such jurisdictional elements. 20
This would constitute a significant change in existing doctrine, precluding the federal government from using proof of a minimal affect
on interstate commerce as a jurisdictional hook to support federal
prosecution.
21
Nonetheless, Lopez is far from an antidote for federalization.'
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, it most likely leaves untouched existing and future duplicative federal statutes that either include jurisdictional elements or pertain to activity that can be
characterized as "commercial." Even if it does lead to narrower statutory interpretation of "affecting commerce" jurisdictional elements,
Lopez will not serve as a limit in three of the most significant areas of

117. United States v. Brown, 959 F.2d 63, 68 (6th Cir. 1992).
118. See Merritt, supra note 76, at 727-28.
119. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995).
120. See United States v. Gomez, 87 F.3d 1093, 1094-96 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522,524-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (Lopez requires proof of substantial impact
on interstate commerce in arson case). See also United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir.
1996) (per curiam) (same). But see United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 1996) (Lopez
not applicable to federal arson statute because arson statute has a jurisdictional element);
United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 383 (1995) ("The
[Lopez] Court did not call into question the Hobbs Act which-unlike the school gun ban-is
aimed at a type of economic activity, extortion, and contains an express jurisdictional element.
Nor did the Lopez decision undermine this Court's precedents that minimal potential effect on
[interstate] commerce is all that need be proven to support a conviction."); United States v.
Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1995) (post-Lopez decision holding that proof of minimal
effect sufficient under money-laundering statute).
121. But see Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism,Federalization,and the Politicsof Crime, 98 W.
VA. L. REv. 789, 809 (1996) ("Lopez could be profound in breaking, and even reversing, the
overfederalization of criminal law.").
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overlapping federal jurisdiction: drug, gun, and fraud cases." The
principal federal drug statute has no jurisdictional element for courts
to construe more narrowly.'3 The principal federal firearms statute,
18 U.S.C. §922(g), allows for federal prosecution when the firearm has
moved in interstate commerce without proof of any effect on interstate commerce 2 4 Similarly, none of the principal duplicative fraud
statutes require proof of an effect on interstate commerce.12 5
B. DisPARA-m TREATmENT

Although the substance of federal criminal law has come to duplicate much of state criminal law, the procedures that apply and the
sentences that convicted defendants receive and serve in the federal
criminal justice system are often far different than those encountered
in state courts. Notwithstanding some significant exceptions, 26 defendants typically fare considerably worse when prosecuted in federal
court. In fact, differences between federal and state law that favor
federal prosecutions are most striking in cases involving frequently
charged duplicative federal statutes, like drug and firearms prosecutions. As a result, the disparity between federal and state prosecution
122. See Little, supranote 5, at 1043-46 (contending that much of the concern with federalization involves an increase in federal gun and drug prosecutions); Bowman, supranote 92, at 733
& n.190 (fraud and drug cases make up over half of federal cases).
123. See 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (1996).
124. The Court recognizes "three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate
under its commerce power- . . . use of the channels of interstate commerce[,] ...the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce ....[and] activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (citations
omitted). Lopez applies only to statutes that regulate the third category of activity. See id.at
1630. In a case decided less than a week after Lopez, the Court clearly held that even if there is
insufficient evidence that the criminal activity satisfies an "affecting commerce" requirement in a
federal statute, sufficient proof to satisfy a statutorily defined "alternate criterion" for federal
jurisdiction can sustain a conviction. See United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733
(1995) (per curiam). Because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1996) allows for conviction if the gun has
moved in interstate commerce, see supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text, Lopez is likely to
have little if any effect on its application. See Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d at 527-28 (proof that the
gun is an article or good in commerce is sufficient); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462
n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).
125. The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1996), is based primarily on the postal power.
The only exception is its application to mailings conducted by private companies, such as the
United Parcel Service, that do business in interstate commerce. See id.The wire fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1996), requires only that the fraud be "transmit[ted] or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce,"
whether or not there is any effect on interstate commerce. The bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (1996), does not require proof of any connection to interstate commerce.
126. See infra note 128.
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is a hallmark of federalization. Without attempting to provide an exhaustive list,127 I will describe five ways in which defendants
receive
1 28
less favorable treatment in federal court than state court.
First, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 is more likely to result
in pretrial detention without bail than state law.-29 Unlike some state
statutes, federal law allows detention based solely on a prediction of
dangerousness. 30 In addition, unlike state laws, federal law imposes a
rebuttable presumption that defendants charged with most federal
drug felonies and some firearms offenses should be detained without
127. For additional examples, see Beale, supranote, 2 at 997 & n.70 (discussing "procedural
rights related to joinder, severance, and pretrial discovery"); Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 54,
at 1103-1125 (describing admissibility of accomplice testimony, investigative powers of federal
grand jury, and ability to use harsh sentences as means of obtaining cooperation).
128. This comparison is subject to two objections. First, one might question why there
should be concern for those prosecuted in federal court even if there is a difference between
treatment that works to the disadvantage of federally prosecuted defendants. That is, it is possible to consider federal prosecution to be the "norm" and to conclude that those who escape
federal prosecution are simply lucky. I reject this contention because both historically, see, eg.,
Brickey, supranote 29, at 1172 ("The original role of federal criminal law was auxiliary to that of
the states."), and numerically, see infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text, state prosecution
is the "norm." Second, a critic could correctly note that in some critical areas, like jury size and
nonunanimity, defense discovery obligations, and sentencing of recidivist felons, state law is less
favorable to criminal defendants than federal law. Perhaps the most noteworthy example is
California's "three-strikes-and-you're-out" statute, requiring draconian sentences for recidivist
felons. If so, why focus on the disadvantages of federal law? My principal reason for doing so is
that federal prosecutors, who typically have more freedom to select a few defendants for prosecution than do their state counterparts, see infra Part II.C., can exploit those differences when
choosing which offenders to prosecute in federal court. If federal law is advantageous, they can
prosecute the case; if not, they can have the state prosecute the case.
129. The federal law is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§3142-3156 (1996).
130. The federal bail statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1996), requires pretrial detention if, after
a hearing, a judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release "will reasonably assure...
the safety of any other person and the community." Although many state bail laws do allow
consideration of future dangerousness, some do not allow consideration of that factor. Cf.YALE
KAmnsAR,WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERALD H. ISRAEL,MODERN CRIMINAL PRocErnDU 877 (8th
ed. 1994) (reporting that "most [states] permit some consideration of the defendant's dangerousness in the pretrial release determination"). See also BARBARA GoTrLEB, PuBLiC DANGER AS
A FACTOR IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS (1985); Michael
W. Youtt, Note, The Effect of Salerno v. United States on the Use of State Preventive Detention
Legislation:A New Definitionof Due Process,22 GA. L. REv. 805,810-811 (1988). Some of the
states that do allow consideration of dangerousness require that the defendant first have a prior
conviction or be on pretrial release, probation, or parole at the time of the subject offense. See
id.at 811-12. Federal law contains no such restriction.
Of course, in those states that do not have statutes that specifically allow pretrial detention
based on a finding of dangerousness, judges may nonetheless consider dangerousness when setting bail. See CHARLES H. WmTEBREAD & CMUSToPERn SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§20.03 (3d ed. 1993); Thomas E. Scott, PretrialDetention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 27 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1, 7 (1989) (discussing judges setting high bails for
dangerous felons and recidivists as a method of achieving "sub rosa detention").
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bail as both dangers to the community and flight risks. 131 These differences likely account, in part, for the fact that in 1992, approximately
fifty percent of federal drug trafficking defendants were detained or
unable to post bail pending disposition of their cases 132 compared to
thirty-five percent of drug trafficking defendants charged in state
courts in the seventy-five largest counties. 33 The increased likelihood
of pretrial incarceration in federal court is significant for a variety of
reasons other than the loss of liberty. It can hamper efforts to prepare
for trial and may cause a defendant to serve most or all of his sentence
without being found guilty." 4
Second, federal law often gives defendants less access to pretrial
discovery than does state law.' 3 5 The law governing disclosure of witness statements is a telling example. Under the federal Jencks Act,
the prosecution need only disclose existing verbatim, substantially verbatim, or adopted statements of those witnesses who actually testify at
trial and need not do so until after the witness has testified on direct
examination. 6 In noncapital cases, the defendant has no right to a
131. Section 3142(e) states that "it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the
community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person"
committed a drug trafficking crime carrying a maximum sentence of 10 years or more or a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a federal statute criminalizing the use or carrying of a firearm during a
crime of violence or drug trafficking offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1996). Unless rebutted,
the presumption requires detention. See id. Almost all federal drug trafficking crimes carry
maximum sentences of 10 or more years, thus triggering the rebuttable presumption. See 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 960 (1996).
State statutes do not contain such presumptions. See KAMIsAR ET AL., supra note 130, at
877 (noting that "only a few states have adopted.., a full.scale preventive detention scheme"
like the federal government).
132.

See OFFICE OF JusrncE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsricm, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-

NAL JusncE STATISTICS 1995, at 460 tbl.5.11 (1995) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]. Of these defendants, 41% were detained; 9.3% were unable to post bail. See id.
133. See id. at 511, tbl. 5.65. Of these defendants, 5% were detained; 30% could not post
bail. See id The differences in federal and state law may not be the only explanation for the
higher detention rate in federal court, however. The severity of offenses committed and
problems of overcrowding in state pretrial detention facilities may also play a role in the
disparity.
134. For a discussion of the various costs to the accused of pretrial detention, see Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972); S-EPmEN A. SALTZBURG & DANmL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN
CRIMIAL PROCEDURE 728-29 (5th ed. 1996).
135. See K~misAR ErAL., supra note 130, at 1234 (describing the "ABA Model" adopted by
some states that is "considerably broader" than the "Federal Model" with respect to defense
discovery).
136. The Jencks Act, which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and Rule 262 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows discovery of witness statements only after a witness has
testified on direct examination. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b); FED. R. Crit. P. 26.2(a). The Act also
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witness list before trial.' 37 Even if the defendant can identify potential
government witnesses, the witnesses have no obligation to give interviews. 138 In marked contrast, some states allow the defense
to take
1 39
pretrial depositions of potential prosecution witnesses.
Third, federal law often provides defendants with fewer opportunities for suppression of evidence as a result of constitutional violations than does state law. While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
have interpreted constitutional doctrines requiring suppression of evidence narrowly,' 40 numerous state courts have construed their constitutions more broadly, conferring rights that the Supreme Court does
not recognize and requiring suppression where the Supreme Court
does not.141 For example, various state doctrines are more favorable
to defendants concerning what constitutes a "seizure"; 142 whether a

employs
adopted
137.
138.
139.

a definition of "statement" that includes only verbatim, substantially verbatim, and
statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1996); FED. R. CGRM. P. 26.2(0.
See, eg., United States v. Sukumolochan, 610 F2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1980).
See, eg., United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985).
See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 15(a) (Michie 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3.220(d) (West
1973); IND. CODE ANN. §35-37-4-3 (Michie 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. R. CRIM. P. §15(a) (1983)
(allowing witness depositions as a matter of right in felony cases). See generally K.sssAR Er
AI., supra note 130, at 1235; John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions in FloridaCriminalProceedings: Should They Survive?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 675 (1988).
140. For a discussion of the development of these doctrines, see Carol S. Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MicH. L.
Rnv. 2466 (1996).
141. See generally NErL Couvmm & CATHER-mN G NErm, STATE CONSTrrToNAL CRiMNAL PROCEDURE (1994); BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1991); Kenneth J. Melilli, Exclusion of Evidence in FederalProsecutionson the Basis of State
Law, 22 GA. L. REv. 667 (1988); Tom Quigley, Comment, Do Silver Platters Have a Place in
State-FederalRelations? Usingillegally Obtained Evidence in CriminalProsecutions,20 ARm. ST.
LJ. 285 (1988).
142. Compare California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (no seizure when police officer
simply shows authority to which defendant does not respond), with State v. Oquendo, 613 A2d
1300 (Conn. 1992) (seizure occurs when police make a show of authority that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that he is not free to leave). Compare Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429 (1991) (no suspicion needed when police ask defendant for consent to search bag as long as
manner of questioning does not suggest lack of choice), with People v. Hollman, 581 N.E. 2d 204
(N.Y. 1992) (intrusive questioning that indicates suspicion of wrongdoing requires some articulable basis), State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358 (Haw. 1992) (same), and Commonwealth v. Matos, 672
A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996) (same).
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defendant has "standing" to object to a search or seizure;143 the determination of whether there is "probable cause"; 144 the existence of a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule; 45 whether there is
"consent" to conduct a warrantless search; 46 whether a warrant is
48
needed to search automobiles, 47 containers found in automobiles,
and trash; 14 9 inventory searches;' 50 electronic monitoring by under-

cover agents and informants;' 5 ' use of pen registers;

52

use of dog

143. Compare Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (requiring a legitimate expectation of
privacy to challenge search), and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), with Commonwealth
v. Frazier, 571 N.E.2d 1356 (Mass. 1991) (defendant has standing if possession is essential to
charges), and Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983) (granting automatic standing if
defendant has ownership or possession of seized property). See generally David A. Macdonald,
Jr., Comment, Standingto Challenge Searchesand Seizures: A Small Group of States Chart Their
Own Course, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 559 (1990).
144. CompareIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (allowing assessment of informant information by consideration of "totality of circumstances"), with People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d
409 (N.Y. 1988) (requiring that information satisfy two-pronged "Aguilar-Spenelli" test), State v.
Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989) (same), State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985) (same),
and State v. Jackson, P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984) (same).
145. Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (recognizing good faith exception
when police rely on warrant), with State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N. J. 1987) (refusing to
recognize good faith exception), and State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993) (same).
146. Compare Schnecklothe v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search considered valid even if subject does not know of right to refuse consent), with State v. Johnson, 346
A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) (requiring knowledge of right to refuse consent).
147. Compare Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of automobile
at police station not a Fourth Amendment violation), with State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I.
1980) (police need warrant to search car at police station). Compare New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981) (after arrest, police can search entire passenger compartment of arrestee's vehicle), with Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995) (requiring actual exigency before
allowing passenger compartment search following arrest).
148. Compare California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (no warrant needed to search
container in car when police have probable cause to search container), and United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (no warrant needed to search container found in car when police have
probable cause to search car), with State v. Savva, 616 A.2d 774 (Vt. 1991) (warrant required to
search containers found in cars).
149. Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (trash not protected by Fourth
Amendment), with State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990) (warrant required to search garbage), State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 1985) (warrant required to search or seize garbage),
and State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996) (warrant required for trash search).
150. Compare Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (police not required to use less intrusive means of safeguarding property before conducting an inventory search), with State v.
Perham 814 P.2d 914 (Haw. 1991) (state must show that inventory search is least intrusive
means). Compare South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of closed
console in car towed for parking violations constitutional), with State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1976) (inventory search of car unreasonable).
151. Compare United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion) (no Fourth
Amendment violation if undercover operative secretly records or transmits conversation with
target of investigation without judicial approval), with Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029
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sniffs;153 and whether there is a "plain touch" exception to the probably cause requirement.154 Similarly, some states have stricter doctrines governing the admissibility of statements that criminal suspects
make to police.155 Because federal suppression doctrine governs in
federal court-even when state or local police acquire evidence in violation of state but not federal law' 5 6 -these differences and others
provide opportunities for suppression in state courts that are not
available in federal court. 57 Like variations between state and federal pretrial release and detention law, these differences are prone to
surface in prosecutions involving drugs and guns. Investigations into
drug and firearms offenses frequently involve techniques, such as
searches and seizures and use of electronic monitoring devices, that
provide opportunities for motions to suppress.1 58
(Mass. 1987) (surreptitious electronic recording or transmission requires warrant), and People v.
Beavers, 227 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1975) (same).
152. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of pen register not a search and
does not require judicial approval), with People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (en
banc) (requires probable cause and warrant), State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162 (Idaho 1988)
(use of pen register is a search), Richardson v. Texas, 865 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. CL App. 1993) (use
of pen register may be a search), and State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986) (en bane) (pen
register use requires warrant).
153. Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (dog sniff of luggage in public
place not a "search"), with People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990) (dog sniff requires
reasonable suspicion), and Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987) (same).
154. Compare Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (police officer conducting patdown can seize nonthreatening object he feels in defendant's pocket and believes to be contraband), with People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting "plain touch" exception as a
matter of state law).
155. See, e.g., State v. Vernon, 385 So. 2d 200 (La. 1980) (prosecution must prove voluntariness of statement to police beyond a reasonable doubt, not by preponderance of evidence, as is
case in federal court); State v. Miller, 388 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1978) (same); People v. Pinzon, 377
N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1978) (unlike federal law, statement not admissible if taken after attorney
attempted to speak with client in custody and requested that questioning stop); State v. Isom,
761 P.2d 524 (Or. 1988) (unlike federal rule, statement taken after invocation of Mirandarights
not admissible to impeach).
156. See United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). See also
United States v.Fossler, 597 F.2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1979) (evidence admissible in federal
prosecution despite earlier suppression in state proceeding).
157. See, eg., United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1992) (defendant alleged
that he lost benefit of more stringent wiretapping protections when prosecuted in federal court);
United States v. Allen, 954 F2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1992) (stricter state search and seizure law not
applicable in federal court); United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1980) (evidence
suppressed in earlier state prosecution admissible under federal law).
158. See KAhiSAR Er AL., supra note 130, at 31 ("In narcotics cases... motions to suppress
are quite common."); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited,
1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 223,228 (author's study revealed that "motions to suppress physical evidence
are most likely to be raised in drug cases").
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Fourth, several aspects of federal sentencing law make federal
prosecution less favorable to defendants. Although there are significant variations in state sentencing schemes, some generalizations are

possible. Federal law often allows greater maximum sentences for

drug trafficking. 159 In addition, some federal laws, most notably those
dealing with drug trafficking and weapons offenses, require imposition
of harsh statutory mandatory minimum sentences1 60 which can be as
long or longer than the maximum sentences permitted under some
state laws. 161 Federal law permits execution of offenders who commit
certain crimes in states that do not authorize a death penalty for
analogous offenses. 162 The federal sentencing guidelines also require
that judges increase sentences, often dramatically, based upon proof
that the defendant engaged in uncharged relevant conduct.' 63 Evidence of that uncharged conduct may come in the form of hearsay and
without many of the procedural protections available at trial.164 Finally, the federal sentencing guidelines constrict sentencing judges'

159. See OFmcE OF JUSTIcE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, DRuGs, CRIME, AND TH
JusrIcE SYsrMF: A NATIONAL REPORT 179-180 (1992) [hereinafter DRuos AND CRME] (listing

maximum sentences for drug offenses in state and federal courts).
160. See, ag., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1996) (requiring mandatory consecutive sentences from
5 to 30 years for various firearms violations); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1996) (requiring mandatory
sentences from 5 years to life for drug trafficking offenses). Many states do not have mandatory
minimum sentencing laws. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, COCANE AN FEDERAL SENTErNc.
ING POLICY 136-37 tbl.4 (1995) [hereinafter CoCANE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY].
161. Federal law generally requires a minimum ten-year term of imprisonment for first-time
offenders who possess a certain quantity of drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). But cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f) (1996) (establishing a limited "safety valve" allowing first-time offenders who attempt
to cooperate with the government to avoid the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences).
In contrast, some states have maximum sentences shorter than ten years. See DRuGS AND
CRuE, supra note 159, at 179-80.
162. See Brickey, supra note 29, at 1166-67.
163. For example, U.S. SENTENCIrCN GuIDELNm MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2) (1995), defines
"relevant conduct" to include acts committed by the defendant or co-conspirators "that were
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
Such "relevant conduct" increases the "offense level" used to determine the defendant's sentence in the same manner as conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. Id.
§ 1B1.3(a). See also Bowman, supranote 92, at 702-04 (explaining relevant conduct provisions).
The federal guidelines sometimes require federal courts to increase defendants' sentences based
on conduct that resulted in acquittal. See United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997).
164. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28
AM. Cium. L. REv. 161,208-220 (1991); Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifur-

cated Fact-FindingUnderthe FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S.
CAL. L. Rnv. 289, 289-92 (1992). Unlike federal law, numerous states have guidelines systems
that "reject routine sentence enhancements based on unconvicted, 'real-offense' factors." Rich-

ard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and FederalReformers, 6 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 123 (1993).
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ability to consider certain types of mitigating evidence. 165 Although
some states have also adopted guideline regimes, they provide significantly more flexibility than the federal system and have less severe
results. 66
Fifth, defendants frequently serve a greater portion of the
sentences imposed in federal court. Under federal law, there is no
parole eligibility. Even with full credit for good behavior in prison, a
federally prosecuted defendant must serve eighty-five percent of the
sentence imposed. 167 In contrast, as a result of parole eligibility and
good time credit, inmates sentenced to state prisons in 1992 will serve
only thirty-eight percent of the sentences imposed. 68 State defendants imprisoned for drug trafficking will serve only a third of their
sentences.69
I.

FEDERAL PROSECUTORS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Federal prosecutors are the footsoldiers of federalization. Armed
with congressionally created and judicially blessed duplicative criminal statutes, they bring charges in numerous cases that could be prosecuted in state courts.' 7 0 For example, of the defendants whose federal
cases terminated in acquittals, convictions, or dismissals in i994, 9228
See U.S. SENTENCING GunELnqES MANuAL §§ 5H1.1-5H1.12 (1995).
166. See Frase, supra note 164, at 123-24.
167. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1996), a defendant may reduce his sentence by 54 days per
year by complying with institutional regulations.
165.

168.

PATRICK A. LANGAN & HELEN A. GRATziADEx, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsncE, FELOrn,

SENTENCEs IN STATE CouRTs, 1992, BUREAU OF JusncE STATISTICS BuLLE IN 4 tblA (1995).
Thirty states retain indeterminate sentencing schemes that allow for early release on parole. See
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POUCY, supra note 160, 136-37 tbl. 4. Congress has en-

couraged states to impose longer sentences on defendants convicted of certain violent offenses
and to require that such defendants serve a larger portion of their sentences by linking the availability of federal grants for prison construction to state enactment of harsher sentencing regimes.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-13704 (1994).
169. See LANGAN & GRA:zmDBi, supra note 168, at 4 tbl.4 (34% of sentence imposed). See
also COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING Poucy, supra note 160, at 143 ("[A]ecording to the

Department of Justice, state courts in 1988 sentenced drug traffickers to an average maximum
sentence of 66 months in prison. Of the maximum 66 months, the Department of Justice Bureau
of Statistics estimated that, on average, 20 months, or roughly 30 percent, were actually
served.").
170. In 1980, after studying the charging practices of the United States Attorney's Office for
the Northern District of Illinois, Professor Frase concluded that "[flederal prosecutors appear to
give as much or more attention to offenses that are also prosecutable, at least in theory, by state
and local prosecutors" as they do to "crimes with no direct state counterpart." Richard S. Frase,
The Decisionto File FederalCriminalCharges:A QuantitativeStudy of ProsecutorialDiscretion,
47 U. Cm. L. REv. 246, 285 (1980). See also Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 54, at 1098 ("It
follows that the federalization of crime is increasingly in the hands of the prosecutors .. ")
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were charged with violations of the principal federal drug trafficking
statute,171 3911 were charged with violations of federal firearms
laws, 172 and 3281 were charged under federal mail, wire, and bank
fraud1 73 statutes.1 74 These statutes duplicate the coverage of state
drug, firearms, and theft laws. Although prosecution under duplicative federal statutes constitutes a substantial portion of federal prosecutors' caseloads,175 most offenders who are eligible for both federal
and state prosecution are charged in state court.1 76 Indeed, federal
prosecutors lack the resources to bring charges in more than a small
percentage of such cases.1 77

As a result of the disparity between state and federal procedural
and sentencing regimes, much is at stake when federal prosecutors determine which offenders to charge in federal court. Federal prosecutors' selection decisions are made more significant by the high
conviction rate in federal court178 and the rigid determinative federal
(1996); Merritt, supra note 76, at 708 ("Overlapping state and federal offenses give federal prosecutors unfettered power to decide which defendants will be prosecuted under federal law and
which will be left to state law.").
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1996).
172. See hi §§ 922, 924; 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1996).
173. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 (1996).
174. These figures are based on information from the Executive Office of United States
Attorneys obtained as a result of Freedom of Information Act Request Number 95-2125 (on file
with the author).
175. See supra note 122.
176. See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 4, at 973 (stating that the Department of Justice
prosecutes "only a small percentage of conduct falling under federal criminal legislation"). For
example, of all felony convictions in 1992, 12.8% of defendants charged with weapons offenses,
9.3% charged with drug trafficking, and 20.4% charged with fraud were prosecuted in federal
court. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 132, at 497 tbl.5.45.
177. In 1994, there were 4099 federal prosecutors, see U.S. SENENaiNo CoWN'N ANNUAL
REPORT app. B (1994), hardly a sufficient number to handle the more than one million felony
cases in state courts. See BRLAN J.OsTRoM & NEAL B. KAUDER, ExAMIsm-o THE WORK OF
STATE CoURTs 45 (1995) (providing graph showing felony cases filed in 1993 in general jurisdiction courts in 32 states). In contrast, in 1994, there were 2343 chief prosecutors and 22,278
assistant prosecutors handling cases in state and local courts. See CAROL J.DEFRANCES,
STEvEN K. SMrrH & LoUIsE VAN DER DoEs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE
CotTs, 1994 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcS BULUETmJ 12-13 app. 1, 2 (1996). See also Dennis

E. Curtis, The Effect of Federalizationon the Defense Function,543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. Pot. &
Soc. Sci. 85, 88 (1996) (stating that "federal prosecutors can bring only a small percentage of
criminal cases in any given area of criminal enforcement").
178. According to the Administrative Office of United States Courts, of those federally
prosecuted criminal defendants whose cases were disposed of in the 12-month period ending
September 30, 1994, over 83% were convicted by guilty plea or trial. See L. RALPH MECHAM,
JUDICIAL BushNEss OF THE UNrr=D STATES COURTs: REPORT OF Ta DnEcroR, A-78 tbl.D-4

(1994). See also 1995 SouRcEnoo, supra note 132, at 478-79 tbl.5.29 (approximately 85% of
federal cases disposed in 1995 resulted in convictions).
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sentencing rules. 179 Because of the relative certainty of conviction
and harsher sentencing, from an offender's perspective, the federal
prosecutor's decision to bring federal charges may be the single most
important decision that any actor in the criminal justice system
makes. 8 0 Defendants chosen for federal prosecution bear the brunt
of federalization, losing procedural protections and receiving and
serving longer sentences.
The significance of selection decisions has not escaped the attention of some offenders chosen for federal prosecution. Defendants
have raised a variety of unsuccessful challenges to their federal prosecutions and resulting sentences. 81 Because they contend that they
179. See Bowman, supra note 92, at 717-18 (describing predictability of ultimate sentence
under federal sentencing regime).
180. See United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1298 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Because
serious drug trafficking crimes often carry mandatory minimum sentences, the crime with which
the [offenders] are charged normally determines the punishment they will suffer. As a practical
matter, then, the charging decision winds up being the only decision that matters.").
181. Three claims are common: (1) that referral from law enforcement officials for federal
prosecution without written, reviewable standards violates due process; (2) that more severe
federal prosecution violates equal protection; and (3) that the disparity between federal and
state sentences warrants a downward departure under the sentencing guidelines. Federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected these contentions. See, eg., United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d
897, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (apparently random selection of defendant for federal prosecution
and mandatory five-year sentence for growing marijuana when state prosecution would have
required only 0-90 days imprisonment did not violate equal protection); United States v. Jacobs,
4 F.3d 603, 604-05 (8th Cir. 1993) (federal prosecution precluding possibility of parole or probation that would have been available in state court did not violate equal protection or due process); United States v. Deitz, 991 F2d 443,447-48 (8th Cir. 1993) (defendant who was prosecuted
in federal court because a violation of the state speedy trial act precluded state prosecution was
not entitled to downward departure to address disparity between federal and theoretical state
sentence); United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 863-64 (4th Cir. 1992) (defendant not entitled to
departure from sentencing guidelines to conform sentence to that received by coconspirator
prosecuted in state court); United States v. Beede, 974 F.2d 948, 951-53 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding
no violation of due process when federal charges requiring longer sentence were brought in
response to defendant's refusal to plead guilty in state court); United States v. Vilchez, 967 F.2d
1351, 1353-56 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court's decision to depart from guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentence was inappropriate because disparity between federal and state sentences not
a proper ground for departure and does not establish equal protection or due process violation);
United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1992) (federal prosecution of case
originating with state parole search not a violation of due process); United States v. Maxwell,
966 F.2d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1992) (police referral of defendant for federal prosecution and resuiting mandatory minimum sentence did not violate due process); United States v. Reyes, 966
F.2d 508, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1992) (federal prosecution of defendant for possession of unregistered
sawed-off shotgun did not violate due process or enable court to depart from guidelines when coaccused prosecuted in state court); United States v. Williams, 963 F.2d 1337, 1341-42 (10th Cir.
1992) (reversing district court's determination that referral of case to federal prosecutor without
written standards violated due process and its consequent imposition of sentence below
mandatory minimum and guidelines requirements); United States v. Nance, 962 F.2d 860, 864-65
(9th Cir. 1992) (no due process violation when case was referred for federal prosecution without
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have received harsher treatment than similar others charged in state
court, claims of equal protection violations most accurately describe
their plight.1' As discussed below, although courts have generally
written guidelines); United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953, 954-55 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing
district court for dismissing counts of indictment because federal prosecution permitted even if
done "for the sole purpose of taking advantage of less stringent federal restrictions on the use of
informants, wire taps, and search warrants"); United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1498-99
(10th Cir. 1992) (federal prosecutor's choice of defendant for federal prosecution and consequent harsher sentence without formulated standard did not violate equal protection or due
process); United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1410-11 (7th Cir. 1992) (due process not
violated when federal prosecution deprived defendant of benefits of state wiretap statute and
more lenient sentence); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 873 n.22 (3d Cir. 1992) (federal
prosecution did not violate due process or require remedial downward departure based on lower
sentence defendant would have received in state court); United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449,
1461-62 (5th Cir. 1992) (referral for federal prosecution and potentially longer sentence without
reviewable guidelines or standards did not violate due process); United States v. Andersen, 940
F.2d 593, 595-97 (10th Cir. 1991) (referral for federal prosecution without guidelines did not
violate due process despite federal sentence in excess of eighteen years compared to possible
sentence of no more than five years in state court); United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377, 138788 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that federal prosecution following dismissal of state
charges violated due process by subjecting defendant to longer sentence and easing burden of
proof for consideration of other crimes used in calculating sentence). Some district courts have
been sympathetic to such arguments, but their efforts to grant relief have not survived appeal.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Utah 1990) (holding that referral for
federal prosecution without benefit of neutral, written guidelines violated due process when federal conviction required substantially harsher sentence), rev'd, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992).
Some defendants raise extra-legal challenges. For example, federal prisoners have created
"major disturbances" because of dissatisfaction with disparities between their sentences and
sentences that they would have received in state court. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Overlapping
and Separate Spheres: A 'Three-Branch Round Table on State and Federal Jurisdiction 90-91
(Mar. 7, 1994) (transcript, on file with the Southern California Law Review).
Defendants prosecuted in the federal district court in Washington, D.C., have raised similar
claims based on the ability of the United State's Attorney's office there, which prosecutes in
both federal court and District of Columbia Superior Court, to select the forum and thus which
law will apply. That office's practice of selecting some defendants for harsher treatment in federal district court is described in detail in United States v. Mills, 726 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1989),
rev'd, 964 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en bane).
182. Due process challenges miss the mark because the decision to file charges in federal
court rather than state court alone works no deprivation of a protected interest, a prerequisite
for a due process violation. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). Rather,
it only subjects the defendant to federal adjudicative procedures, which presumably provide
whatever process is due before subjecting a defendant to a deprivation. Although federal procedures may be less advantageous and federally imposed deprivations more severe than those that
a defendant would experience in state court, if each complies with due process in its own right,
the differences between federal and state procedures do not make selection of the former a
cognizable deprivation. Cf. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996) (claim that state cannot
require an indigent to pay a fee to appeal termination of parental rights fits the equal protection
framework better than due process because there is no independent right to appeal).
Motions for departures from the sentencing guidelines are only available in atypical cases
involving factors that the Sentencing Commission did not contemplate when drafting the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); U.S. SENTENciN G GumEuirNs MANUAL 5 (1995). See also
Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2044 (1996). Although the Supreme Court recently
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failed to recognize or acknowledge it, equal protection requires prosecutors to have a rational basis for distinguishing between those who
are prosecuted and those who are not. This constitutional obligation
has particular significance when federal prosecutors bring charges
under duplicative federal statutes against only a small portion of eligible offenders. Even if courts refrain from enforcing the equal protection rationality requirement, federal prosecutors should comply with
it.
A. EQUAL

PROTECTION

Equal protection doctrine "is essentially a direction that all per' by the government.
sons similarly situated should be treated alike"183
It requires that both federallm and state officials185 have a valid reason for treating people differently than others who appear to be similarly situated.186 Courts faced with equal protection claims determine
whether the government's disparate treatment of some persons "trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect
approved of a downward departure based in part on the fact that defendants were prosecuted in
federal court following acquittals and a hung jury in a lengthy, highly publicized state court trial,
see id. at 2053, that situation is atypical. See supra note 7. In contrast, federal-state disparities
are hardly atypical and likely were known to the Sentencing Commission.
183. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985) (citing Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982)). The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[njo State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, §1.
184. Although the Equal Protection Clause is located in the Fourteenth Amendment, which
applies only to the states, the Supreme Court has determined that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment imposes similar restrictions on the federal government. See, eg., Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.9 (1985); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Court
appears to have adopted the view that the amendments provide identical protection and that
federal and state classifications are subject to the same level of scrutiny. See Adarand Const.,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) ("[A]U1 racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.").
Of course, the Court may apply differential levels of review to classifications other than those
based on race, but after Adarand that seems unlikely. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth
Amendment's Guaranteeof Equal Protection,55 N.C. L. Rv. 541 (1977).
185. The requirement applies to administrative actors, as well as legislators. Se4 e.g., Allegheny Pittsburg Coal Co. v. County Comm'r of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (requiring
state tax assessor to make rational distinctions when assessing value of taxpayers' properties);
Wayte v. United States 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (prohibiting federal prosecutors from selecting persons for prosecution because of their exercise of First Amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that equal protection prevented the local board of supervisors from
discriminatory distribution of licenses for the operation of laundries in wooden buildings).
186. Typically the valid reason will demonstrate that, despite appearances, those who receive differential treatment are different in some critical respect and thus not "similarly situated." For a discussion of the meaning of "similarly situated," see Applegate, supra note 28, at
48-54; infra notes 388-89 and accompanying text.
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If so, courts

subject the discriminatory classification to "strict scrutiny" and find it
unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. 188 If a classification does not implicate a suspect class or fundamental right, courts apply less rigorous review,
often simply asking whether the classification is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental end.18 9 If there is no rational reason, the disparate treatment is unconstitutional' 9 0° In some situations, such as
those involving gender discrimination, courts apply a "heightened"

standard of review less exacting than strict scrutiny but more searching than rational relationship review.' 9 '
Although the Court has had difficulty achieving consensus on the
precise nature of the rational relationship requirement,192 it is settled
law that the requirement is deferential and not meant to serve as "'a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic' of governmental classifications. 193 Thus, imperfect classifications will survive
review so long as they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate
187. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
188. See, eg., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) ("With respect to... classifications
[that disadvantage a suspect class or impinge on the exercise of a fundamental right], it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its
classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."). Professor Gunther has described such scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." See Gerald
Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
189. See, e.g.,
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
190. See, eg., City of Clebure v. Clebure Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1973).
191. See, eg., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264,2274-76 (1996) (applying heightened
scrutiny for gender-based classifications); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
723-24 (1982) (same).
192. See, e.g., United States R.R. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10 (1980) ("The most
arrogant legal scholar would not claim that [the eleven cited Supreme Court decisions applying
the rational relationship test] applied a uniform or consistent test under equal protection principles."). For example, when the Court applies the rational relationship test to determine the
constitutionality of legislative classifications, sometimes it hypothesizes reasons supporting the
challenged classification scheme. See, eg., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 652
(1992) (concluding that a state "could thus have decided" that venue rules more favorable to
corporate defendants incorporated in that state than corporate defendants incorporated out of
state are justified by greater inconvenience that defending distant lawsuit will create for resident
corporate defendants). On other occasions the Court has examined only the actual reasons
given for the classification. See, eg., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50 (assessing the city council's
reasons for the classification scheme, as found by the lower federal court). See generally
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243 n.4, 244 n.6 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
193. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). See also City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(stating that "the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
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government purpose. 194 At its most solicitous, the test allows for
otherwise inexplicably underinclusive classifications on the grounds

that the government may seek to make changes "'one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute.' 195 Despite the deferential nature of the rationality standard,
the Court has applied it to invalidate a handful of challenged classifications.1 9 6 At minimum, it seems that a legislative classification will

not survive rational basis review if it imposes an unequal burden on an
individual or group selected due to irrational fears,197 animosity,198 or
unprincipled or thoughtless error. 199
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines"). Although, like the passage from Dukes, the language quoted in the
text refers to "legislative," not "governmental," choices, the rational relationship requirement
applies to administrative classifications as well as legislative ones. See supranote 185. There is
reason to believe that the rational relationship test may be less deferential when applied to
administrative decisions. See infra note 237.
194. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320-21 (stating that "if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose," the classification
will survive review "even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends"); Dukes, 427
U.S. at 303 (commenting that "rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than
mathematical exactitude").
195. Cleburne,473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Williamson
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).
196. See eg., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (applying the rationality standard to
invalidate a statewide initiative banning state and local ordinances prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation); Allegheny Pittsburg Coal Co. v. County Comm'r. of Webster
County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (applying the rationality standard to prohibit a property value assessment method that burdened owners of recently purchased commercial property); Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 432 (local zoning ordinance restricting group homes for mentally retarded unconstitutional); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Tax Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (tax exemption for
Vietnam War veterans residing in state before specified date); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55
(1982) (state statute granting dividends to residents based on length of residency); United States
Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (provision of Federal Food Stamp Act withholding benefits from households containing unrelated persons); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (appeal provision of wrongful detainer statute requiring posting of double bond by
tenants).
197. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (stating that "mere negative attitudes, or fear" are not a
rational basis for a classification burdening the mentally retarded unless they are substantiated
by "properly cognizable" factors); id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The record
convinces me that this permit was required because of the irrational fears of neighboring property owners ....

).

198. See, &g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (the challenged state initiative "seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests"); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 ("For if the constitutional conception of 'equal
protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.").
199. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (in separate concurring opinions, six members of the Court determined that dismissal of plaintiff's unlawful termination
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CHARGING DECISIONS AND SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

DocrRINE
1. The ProhibitionAgainst DiscriminatoryChargingDecisions
Although the Supreme Court is loath to constrain prosecutors'
charging descretion, 200 it has concluded that the Constitution imposes
some restrictions, including those mandated by equal protection. 20 1
When determining whether a charging decision runs afoul of equal
protection, courts employ "selective prosecution" doctrine2 0 2 which
prohibits prosecutors from bringing charges because of an offender's
race, religion, or other suspect characteristic, or in response to an offender's exercise of a constitutional right, even if there is evidence to
support the charges.203 These prohibitions are consistent with the
claim due to state's inadvertent scheduling error which set conference past time deadline prescribed by state statute violated equal protection). See also infra notes 293-94 and accompanying
text.
200. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.") (footnote omitted).
201. See, eg., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). Due process also limits charging
discretion, preventing prosecutors from increasing charges in retaliation for a defendant's exercise of a litigation-related right. See, eg., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). But see
Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 357 (allowing a prosecutor to file additional charges when a defendant refuses to plead guilty and instead exercises his right to go to trial).
202. Selective prosecution doctrine is not limited to cases that are at issue here, those in
which the federal government brings charges under duplicative federal statutes. Prosecutors
make a variety of other types of charging decisions that the doctrine addresses. For example, it
applies when federal prosecutors decide which offenders to charge under nonduplicative federal
statutes. See, e-g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (selecting only some draft nonregistrants for prosecution under federal Selective Service laws). It also applies when state prosecutors choose to prosecute some offenders but not others. See Twvo Guys From HarrisonAllentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (involving allegations of selective enforcement
of Sunday closing laws). These sorts of decisions are referred to as "screening decisions"--prosecutors "screen" offenders to be prosecuted from those who are not.
The doctrine also applies to other types of charging decisions such as the determination
which of several offenses to charge, see United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (prosecutor's decision to select one of two applicable federal statutes), and the decision whether to file
charges that require enhanced sentences based on the nature of an offense or a defendant's
criminal record. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (decision whether to seek
mandatory life sentence for habitual offenders). For a general discussion of the different types of
charging decisions, see Vorenberg, supra note 28, at 1524-32.
203. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court held that the equal protection
ban on improper discriminatory classifications applies to administrators, as well as legislators.
That decision set the stage for the imposition of the same restriction on prosecutors' charging
decisions. In Ylck Wo, a board of supervisors' racially discriminatory distribution of licenses for
laundries in wooden buildings led to prosecution of only Chinese laundry operators for zoning
code infractions. The Court determined that these procedures violated equal protection. When
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"strict" and "heightened" scrutiny branches of equal protectionthere is never a legitimate, much less a compelling, reason for prosecuting a person because of his race, religion, gender, or exercise of a
constitutional right. Most courts assume that a defendant who can
prove that he has been a victim of this sort of discriminatory selective
prosecution is entitled to dismissal of the indictment or reversal of his
conviction. 2" Although theoretically stringent, the prohibition on discriminatory selective prosecution is largely meaningless in practice because courts require that a defendant raising such a claim prove both
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent, burdens that are all
but impossible to satisfy.205
the Court later upheld the rejection of a request for injunctive relief to prevent the allegedly
selective enforcement of a Sunday closing law in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,366 U.S.
at 582 (1961), it noted that a defense of discriminatory prosecution would be available if the
plaintiff were to be charged. "Since appellant's employees may defend against any such proceeding that is actually prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination, we do not
believe that the court below was incorrect in refusing to exercise its injunctive powers at that
time." Id. at 588-89. In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), the Supreme Court first addressed
the merits of a criminal defendant's claim that a prosecutor's charging decision violated equal
protection. Although it found no violation in that case, the Court made clear that a charging
decision "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification" would run afoul of equal protection. See id.at 456. In Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Court concluded that a charging decision based on an offender's
exercise of a constitutional right, such as the Frst Amendment right to protest government policy, would be unconstitutional.
204. See, eg., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v.
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
Although the courts in those cases reversed convictions as a remedy, presumably they would
have dismissed the indictments had they made the same findings before trial began. The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether dismissal is warranted. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1484 n.2 (1996) ("We have never determined whether dismissal of the
indictment, or some other sanction, is the proper remedy if a court determines that a defendant
has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his race.").
205. Ah Sin v. Wittman, 98 U.S. 500 (1905), demonstrates that equal protection challenges
require proof of discriminatory effect, that is, that the administrative actor has treated similarly
situated others differently. In Ah Sin, the Court rejected a habeas corpus challenge which alleged that a sheriff had enforced a local antigambling ordinance in a manner that discriminated
against Chinese because the petitioner failed to prove that others were violating the ordinance
but not being prosecuted. See also Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. at 1487; McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 356-59 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Wayte, the Court reiterated the discriminatory
effect requirement and held that a claimant also must prove discriminatory intent. "[E]qual protection standards ...require petitioner to show both that the [government's] enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." 470 U.S.
at 608 (footnote omitted). Equal protection doctrine imposes the same requirement in other
contexts. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
The need to prove discriminatory effect and intent has been described as "an impossibly
high burden of proof on defendants attempting to raise claims of selective prosecution in the
racial context." Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L.
Rav. 1472, 1542 (1988) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Developments]. See also Barry Lynn
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The Requirement of Rational ChargingDecisions

In contrast to the clear prohibition against discriminatory charging decisions, courts have been markedly less certain about whether
selective prosecution doctrine incorporates the "rationality" component of equal protection-whether it requires that prosecutors' charging decisions, like other governmental actors' decisions, be rationally
related to a legitimate objective.20 5 When addressing equal protection
challenges to federal prosecutors' decisions to bring charges under duplicative federal statutes, appellate courts frequently take one of two
approaches. Some tacitly deny the existence of a rational basis requirement by articulating a selective prosecution standard that applies
only if there is proof of discrimination based on a suspect characteristic or exercise of constitutional rights.20 7 In other words, these courts
Creech, Note, And Justice ForAll: Wayte v. United States and the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 64 N.C. L. Rav. 385, 408 (1986) ("Because the government is not likely to announce publicly its intent to discriminate and defendants are not generally entitled to discovery until they
have made a prima facie case, defendant will rarely succeed in demonstrating that their prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.") (footnote omitted).
206. Under the Court's multitiered approach to equal protection, charging decisions do not
merit strict or heightened scrutiny. Although the decision to prosecute may ultimately result in
an offender's loss of life or liberty-fundamental interests that typically trigger strict scrutinycharging decisions alone do not burden those interests. They only subject selected offenders to
procedures that may result in a loss of life or liberty.
207. For example, in United States v. Jacobs,4 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 1993), the court concluded:
Jacobs does not assert that the decision to prosecute him in federal forum was based
upon an improper motive such as race, gender, national origin, religious beliefs, or
political affiliation. Likewise, he does not allege that the prosecution was retalitory or
vindictive in nature. Accordingly, there is no merit to his contention that the federal
prosecution violated his Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. at 605 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489,1499 (10th Cir.
1992) ("In the absence of proof that the choice of forum was improperly motivated or based on
an impermissible classification as a matter of constitutional law, the prosecutor's discretion to
prosecute in a federal rather than a state forum does not violate due process or equal protection
Several scholars have noted this judicial reluctance to apply a rational basis standard. As
Professor Gifford has explained:
The rule articulated by most federal and state courts is that the prosecution violates the
defendant's equal protection rights, thereby entitling the defendant to a dismissal of
charges, only when "the government's discriminatory selection of him for prosectution
has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissable consideration as
race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights."
Gifford, supra note 28 at 661-62 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d
1207, 1211, (2d Cir. 1974)). Berrios first stated this rule, which most courts have since followed
"with unthinking but general acceptance." DAvis, supra note 28, at 164. See also Applegate,
supra note 28, at 47; Gifford, supranote 28, at 680 ("In the case of constitutional challenge to the
prosecutor's charging decision, there does not appear to be even a minimum rationality requirement when no suspect classification or fundamental right is involved."). In other contexts, some
lower courts have explicitly denied the right to rational administrative classifications. See, e.g., E
& T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1114 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988)
HeinOnline -- 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 684 1996-1997

1997]

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW

apparently conclude that as long as a charging decision is not motivated by considerations that would trigger strict or heightened scrutiny, it need not be rational. Other courts neither confirm nor deny
the existence of a right to rational charging classifications but refuse to
conduct review unless faced with evidence of improper discrimination.20 8 It may matter little to a criminal defendant seeking judicial
relief whether a court does not recognize an equal protection-based
restriction on prosecutorial discretion, or simply refuses to conduct
the review necessary to enforce that restriction, but the difference
should matter to prosecutors. If, contrary to some lower court decisions, equal protection imposes a rationality requirement, prosecutors
are bound to comply with that constitutional command whether or not
courts are willing to enforce it.209 Thus, putting aside the question of
("Even arbitrary administration of a statute, without purposeful discrimination, does not violate
concurring and dissenting)
the equal protection clause."). But see id at 1115-16 (Kravitch, J.,
(asserting that equal protection rational relationship requirement does apply to administrative
decisions).
Although some cases conclude that "bad faith" charging decisions violate equal protection,
it is not clear whether courts use that term to denote charging decisions based on malice or
animosity, see Gifford, supra note 28, at 677 ("[p]resumably," personal hatred is sufficient to
show bad faith), which would extend selective prosecution doctrine beyond classifications that
trigger strict or heightened scrutiny, or whether "bad faith" is simply shorthand for charging
decisions brought because of race or religion, see, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538,
1539 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated in part on other grounds, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating
that evidence "that the decision to prosecute was invidious or in bad faith because it was based
upon an impermissible factor such as race" is a prerequisite for selective prosecution claims)
(emphasis added), or in response to the exercise of a constitutional right. See Mark Lemle Amsterdam, The One-Sided Sword. Selective Prosecutionin Federal Courts, 6 Rur.-CAm. L.J. 1, 22
(1974) (interpreting "bad faith" to mean in response to the exercise of a constitutional right).
See generally Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 28, at 671 (discussing ambiguity of term "bad
faith").
Some courts have held that a claim of malicious enforcement entitles a litigant to relief in a
civil action filed under 42 U.S.C. §1983. See, eg., Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & Lounge v.
Board of Selectmen, 932 F.2d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing maliciousness as a grounds for
relief); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1980) (same). But see Futernick v.
Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 296 (1996) (rejecting
malicious enforcement as a grounds for relief). Even if courts were to prohibit malicious prosecutions on equal protection grounds, such a prohibition would still fall short of a requirement
that prosecutors have affirmatively rational reasons for charging decisions.
208. See, eg., United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e have no jurisdiction to review prosecutors' charging decisions, absent proof of discrimination based on suspect characteristics such as race, religion, gender or personal beliefs."); United States v. Palmer,
3 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[S]eparation of powers concerns prohibit us from reviewing a
prosecutor's charging decisions absent a prima facie showing that [the selection of the defendant
for federal rather than state prosecution] rested on an impermissible basis, such as gender, race
or denial of a constitutional right." (footnote omitted)).
209. As the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Redondo-Lemos:
The judicial branch is not the only one charged with enforcing the Constitution of the
United States. The President and Congress, and all of the subordinate employees
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judicial enforcement, it is useful to consider whether equal protection
imposes such an obligation.
Judicial refusal to recognize a constitutionally imposed requirement that prosecutors make rational charging decisions is a departure
from standard equal protection doctrine. Lower courts have reached
such a conclusion primarily by interpreting the language in several
Supreme Court opinions to require proof of deliberately impermissible discrimination, such as that which would trigger strict or heightened scrutiny in other contexts, before finding that administrative
actors, like prosecutors, have violated equal protection. For example,
in Snowden v. Hughes,21 0 the Court stated that
[t]he unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair
on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entifled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless
there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. 211
Similarly, in Oyler v. Boles,2 12 the Court held that a prosecutor's
selective charging decisions are unconstitutional if "deliberately based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. 2 13 Some lower courts construe these passages as

within their respective branches, have a solemn responsibility to comply with the Constitution in the performance of their assigned functions. This responsibility is derived
directly from the Constitution and is reinforced by the oath of office administered to
every government employee before he enters on duty. 5 U.S.C. §3331. When no judicial remedy is available to enforce constitutional strictures, we must rely on the diligence and good faith of the officials of the other branches to avoid constitutional
violations.
955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). See also Paul Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,27 STAN.L. RFv. 585 (1975) (suggesting that
legislators have duty to interpret the Constitution and abide by limitations even if courts do not
enforce them).
210. 321 U.S. 1 (1944). The Court rejected Snowden's claim that he had suffered an injury
of constitutional magnitude when members of a state election Primary Canvassing Board failed
to designate him as one of two Republican nominees for the Illinois General Assembly, despite
the fact that he had received sufficient primary election votes to be nominated, state law re-

quired that he be designated as a nominee, and the Board had properly designated the other
Republican nominee.
211. Id. at 8. See also Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 353
(1918) ("Mere errors of judgment by officials will not support a claim of discrimination [under
equal protection]. There must be something more-something which in effect amounts to an
intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity.").
212. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
213. Id. at 456.
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requiring that a litigant prove improper discrimination to mount a successful equal protection challenge to an administrative classification.21 4 Other courts conclude that Oyler's prohibition on "arbitrary
classification[s]" protects only against group discrimination, not
against irrational charging decisions that harm individuals.215 However, less restrictive interpretations are equally plausible. The language in Snowden can be read to merely require proof of something
more than mistaken selection.216 In addition, as LaFave and Israel
have explained, the language in Oyler prohibiting arbitrary classifications may bar charging decisions that are not rationally related to legitimate government ends.217
Lower courts also rely on Wayte v. United States, 218 in which the
defendant challenged his prosecution for failure to register for the
draft by claiming that his vocal protest of Selective Service laws made
214. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 805 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Oyler);
United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 474-75 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Oyler); United States v.
Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Oyler); United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d
1205, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing Snowden); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d
Cir. 1974) (citing Snowden); Applegate, supra note 28, at 46-47, 54 n.129 (discussing lower
courts' treatment of Oyler); Gifford, supranote 28, at 680 (same); Givelber, supranote 28, at 113
(same). See also Cardinale & Feldman, supranote 28, at 671 n.86 (contending that Snowden and
Oyler should be read to require a defendant to "show that the prosecutor had the specific intent
to discriminate" in order to establish an equal protection violation).
215. See, eg., Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051,1058 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 296 (1996); New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F2d 1474,148182 (7th Cir. 1990); Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 28, at 667, 672. Others have reached the
opposite conclusion. See, eg., Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176,180 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the
view that equal protection is "limited to protecting members of identifiable groups"); United
States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569 n.9 (3d Cir. 1979).
216. Other language in Snowden suggests as much: "[W]here the official action purports to
be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the
statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws." Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8. See also Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 28,
at 670 ("One commentator has remarked that 'intent' can take on meaning anywhere along a
continuum from 'not accidental or negligent' at one end to 'with specific knowledge of a violation' at the other." (quoting Andrew B. Weissman, The DiscriminatoryApplication of Penal
Laws by State Judicialand Quasi-JudicialOfficers: Playing the Shell Game of Rights and Remedies, 69 Nw.U. L. Rav. 489, 504 (1974))).
217. See 2 WAYNm R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAiEL, CRhINAL PROCEDURE §13A(c), at
192-98 (1984). See also United States v. Cyprian, 756 F. Supp. 388, 394-95 (D.N.D. 1991) (repeating analysis in LAFAVE & IsRAEL); Givelber, supra note 28, at 116 n.116 (describing Oyler's
ban on "arbitrary or unjustifiable standards" as "shorthand" for classifications that do not
"bear[ ] an arguably reasonable relationship to legitimate state purposes"). That construction
has the dual advantage of being consistent with both the common usage of "arbitrary," see
an unreasonable
BLAcK's LAW DIcroNARY 104 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "arbitrary" as "[i]n
manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure"), and general equal protection doctrine,
which imposes a rationality requirement.
218. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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it more likely that he would be charged. The Court rejected the claim,
holding that in order to prevail on a selective prosecution claim a defendant must prove that the prosecutor selected him because of his
exercise of his First Amendment rights.219 From this, lower courts apparently reason that Wayte imposes a "proof-of-improper-purpose"
threshold for all selective prosecution claims.320 A defendant who
only questions the rationality of a charging decision can never satisfy
this requirement because a rationality challenge tacitly concedes an
inability to prove that the prosecutor has an improper discriminatory
purpose. However, Wayte does not impose such a threshold.
Although Wayte does require proof of an improper prosecutorial purpose, it does so only in those cases in which the defendant's equal
protection claim is predicated on an allegation that an exercise of a
constitutional right (or membership in a suspect class) played a role in
the charging decision."2 Wayte never challenged the decision to prosecute him but not others who had also failed to register as simply irrational. Thus, the Court had no occasion to address the viability of
such a claim.
Whatever force lower courts' interpretations of Snowden, Oyler,
and Wayte may have once had,22 it is unlikely that they survived Wade
219. See supra note 205.
220. For example, in Esmail,53 F.3d at 178-79, the court cited Wayte for the proposition that
[tjhe [only] form of selective prosecution... that is actionable under the federal Constitution ... is where the decision to prosecute is made either in retaliation for the
exercise of a constitutional right, such as the right to free speech or to the free exercise
of religion, or because of membership in a vulnerable group.
See also Developments, supra note 205, at 1540-41 (reading Wayte as imposing purposefulness
threshold for all selective prosecution claims).
221. Cf. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1303-04 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Canby, J., concurring) ("The [Wayte] Court did not say... that in a case of pure arbitrariness,
such as a coin toss decision, due process inquiry would be precluded.").
222. At the root of lower courts' interpretations of Snowden, Oyler, and Wayte as limiting
selective prosecution doctrine to cases involving deliberately improper discrimination may be
the fear that a more generous view would compel prosecutors and administrators to treat all
similarly situated persons the same absent a rational reason to do otherwise, regardless of the
prosecutor's or administrator's state of mind. Such a "strict liability" equal protection requirement would enable any person to assert a right to the more lenient treatment that any similarly
situated person already had received or receives in the future, whether or not the government
actor intended to treat.the complaining person more harshly or even knew that the other person
had received more favorable treatment. The Eleventh Circuit raised the specter of such a result
in E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1987):
The problem with the district court's standard [that an arbitrary but not improperly
discriminatory administrative classification violated equal protection] is that any departure from state law would give rise to a constitutional claim. Under the district court's
standard, if local government decisionmakers correctly applied a facially neutral resolution in hundreds of cases and erroneously applied it in a single case, they could never
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v. United States,' a more recent Supreme Court decision. In Wade, a
unanimous Court concluded that the Constitution requires that all
prosecutorial decisions, including charging decisions, be rationally related to legitimate government ends. The Court did not suggest equal
protection prohibits only improper discriminatory decisions. At issue
in Wade was whether there are limitations on federal prosecutors' discretion to refuse to fie sentencing motions acknowledging defendants' "substantial assistance" in the investigation or prosecution of
another person. Without such motions, courts are powerless to depart
downward from statutory mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing guidelines ranges to credit a defendant's cooperation? -2 4

again apply it correctly without violating equal protection. A plaintiff [alleging a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983], to whom the statute was subsequently
correctly applied, could establish a denial of equal protection merely by proving that
the statute was misapplied in a single previous incident and that there is no rational
reason for the difference between the single previous misapplication and the subsequent correct application to him.
Id. at 1114. The Eleventh Circuit's position-doubting the existence of a constitutional obligation at all, rather than simply questioning the propriety of judicial review-is unpersuasive. As
is explained in detail below, see infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text, there is a middle
ground between a rigid requirement of equal treatment without regard to a prosecutor's mental
state on one hand and a threshold requiring proof of deliberate improper discrimination sufficient to trigger strict or heightened scrutiny on the other. Simply put, without running afoul of
the Supreme Court's selective prosecution doctrine, courts can require proof that the prosecutor
knows of a pool of similarly situated persons being treated more leniently before imposing equal
protection constraints.
223. 504 U.S. 181 (1992). After law enforcement officials arrested Wade in possession of
cocaine, handguns, and $22,000 in cash, he agreed to cooperate with them, giving "valuable
assistance" that resulted in the convictions of other drug dealers. See id. at 183; Wade v. United
States, 936 F.2d 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1991). Despite Wade's cooperation, the government did
not make a "departure motion" at Wade's sentencing. As a result, the court could not reduce his
sentence to reward his cooperation. Understandably disillusioned, Wade moved the district
court for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines and sought permission to inquire
into the government's reasons for refusing to make a departure motion to determine if that
refusal was arbitrary or in bad faith. The district court denied both requests. See id. at 171.
After the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, Wade
successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. See id. at 172-73.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1996) empowers federal prosecutors to move a court to depart
from a statutorily imposed mandatory minimum sentence to reward a defendant's "substantial
assistance in the investigation and prosecution of another person." Section 5K1.1 of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines allows federal prosecutors to make a similar motion for a departure
from the sentencing guidelines. In order for a court to depart from both a statutory minimum
and the guidelines, a prosecutor must make both motions. See United States v. Melendez, 116 S.
CL 2057 (1996). Without such motions, federal courts are powerless to depart from the
mandatory minimums and guidelines to reward a defendant for cooperating with the government. See, eg., United States v. Emery, 34 F.3d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1994).
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The Wade Court found that constitutional requirements constrain
the government's discretion to refuse to file departure motions.-5 For
example, the Court noted that Wade "would be entitled to relief if a
prosecutor refused to file a substantial-assistance motion, say, because
of a defendant's race or religion. ' ' 1 6 More importantly, the Court
also made clear that the decision not to move for a departure must be
rational, a point that the government conceded. The Court wrote:
"Wade would be entitled to relief if the prosecutor's refusal to move
,,227
was not rationally related to any legitimate Government end ....
Significantly, the Court accepted without question that the same restriction applies to charging decisions: "[W]e see no reason why
courts should treat a prosecutor's refusal to fie a substantial-assistance motion differently from a prosecutor's other decisions, see, e.g.,
Wayte v. United States...."28 By citing Wayte, which involved an
equal protection challenge to a charging decision, the Court clearly
indicated that charging decisions, indeed virtually all prosecutorial decisions, must be rational. 29
Whether or not there are valid reasons for courts to refrain from
enforcing this "rational prosecution " obligation-a topic that Part
Four of this Article addresses-Wade makes sense. Equal protection
225. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 185. The Court's opinion does not state whether equal protection
or due process principles impose the constraints. Elsewhere, the Court has noted that when
assessing the constitutionality of allegedly arbitrary classifications, "an argument based on equal
protection essentially duplicates an argument based on due process." See Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 n.10 (1983)).
226. Wade, 504 U.S. at 186. The Court determined, however, that Wade "never alleged,
much less claimed to have evidence tending to show, that the Government refused to file a
motion for suspect reasons such as his race or his religion." See IhL
227. Id.
228. Id. at 185.
229. Despite Wade, the Supreme Court later determined in Purkett v. Elam, 115 S.Ct. 1769
(1995) (per curiam), that a prosecutor's reason given to justify the exercise of a peremptory
challenge need not "make[ ] sense" in order to comport with equal protection, exempting such
decisions from any rationality requirement. See id. at 1771. Purkett's apparent rejection of a
rationality requirement is likely limited to peremptory challenges, which litigants historically
could exercise without any reason at all. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable
to peremptory challenges. ...A clause that requires a minimum 'rationality' in government
actions has no application to 'an arbitrary and capricious right."') (citations omitted). See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 211-21 (1965). In addition to the historical pedigree of
peremptory challenges, the Purkett Court may have been influenced by the fact that prospective
jurors' interests in being free from arbitrary peremptory challenges are far less significant than
other interests that equal protection doctrine addresses. Because other prosecutorial decisions,
including charging decisions and departure motions, affect more substantial interests and are not
characterized by a history of accepted irrational use, Purkett is not a retreat from Wade.
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compels government actors to behave rationally when classifying people in other contexts. 23 0 These contexts often involve commercial or
economic interests that are far less compelling than those at stake
when prosecutors determine who to select for prosecution. 1 In light
of the profound effect that charging decisions have on the lives of
those chosen, including possible pretrial detention, the rigors of criminal prosecution, and the potential deprivation of life or liberty that a
conviction entails, it would be anomalous for the Constitution to exempt charging decisions from a standard that applies to governmental
classifications affecting less significant interests.
Indeed, it may be appropriate for courts to hold charging decisions to a more demanding standard than that applied to less consequential classifications. The Court purports to reject such a position,
maintaining that unless a classification impairs a fundamental right or
burdens a protected class, equal protection scrutiny does not vary with
the importance of the interests at stake.2 3 2 Several justices have questioned whether a rigid three-tiered approach, with an extremely deferential standard applied to all classifications that do not merit strict or
heightened scrutiny, is consistent with the Court's treatment of the
cases or desirable. Justice Marshall argued that the Court's equal protection decisions can and should be explained as the application of "a
spectrum of standards" involving "variations in the degree of care
with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications depending.., on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon
which the particular classification is drawn. 28 3 Similarly, Justice Stevens contends that all equal protection decisions apply a single, flexible standard of rationality that "includes a requirement that an
230. See, ag., Allegheny Pittsburg Coal Co. v. County Comm'r of Webster County, 488 U.S.
336 (1989); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1973).
231. See, eg., Burlington N. R.R v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648 (1992) (ability to choose in-state
venue for civil lawsuit); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (ability to operate a
pushcart in French Quarter of New Orleans).
232. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (refusing to apply standard more
stringent than traditional rationality approach to state decision to impose a ceiling on payments
under Federal Aid to Families With Dependent Children program despite fact that decision
could deprive large families of "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings").
233. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 520-212 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against... and the asserted state interests in
support of the classification"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,45960 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
230-31 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification
would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to
the members of the disadvantaged class.''234 Unlike traditional rational relationship analysis, this approach would require balancing the
purpose of the classification against the burdens that it imposes. Both
the Marshall "spectrum" view and the Stevens unified-rationality approach would likely require greater scrutiny of prosecutors' charging
decisions than the traditional standard 3 5 Even if these formulations
of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence are inaccurate, or if
charging decisions need not meet a requirement more demanding
than that which governs less significant classifications, such decisions
certainly must satisfy the same minimal standard that applies
elsewhere.
The equal protection rationality requirement does not prohibit
intentionally selective charging decisions. Indeed, the Court has
stated that "conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is
not in itself a federal constitutional violation. ''1 3 6 Rather, as in other
contexts, the rationality standard simply demands that prosecutors
have valid reasons for charging decisions that treat one offender differently than others who appear to be similarly situated.3 7 The reason given must do more than describe why the selected offender has
234. Cleburne,473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Michael M. v. Superior Ct.
of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 497 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. These alternative formulations of equal protection help explain some of the Court's
decisions applying the rational relationship standard to invalidate legislative classifications. For
example, the Court has struck down laws that deny publicly funded education to children of
illegal immigrants, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); zoning for group housing for the mentally retarded, see City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); and federal
food stamps to needy households containing unrelated members, see United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), despite compelling arguments that there were rational
reasons for the classifications in those cases. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 249-53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
236. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
237. There is reason to believe that equal protection rationality review is more stringent
when applied to administrators' decisions than legislative classifications. In Allegheny Pittsburg
Coal Co. v. County Comm'r of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336,344 (1989), the Court struck down
a local assessment practice that created significant disparities between mining property that had
been recently sold and that which had not, but noted that "[w]e need not... decide today
whether the Webster County assessment method would stand on a different footing if it were the
law of a State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to
be." Three years later, in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S.Ct. 2326 (1992), the Court upheld a provision of the California Constitution that created similar disparities between sold and unsold property, but which, unlike the Webster County disparities, resulted from a provision resulting from a
statewide ballot initiative rather than an administrator's enforcement policy.
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been prosecuted: It must distinguish between those who are prosecuted and those who are not."3 In addition, there must be a rational
connection between the reason for the differential treatment and a
legitimate government objective.239
C.

PROSECUTION UNDER DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL STATUTES

Although there is no reason why the rationality requirement
should not apply to all prosecutorial charging decisions, it has greater
import for federal prosecutors' decisions to select only some eligible
offenders for prosecution under duplicative federal statutes. To explain why this is so it is necessary to compare prosecutors' decisions to
bring charges generally with federal prosecutors' decisions to bring
charges under duplicative federal statutes. Assume there is a pool of
offenders, all of whom have committed a particular crime. If the
crime is a serious one, typically both state prosecutors and those federal prosecutors enforcing nonduplicative federal statutes will bring
charges against all known and convictable members of that pool.
Prosecutors have a powerful incentive to do so because a decision not
to prosecute would enable the offenders to escape punishment. 4 °
Such an outcome not only runs contrary to a prosecutor's obligations
238. See, eg., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966) (stating that equal protection
"imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out... requir[ing]
that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have 'some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made') (citations omitted).
239. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 184 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("When faced with a challenge to a... classification under the rational-basis test, the
court should ask first, what the purposes of the [classification] are, and, second, whether the
classification is rationally related to achievement of those purposes."); Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 62-63 (1982) (determining that state objective of rewarding citizens for past contributions to state "is not a legitimate state purpose").
240. Arguably, in cases of overlapping jurisdiction, a state prosecutor could decide not to
bring charges in a serious case without fear that the offender will go unpunished because federal
prosecution would be available. In reality, however, state prosecutors cannot rely on federal
prosecutors to serve as a "safety net" by prosecuting convictable offenders whose conduct violates both state and federal law. Federal prosecutors almost certainly lack the resources to pursue more than a handful of offenders who state prosecutors deem unworthy of prosecution. See
supra note 177.
Similarly, the possibility of state prosecution does not serve as an effective safety net if
federal prosecutors fail to bring charges against known and convictable violators of nonduplicative federal statutes. First, there may be no analogous state law. Even if there is a state law that
prohibits the violator's conduct, it may not adequately protect the interests that the federal law is
meant to safeguard. As a result, federal prosecutors may be loath to rely on state prosecution to
vindicate distinct federal interests, particularly in serious cases.
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as a law enforcement official, but also may prove harmful to a state
prosecutor's chances of future electoral success.2 4 '
Thus, for serious offenses, two factors usually will distinguish
prosecuted from unprosecuted offenders: whether they are known and
whether they are convictable. Obviously, prosecutors cannot and do
not bring charges against offenders who have not been identified as
having committed an offense. Even when prosecutors know that
someone has committed an offense, they usually will not bring charges
if they lack sufficient admissible evidence to prove the case. Although
they may screen offenders who commit minor offenses like possession
of small amounts of drugs for personal use, gambling, and prostitution
by use of other criteria as well,' 2 the costs of choosing not to prosecute any known and provable serious offenses outweigh any advantages gained by selectivity.' 3
In contrast, federal prosecutors selecting offenders who violate
duplicative federal statutes have far greater freedom. As is true for
241. Although there is disagreement about the extent to which state and local prosecutors
are politically accountable, repeated failure to prosecute cases against known serious offenders
would almost certainly harm reelection efforts. Compare Beale, supra note 2, at 994 ("State
criminal laws are enforced by elected state and local prosecutors who are ... politically accountable to their varied constituencies."), with Gifford, supranote 28, at 670 ("In theory, [state and
local prosecutors] can be defeated for re-election if the public disapproves of abuses in the
charging decision. In reality, however, the prosecutor's decisions are not highly publicized, and
voters' memories are short. The election of the prosecutor is not a referendum on charging
policies."), and Bubany & Skillem, supranote 28, at 488,492 n.105 (noting that political controls
on prosecutors are "conjectural" and "illusory"; "[r]arely is the public aware of any activity of
the prosecutor other than in connection with sensational trials reported by the news media. Additionally, prosecutors' policies are seldom publicized, elections are infrequent, and the voter's
memory is short." (footnote omitted)). Because almost all local and state prosecutors are
elected, see DEFRANcEs Er AT., supra note 177, at 1 (95% of chief prosecutors elected locally),
they likely perceive political pressure to bring charges in most or all provable serious cases,
whether such pressure actually exists. No similar pressures affect federal prosecutors, who are
appointed by the President and are not accountable to a local constituency. See Frase, supra
note 170, at 249.
242. See Givelber, supra note 28, at 97,106 ("Only those laws whose violation does not have
an immediate, personal effect on unconsenting others are likely candidates for unequal or sporadic enforcement. Gambling laws, licensing laws, post-no-bills laws, Sunday closing laws are
typical examples.") (footnotes omitted); Vorenberg, supra note 28, at 1531 ("Prosecutors exercise the greatest charging discretion when dealing with minor offenses, such as consensual
crimes, petty thefts, and assaults without serious injury.").
243. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 11-12 (stating that "[p]rosecutors probably do not exercise much discretion to withhold prosecution where violent crimes ... have been committed");
Gifford, supra note 28, at 666 & n.32 ("Decisions to forego prosecution on policy grounds are
obviously less frequent in cases of violent felonies"; they are largely based on "whether there is
sufficient evidence to convict"); Vorenberg, supra note 28, at 1526 ("Prosecutors exercise the
least discretion over those crimes that most frighten, outrage, or intrigue the public, such as
murder, rape, arson, armed robbery, kidnapping, and large-scale trafficking in hard drugs.").
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charging decisions generally, federal prosecutors may not prosecute
because they do not know of the offense or offender, or because they
lack sufficient admissible evidence to convict. However, federal prosecutors have considerably greater latitude to screen offenders-even
those who have committed serious crimes-using additional criteria
because, where duplicative statutes are involved, their failure to prosecute does not mean that the offenders go unpunished. Because an
offender's conduct will also violate state law, he is subject to state
prosecution even if the federal prosecutor chooses not to bring
charges. State prosecutors will likely have the resources to prosecute
cases that federal prosecutors do not pursue, and, as the primary prosecution entity in their jurisdiction, have an obligation to do so. Thus,
federal prosecutors are free to ignore or decline to prosecute cases
against known and convictable offenders. 244
Significantly, because federal prosecutors lack the resources necessary to review the evidence in all cases eligible for duplicative federal prosecution,245 they must resort to methods of screening cases
other than consideration of the "convictability" of individual offenders. Federal prosecutors can employ a variety of methods to accomplish this preliminary sorting. For example, they may review only
those cases that are investigated by federal law enforcement agencies
or those that involve threshold quantities of drugs or money, especially dangerous or violent offenders, or particular federal offenses. In
short, they can employ policy-based screening mechanisms before
having to conduct case-specific assessments of evidence.246 Alternatively (and problematically), federal prosecutors may not employ predetermined screening criteria at all, distinguishing instead between the
cases that they review and those that they overlook with no principled
basis for doing so.
244. See Frase, supranote 170, at 250 ("[F]ederal criminal laws frequently overlap with state
statutes, permitting the federal prosecutor additional flexibility in the selection of cases.").
245. See supra note 177.
246. Professors Bubany and Skillem noted a similar dichotomy when they discussed "two
basic standards" that prosecutors use when determining when to bring charges: "(1) the convictability of the accused and (2) the desirability of obtaining a conviction vis-a-vis pursuing
some other course. In other words, the prosecutor determines not only whether he can convict,
but also whether he should convict." Bubany & Skillem, supra note 28, at 479 (footnote omitted). Although state prosecutors and federal prosecutors enforcing nonduplicative federal statutes will almost always answer the second question affirmatively when serious crimes are
involved, they have more flexibility when considering whether to prosecute minor offenses.
When the costs of allowing unprosecuted offenders to go unpunished are low, prosecutors have
more freedom to screen cases by use of methods other than consideration of the strength of
evidence. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
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These differences help explain why the equal protection rationality requirement is particularly important as a limit on federal prosecutors' decisions about whether to bring charges under duplicative
federal statutes. First, their greater freedom to ignore offenders-a
freedom afforded by the "safety net" of potential state prosecutioncarries with it an enhanced risk that selection will be arbitrary, increasing the importance of an equal protection rationality constraint.
More discretion does not necessarily lead to unprincipled decisionmaking, but it certainly magnifies the danger. 7
Second, equal protection is more likely to be applicable to a federal prosecutor's decision to select only some offenders. Equal protection does not constrain a prosecutor's charging discretion unless, at
a minimum, the prosecutor knows of uncharged offenders who are
similarly situated to those who the prosecutor has charged.2 48 Thus,
equal protection doctrine has nothing to say about a prosecutor's failure to charge unknown similarly situated others. However, it may
have something to say when a federal prosecutor chooses to prosecute
some offenders and ignore others who instead are prosecuted in state
court. Federal prosecutors are aware that their state counterparts are
bringing charges for crimes also covered by federal statutes. They
know that the offenders exist, have been identified, apprehended,
charged, and are eligible for prosecution under duplicative federal
statutes. Although federal prosecutors may not be familiar with the
specific evidence against each such offender, this ignorance is the
product of their own preliminary screening decisions by which they
select cases for review. Thus, federal prosecutors arguably have sufficient "knowledge" of such offenders to trigger an equal protection obligation to have a rational basis for treating them differently than
similar federally prosecuted offenders.249 In short, a federal prosecutor's awareness that similarly situated offenders are charged in state
court may create otherwise nonexistent equal protection obligations.
247. The same holds true for other charging decisions that do not present prosecutors with
the choice of bringing charges or allowing the offender to go unpunished. For example, prosecutors have considerable latitude when determining whether to seek the death penalty or other
sentencing enhancements based on the criminal history of the offender or the nature of the
offense. A decision not to seek death or an enhanced sentence does not allow the offender to
avoid punishment.
248. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). See also infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text. Viewed from another perspective, the prosecutor's lack of knowledge of uncharged
offenders is a rational basis for differential treatment.
249. For a more detailed discussion of whether federal prosecutors "know" of the offenders
prosecuted in state court, see infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
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Finally, federal prosecutors' selection criteria, or lack thereof, are
more susceptible to the limits that the rational relationship constraint
imposes. The principal criterion that state prosecutors and federal
prosecutors enforcing nonduplicative federal statutes use in deciding
whether to prosecute known offenders who commit serious crimes is
the likelihood of conviction 5 10 This method of distinction between
charged and uncharged offenders is eminently rational. In contrast,
when federal prosecutors enforcing duplicative federal statutes make
preliminary selection decisions by screening cases without consideration of the evidence, as they are able to and indeed must do, there is
no similar guarantee that the screening criteria will be rational. As a
result, there is a greater chance that a rationality requirement can inform their charging decisions151
Ill. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY AND PRACTICE
The profound effect that federal charging decisions can have on
the treatment of offenders, federal prosecutors' considerable discretion when enforcing duplicative statutes, and the absence of meaningful judicial oversight make effective administrative guidance critical.
Unfortunately, Department of Justice policy falls short of dictating an
affirmative obligation to make rational selection decisions. Furthermore, in an effort to provide guidance to federal prosecutors making
charging decisions, the Department encourages an approach that infringes on state law enforcement policy and may be unfair to offenders. Existing practice reflects these policy deficiencies. Federal
prosecutors sometimes select offenders for prosecution without determining whether there is a principled basis for distinguishing them
from similar offenders who receive more lenient treatment because
they are charged in state, not federal, court. The Department should
amend its policy to require federal prosecutors to have a rational basis
for making these decisions.
A. Tim "PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUnON"
The "Principles of Federal Prosecution" provide Department of
Justice standards for the charging decisions of federal prosecutors in
250. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
251.

Cf. Abrams, supra note 28, at 11 (noting the difference between strength-of-evidence

considerations, which "do not lend themselves to much meaningful systemization," and "considerations... linked to particular offense categories," which do).
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the United States Attorney's offices." 2 To a degree, these guidelines
promote rational charging decisions by precluding federal prosecutors
from considering an offender's "race, religion, sex, national origin, or
political association, activities or beliefs; [t]he [federal prosecutor's]
own personal feelings concerning the [offender], the [offender's] associates, or the victim; or [t]he possible effect of the decision on the
[prosecutor's] own professional or personal circumstances. ' 'z53 However, other than explicitly prohibiting charging decisions based on
these improper considerations, the guidelines do not ensure that federal prosecutors will have affirmatively rational reasons for selecting
which among all eligible convictable offenders will be subject to federal prosecution.2 4
The guidelines permit commencement of federal prosecution
only if the government attorney believes that the offender's conduct
constitutes a federal offense provable by admissible evidence2 55 They
urge declination of prosecution despite such a belief, however, if "[n]o
substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution" or if
"[t]he person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction."'256 These provisions appear to require that federal prosecutors
have a rational basis for differentiating between defendants selected
for federal prosecution-cases in which there is a substantial federal
interest-and defendants that are left to the states for prosecutionthose subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction. This appearance is deceptive.
The guidelines require that prosecutors conduct the "substantial
federal interest" and "effective prosecution in another jurisdiction" inquiries only after assessing the evidence and determining that there is
252. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, UNITED STATES ArToRNEYs' MANUAL § 9-27.000 (1993)
[hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
253. Id.§ 9-27.260(A)(1)-(3).
254. See Mengler, supra note 3, at 533 (noting that the Department of Justice has not issued
specific guidelines about when cases that the states can prosecute should be brought in federal
court).

255. The prosecutor must believe "that the person's conduct constitutes a federal offense
and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction .... DOJ MANUAL, supra note 252, § 9-27.220(A). Elsewhere, the manual explains that
the federal prosecutor can bring charges only if she "believes that the person probably will be
found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact." Id. § 9-27.220(B).
256. Id. § 9-27.220(A)(1)-(2). Section 9-27.230(A) lists factors that a prosecutor should consider when determining whether there is a "substantial federal interest." Section 9-27.240(A)
lists factors to be considered when determining whether an offender is subject to "effective prosecution in another jurisdiction."
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a provable offense." 7 The guidelines do not address the preliminary
screening decisions by which federal prosecutors distinguish between
the cases that they review and those that they ignore. Thus, although
the guidelines may encourage rational distinctions between cases that
federal prosecutors actually assess and decline and those that they assess and prosecute, they do not require that there be a rational basis
for distinguishing between eligible offenders prosecuted in federal
court and those who are instead prosecuted in state court because federal prosecutors never reviewed the evidence against them.25s Other
257. See id. § 9-27.220 (requiring assessment of grounds for declination only after assessment of evidence).
The guidelines provide less than clear direction even in regard to applying the declination
criteria. The manual states that a prosecutor "may properly decline to take action" when no
substantial federal interest will be served by federal prosecution or when effective prosecution is
available in another jurisdiction. Id § 9-27.220(B) (emphasis added). In addition, "[ilt is left to
the judgment of the attorney for the government whether such a situation exists." Id Furthermore, the guidelines are advisory, having little binding effect in individual cases. Section 927.140 allows United States Attorneys in each federal district to depart from the prosecutive
guidelines "as necessary in the interests of fair and effective law enforcement within the district."
Although "[a]ny significant modification or departure contemplated as a matter of policy or
regular practice must be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General," no such approval is required for departures in individual cases. Id. § 927.140(A)
258. In 1994, the Department of Justice intimated that it would soon amend the "Principles
of Federal Prosecution" to require federal prosecutors to "meet with local prosecutors to establish local rules for distinguishing which offices would handle which [drug] cases." Drug Charging
Jurisdiction,DOJ ALERT, Mar. 21, 1994. Although such an amendment would promote rational
selection of offenders for federal prosecution from among all eligible drug offenders, to date
there has been no such amendment. See Mengler, supranote 3, at 533 (discussing DOJ failure to
establish drug guidelines).
On its face, a provision in a different portion of the United States Attorneys' Manualsuggests
that federal prosecutors have an obligation to meet with state and local prosecutors to determine
which cases to prosecute in federal court among all cases that are eligible for federal prosecution. Section 9-2.142(I)(E) states:
In order to ensure the most efficient use of law enforcement resources, whenever a
matter involves overlappingfederal and state jurisdiction,federal prosecutors should at
the earliest possible time coordinate with their state counterparts to determine the
most appropriate single forum in which to proceed to satisfy the substantial federal and
state interests involved, and to resolve all criminal liability for the acts in question if
possible.
DOJ MANUAL, supra note 252, § 9-2.142(I)(E) (emphasis added). Read literally, this provision
appears to impose on federal prosecutors a duty to consider the propriety of federal prosecution
for every eligible offender, a mandate that would dramatically alter present practice. However,
because the quoted provision does not appear in the "Principles of Federal Prosecution," but
rather in the "Petite Policy" portion of the manual, which applies when "contemplated federal
prosecution is based on substantially the same act(s) or transactions(s) involved in a prior state
or federal prosecution," id. § 9-2.142(11)(A), it almost certainly imposes the obligations to coordinate with state and local prosecutors only in those cases in which there is a risk of prosecutions
by both federal and state authorities. Thus, the provision is designed to reduce the likelihood of
dual prosecutions, rather than to rationally allocate offenders between federal and state courts.
For a discussion of the "Petite Policy," see infra note 312.
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sections in the United States Attorneys' Manual, which provide offense-specific charging guidance, do not remedy this deficiency.25 9
B. THE "CoMPaRTIvE ADVANTAGE" APPROACH
Among other considerations, the "Principles of Federal Prosecution" encourage federal prosecutors to select cases based on differences between federal and state laws. They instruct federal
prosecutors to take into account whether there are "legal or evidentiary problems that might attend prosecution in the other jurisdiction. '2 60 They also mandate consideration of the "probable sentence"
available in the other jurisdiction.261 Taken together, these factors
suggest that federal prosecutors should select offenders in order to
take advantage of procedural and sentencing disparities between federal and state law. They encourage federal prosecutors to file federal
charges because critical evidence has been or will be suppressed in
state court, a defendant has greater bail or discovery rights in state
court, or a longer sentence is required in federal court.262 Consistent
259. For example, sections 9-101.200 and 9-101.400(B), which became effective in July 1992,
discuss when drug cases should be charged in federal court. These sections mandate the sufficiency of the evidence in individual cases as one factor to be considered and discuss the declination of federal prosecution and referral of cases to state and local prosecutors as alternatives to
federal prosecution. Thus, the sections suggest that the guidelines apply to cases that the federal
prosecutor has already reviewed, giving federal prosecutors guidance about when to bring
charges and when to decline prosecution in those cases. There is no indication that the sections
are meant to apply more broadly to promote rational policies for differentiating between cases
involving all drug offenders eligible for federal prosecution, whether or not the federal prosecutor has assessed the evidence. Similarly, although section 943.110 discourages federal prosecution of mall-fraud schemes that "consist[ ] of some isolated transactions between individuals
[and] involv[e] minor loss to the victims," it otherwise imposes no general obligation on federal
prosecutors to ensure that there is a rational basis to select only some of the eligible fraud cases
and leave others for state prosecution. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 252, § 9-43.110.
Further complicating matters, it sometimes appears as if federal prosecutors are unaware of
these guidelines or that they ignore them. For example, although section 9-131.040 limits use of
the robbery provisions of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, to "instances involving organized
crime, gang activity, or wide-ranging schemes," it is used in more mundane circumstances. See,
eg., United States v. Quigley, 53 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 1995) (Hobbs Act prosecution of case involving stabbing and armed robbery of eighty cents to be used to purchase beer).
Although individual United States Attorney's Offices often have their own internal guidelines, see KAhusAR E- AL., supra note 130, at 903 n.c, because they are not available to the
public, it is impossible to determine if they address the issues raised here.
260. DOJ MruA , supra note 252, § 9-27.240(B)(2).
261. See id. § 9-27.240(A)(3).
262. See Holion, supra note 3, at 513 n.57 (noting that the United States Attorneys' Manual
"appears virtually to instruct federal prosecutors to go after particular defendants on the basis
that a harsher sentence can be obtained under federal law").
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with these administrative guidelines, both the Attorney General 263
and a former Deputy Attorney General" have cited the benefits of
more advantageous federal law as a valid reason for selecting offenders for federal prosecution.265 Although the policy of seeking a comparative advantage does promote comparison of federally prosecuted
offenders with those charged in state court, it does not always ensure
rational selection of offenders. Even when it does promote rational
charging decisions, the comparative approach has other shortcomings.
The effort to obtain a comparative advantage does not always rationally distinguish between defendants selected for federal prosecution and those who are not. When compared with state laws, some
federal laws, such as those that increase the possibility of pretrial detention or routinely require longer sentences in drug cases, are uniformly advantageous to federal prosecutors. In those cases, a desire
to take advantage of federal law does not explain the selection of
some eligible defendants rather than others who would also be subject
to the proprosecution federal doctrines. 2 66 To screen rationally in
such cases, federal prosecutors must have some independent basis for
selecting the offenders against whom they seek to obtain the comparative advantage that federal law confers-for example, reliable information that a defendant is an organized crime figure or a major drug
trafficker.267 Such characteristics, as opposed to the advantages of
federal law, serve to rationally distinguish the selected offenders from
263. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, then Attorney-General-designate
Janet Reno explained that when she served as district attorney for Dade County, Florida, her
office referred a case against corrupt police officers to federal authorities in part to avoid more
liberal state discovery rules. See Hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination
of Janet Reno to be Attorney General (Mar. 9, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library,
SCRIPTS File.

264. In a recent article responding to critics' concerns about federalization, former Deputy
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick cited the "comparative advantage" of federal procedures such

as "preventive detention" and "stiffer penalties" as reasons for federal rather than state prosecution. See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 4, at 976-77.
265. See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Reporters' Draftfor the Working Group on
Federal-StateCooperation,46 HAsTINS L.J. 1319,1324-27 (1995) (discussing use of comparative

advantage approach to take advantage of "long sentences [and] favorable procedural rules such
as preventive detention"). Federal District Court Judge Stanley Marcus has "confessed" that
during his tenure as a United States Attorney he prosecuted cases in federal court because of
procedural advantages in that forum. See Landers, supra note 3, at 1263-64.
266. Thus, it is not surprising that former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick has concluded

that "[t]he comparative advantage approach does not imply that a federal prosecution should be
brought whenever the federal government has a comparative advantage." Gorelick & Litman,
supra note 4, at 977.
267. See Jeffries & Gleeson, supranote 54 (contending that advantages in federal court justify bringing organized crime prosecutions in that forum).
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those not prosecuted. Without such distinguishing characteristics, a selection decision made to take advantage of a uniformly advantageous
federal law does not explain
the different treatment and thus does not
68
protection.1
equal
satisfy
268. United States v. Batchelder,442 U.S. 114 (1979), does not suggest otherwise. In Batchelder, the Court stated that "[t]he prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon
conviction, but this fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection
or Due Process Clause." Id.at 125. The federal prosecutor in Batchelder had the option of
bringing charges under one of two different federal firearms statutes, both of which prohibited
convicted felons like Batchelder from possessing firearms. The prosecutor chose to use 18
U.S.C. § 922(h), which allowed imposition of a sentence of up to five years imprisonment, rather
than 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a), which carried a maximum sentence of only two years imprisonment. After conviction, the court imposed a five-year sentence. See id.at 116. On appeal,
Batchelder claimed that the government's ability to select which statute to charge could result in
unequal treatment of people who had committed the same crime and thus violated equal protection and due process. The Court rejected the claim, noting that in cases in which criminal conduct violates more than one criminal statute, prosecutors have broad discretion to select charges,
"so long as [they do] not discriminate against any class of defendants." Id.at 124. Analogizing
such cases to Batchelder's, the Court held that "j]ust as a defendant has no constitutional right
to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution neither is he entitled to choose the penalty scheme under which he will be sentenced." Id.
at 125. Lower courts have relied on Batchelderto deny the constitutional claims of defendants
subject to harsher penalties in federal court. Se4 eg., United States v. Nance, 962 F.2d 860, 865
(9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1991).
However, Batchelderis not inconsistent with the view that equal protection requires federal
prosecutors to have rational reasons for determining which offenders are subject to the possibility of longer sentences. First, Batchelder did not involve allegations that the government had
treated similarly situated others differently. Batchelder merely argued that the possibility of
disparate treatment violated equal protection and due process. Thus, there was no reason for
the Court to consider prosecutors' obligations to rationally distinguish between similarly situated
offenders. Second, the Court determined only that the prosecutor may be "influenced" by the
possibility of a longer sentence. The Court did not address a situation in which the desire to
impose harsher penalties is the only reason for the changing decision, without some independent
basis for distinguishing between offenders. Third, Batchelderinvolved a selection of one federal
statute rather than another, not a selection between state and federal forums. Thus, concerns
about the effect charging decisions would have on state criminal justice systems, see infra notes
269-70 and accompanying text, were absent. Finally, at the time the Court decided Batchelder,
federal judges had largely unfettered sentencing discretion. The judge who sentenced Batchelder was free to impose a sentence no longer than that which would have been available had the
government brought charges under § 1202(a). As the Court acknowledged, judicial discretion
was available to ameliorate any improprieties in the charging decision: "[A prosecutor's] decision to proceed under § 922(h) does not empower the Government to predetermine ultimate
criminal sanctions. Rather, it merely enables the sentencing judge to impose a longer prison
sentence than § 1202(a) would permit...." Batchelder,442 U.S. at 125. In contrast, under the
present federal sentencing regime, with its mandatory minimum sentences and rigid guidelines,
the prosecutor's decision to select a defendant for federal prosecution will likely preclude the
sentencing court from taking into consideration the shorter sentence that would have been imposed in state court and reducing the federal sentence accordingly. See United States v. Reyes,
966 F.2d 508, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1992) (district courts lack authority to depart from sentencing
guidelines to conform sentence to that received by co-accused who is prosecuted in state court).
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In other circumstances, however, federal law may provide a comparative advantage only in certain cases, thus serving to distinguish
the selected offender from others who instead are prosecuted in state
court. For example, in a particular case, state law may require suppression of evidence that is admissible in federal court. Resort to federal law for its comparative advantage in such cases provides a
rational basis for distinction and thus does not raise equal protection
concerns. Nonetheless, these situations may be problematic for other
reasons which should matter to the Department of Justice.
First, when promoted as a method of selection, the comparative
advantage approach encourages federal prosecutors to intentionally
circumvent legal protections that states afford offenders. In essence,
these selection decisions defeat the policies underlying state laws, such
as states' determinations that people who commit crimes within their
borders are entitled to certain procedural protections and should be
subject to certain punishments.269 Conflicts between the policies embodied in the federal and state criminal justice systems are unavoidable, given the expansion of federal substantive criminal law and the
procedural and sentencing differences between the two systems.
However, the Department of Justice should be wary of exacerbating
269. In fact, some state attorneys general and judges have expressed displeasure with the
intrusion of federal criminal law. See; e.g., Brickey, supra note 29, at 1165-66 n.170 (summarizing
views of attorneys general and judges); Reports and Proposals:Federalizationof Crime Is Focus
of FederalBar Association Panel Discussion, 58 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1175-76 (Nov. 22, 1995)
(giving judges' views of federalization).
One might respond that a federal prosecution does nothing to prevent a state from treating
those who violate state law any way that the state deems fit. Double jeopardy doctrine does not
bar a state from bringing charges when there has been a federal prosecution. See supra note 7.
Although some states have statutory prohibitions on state prosecutions following federal prosecutions, see, eg., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 687 (West 1995); N.Y. Cm. PRoc- LAW §§ 40.10-40.30
(McKinney 1995), such laws reflect state policy choices and are not imposed by the federal government. Thus, unless they have chosen to bar successive prosecutions in their own courts, states
are free to apply any procedural rules and impose any sentences they deem appropriate, independent of federal charging decisions, prosecutions, and sentences.
Although technically correct, this view ignores the real concern-the federal government's
intrusion into law enforcement and its prosecutorial decisions that override state policy choices.
Subsequent state prosecutions not only fail to rectify that intrusion; at worst, they effectively
increase the offenders' sentences, exacerbating the problem. When federal prosecutors select an
offender in orderto circumvent more prodefendant state law, rather than because of some other
federal interest, their conduct infringes on the states' historical role as the primary enforcer of
criminal law, an infringement that a subsequent state prosecution will not remedy. The problem
is not simply that the federal government is increasing its involvement in law enforcement,
although some critics see that as a concern, see supranote 4, it is that federal prosecutors' charging decisions in individual cases purposefully frustrate state policy determinations about a matter
that historically has been within state and local control.
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the situation by encouraging its trial-line prosecutors, who are unlikely to be sensitive to state-federal comity concerns, to exploit differences as a principal method of selecting offenders.
Selection of defendants in order to defeat state procedural protections can also reduce the efficacy of state efforts to deter police and
prosecutorial misconduct. State and local law enforcement officers
who are aware that evidence obtained in violation of state constitutional law is nonetheless admissible in federal court will have less incentive to respect state constitutional rights. 270 The same holds true
for state prosecutors, who may be more willing to violate state laws
protecting defendants knowing that if courts sanction them by dismissal or another remedy that forecloses state prosecution, federal prosecution remains available. In fact, if investigators believe that federal
prosecution will be advantageous, they may violate state constitutional guarantees intentionally in an attempt to make the state forum
unavailable and thus prompt federal prosecutors to bring charges.
Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, selecting offenders for federal prosecution in order to obtain a legal advantage can penalize
them for having valid claims under state law. Often, multiple aspects
of federal law, frequently including sentencing, are more favorable to
the prosecution than state law. If a federal prosecutor selects a defendant in order to obtain a comparative advantage by avoiding a
state constitutional or procedural protection, such as a prodefendant
discovery or suppression doctrine, the defendant may not only be
stripped of that benefit, but he may also be subject to other aspects of
federal law that are harsher than those that he would have faced in
state court.271 There is a danger that when police or state prosecutors
270. Cf. State v. Isom, 761 P.2d 524, 528-29 (Or. 1988) ("[Far from discouraging the [local]
police [from continuing to question a suspect after he requests a lawyer], the federal rule [allowing statements taken in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach] they were following
actually encourages unconstitutional interrogation where the suspect has taken the police at
their word and declined to talk.... Police officers have a duty to uphold the constitution of this
state and may not intentionally violate a person's constitutional rights without serious
sanctions.").
271. This scenario occurred in United States v. Deitz, 991 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1993). Deitz was
charged with drug offenses in an Arkansas court. The case was dismissed when the state failed
to bring the case to trial within the time limits of the state speedy trial act. As a result of his
successful assertion of state rights, Deitz was charged in federal court, where he received a
longer sentence than he would have if convicted in state court. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's refusal to depart downward from the applicable federal sentence. See
id. at 447-48. In dissent, Senior Judge Bright noted that "the defendant who asserts rights
granted under state law now faces increased penalties in a federal court." Id. at 449 (Bright, J.,
dissenting). See also United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271 (2d Cir. 1996); People v. Reilly, 606
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violate state law, federal prosecutors will intervene to salvage prosecutions, and defendants will suffer harsher treatment because their
state constitutional or statutory rights have been violated. The defendant will not go free when the constable blunders; instead, he will
receive a longer sentence in federal court.
C.

CHARGING PRACTIICES

Because prevailing doctrine ensures that federal prosecutors will
almost never have to explain decisions to ignore, reject, or select offenders,2 72 and because practices vary from district to district, it is difficult to determine how federal prosecutors choose which offenders to
prosecute under duplicative federal statutes and whether they do so
for reasons related to legitimate government objectives.273 At best,
one would hope that federal prosecutors make charging decisions, including decisions that determine which cases they will consider for
prosecution, based on predetermined guidelines or standards designed
to further the goals of effective law enforcement. Some United States
Attorneys' Offices do employ such guidelines. 274
N.Y.S. 2d 836 (1994). Reilly received a six-month sentence in state court for growing marijuana.
He appealed, alleging that the search that uncovered the marijuana violated state constitutional
guarantees broader than those available in federal court. The appellate court agreed, suppressing the marijuana needed to convict him, reversing the conviction, and dismissing the indictment. See id. at 840. As a result, Reilly was prosecuted in federal court and exposed to the
possibility of a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment. See United States v.
Reilly, 875 F. Supp. 108 (N.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 76 F.3d 1271 (2d Cir. 1996). Fortunately for
Reilly, the federal district judge suppressed the marijuana on other grounds, see Reilly, 875 F.
Supp. at 121, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
272. Prosecutors need not produce discovery related to a selective prosecution claim unless
a defendant presents some evidence of discriminatory effect and intent. See United States v.
Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480,1488 (1996). Although Armstrong only addressed the discriminatory
effect requirement in the context of the threshold burden to obtain discovery, it mentioned with
approval that Courts of Appeals require a defendant seeking discovery to present evidence of
"discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent." Id.
273. In 1980, Professor Frase studied the charging practices of the United States Attorney's
Office for the Northern District of Illinois. See Frase, supra note 170. Although instructive,
Frase's study has limited application to the present inquiry. First, Frase only considered those
matters actually referred to the office for prosecution. He did not examine cases that had been
prescreened by some selection method that limited the number of cases that the office had to
consider. See id. at 255. Second, Frase's study is now 16 years old and precedes the present
federalization concerns. Third, it only reflects the charging practices of a single United States
Attorney's Office.
274. For example, some districts use quantitative guidelines to determine whether federal
prosecution is warranted, imposing a threshold weight figure in drug cases or a dollar figure in
fraud or money-laundering cases. These districts prosecute only those cases involving amounts
above the threshold. See, eg., CocAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING PoLcy, supra note 160, at
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On the other hand, one might fear that even if they obey constitutional and administrative prohibitions barring the conscious selection
of offenders for obviously improper reasons such as race, some federal
prosecutors nonetheless select offenders haphazardly, without rationally distinguishing them from similarly situated others who receive
radically different treatment in state court.275 Although these federal
prosecutors may not intentionally select defendants for bad reasons,
they do not do so for principled reasons either. Some observers have
concluded that such a fear is valid,2 76 and anecdotal evidence supports
their conclusions.
For example, some federal prosecutors apparently bring charges
in drug cases against offenders who are no different than those routinely charged in state courts. In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee noted that "[t]he federal system [is being] overwhelmed with
[drug] cases that could be prosecuted in state courts," and that "at the
present time minor [drug] cases that lack.., a connection [to interstate or foreign commerce] are being brought in many districts. '277
Similarly, numerous reported appellate decisions describe federal
139 (discussing 50 gram threshold for crack cocaine prosecutions in the Central District of California); Bowman, supra note 92, at 739 n.219 (describing five kilogram powder guidelines in
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida in the early 1990s). Those
guidelines can serve as rough indicators of the most serious offenders in that district.
275. See, ag., United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,510 U.S. 1138
(1994). See also discussion supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text. In Palmer,there was evidence that the United States Attorney's Office had no policy for determining which cases were
prosecuted in state court and which cases were charged in federal court. See supra note 24.
276. Professor Beale contends that "the decision to bring charges in federal rather than state
court is made on an ad hoc basis.... [Mjany [United States Attorney's Offices have] no standards to guide individual prosecutors." Beale, supranote 2, at 999-1000. See also Curtis,supra
note 177, at 86 ("[E]rratic prosecution of and disparate penalties for similarly situated defendants are commonplace."). Professor Givelber expressed a similar concern in 1973: "In reality,
then, a decision to selectively prosecute an offender for a crime may involve neither a rational
policy nor a considered value judgment nor expertise." Givelber, supra note 28, at 104.
In the Central District of California, where I practiced as a federal prosecutor from 1987
until 1994, screening decisions for many cases involving duplicative federal statutes were made
according to predetermined guidelines based largely, but not wholly, on drug weights and dollar
amounts. Sometimes, however, offenders who did not satisfy the predetermined guidelines, and
who were no different than offenders being charged in California state courts, were charged in
federal court and subjected to harsher penalties.
277. REPORT, supra note 2, at 37 (1990); see also Beale, supra note 2, at 990 (describing
complaints of district court judges in the District of Columbia about prosecution of minor drug
cases in federal courts). Because the Department of Justice at one time considered workload of
individual United States Attorney's Offices as a factor when allocating resources, there was a
danger that federal prosecutors pursued minor drug cases to inflate their statistics and obtain
more resources. See DOJ ALERT, Nov. 1, 1993.
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prosecutions in robbery,7 8 bribery and extortion,279 and arson 2s0
cases of offenders whose crimes appear identical to cases routinely
prosecuted in state courts.
Furthermore, the federal government has adopted policies, at
both the national and local level, that promote prosecution of offenders under duplicative federal statutes but ignore the possibility that
similarly situated others are charged in state court. For example, in
early 1991, in order to take advantage of lengthy federal sentences,
the Department of Justice announced "Operation Triggerlock," a vigorous federal effort to prosecute cases involving possession and use of
firearms in violation of federal law,2 1 despite the fact that far more
firearms offenders were prosecuted in state court?82 In the Southern
District of New York, from 1983 until 1989, a program dubbed "Federal Day" mandated federal prosecution of all drug arrestees on randomly selected days? 83 Obviously, the only thing that distinguished
offenders prosecuted in federal court from those charged in state
court was the day of the week on which they happened to be arrested.214 Likewise, the federal government periodically prosecutes
defendants who are arrested in random law enforcement "sweeps."
These sweeps take place during a short period of time and involve
numerous arrests either in a specific geographical area, for violation of
278. See, eg., cases cited supra note 112.
279. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 113.
280. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114.
281. See Gun Crimes Targeted By Prosecutors,WAsm PosT, Apr. 11, 1991, at A14; Thornburg Orders Drive on Gun Violence, N.Y. Tanms, Mar. 27, 1991, at A20. Federal statutes
criminalizing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1) (1996), use
of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence, see id. § 924(c)(1), and possession of a firearm by a career criminal, see id. § 924(e)(1), "form[ed] the core of the program."
Michael M. Baylson, MandatoryMinimum Sentences:A FederalProsecutor'sViewpoint, 40 FED.
B. NEws & J. 167 (1993).
282. In October 1992, then-President Bush claimed that there had been nearly 8,000 arrests
as a result of Triggerlock. See Bush v. Clinton, The Candidateson Legal Issues, 78 A.B.A.J. 57,
60 (1992). That year alone there were approximately 26,422 defendants who the states convicted of firearms offenses. See SouRcEBooc, supra note 132, at 498 tbl.5.46.
283. See United States v. Aguilar, 779 F2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing "Federal
Day" as "the day of the week when federal law enforcement authorities have decided to convert
garden-variety state law drug offenses into federal offenses"); Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in
the War on Drugs Tt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at A18 ("In
Manhattan, under a program known as Federal Day, more than 1,200 Federal indictments have
been handed up since 1983 in cases developed by the local authorities. [D]uring one random day
a week[,] all drug arrests are processed in Federal court... . ").
284. See Aguilar,779 F.2d at 125 (involving a "Federal Day" case that "was developed by
New York City police officers, concerns readily visible criminal conduct requiring no special
investigatory resources or equipment, and involves a $30 [heroin] transaction").
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a particular crime, or both, without regard to whether similarly situated others are charged in state court. s5
D. AMENDING THE "PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION"
Although available evidence does not reveal the prevalence of
unprincipled selection of offenders for duplicative federal prosecution,28 6 existing administrative guidelines do not prohibit such selection. This deficiency, coupled with anecdotal evidence that federal
prosecutors sometimes do choose offenders who appear to be no different than those prosecuted for analogous offenses in state court, is
sufficiently troubling to warrant amendment of the "Principles of Federal Prosecution" to ensure compliance with the equal protection rationality requirement. Before describing specific proposals, however,
it is worthwhile to consider two objections to the conclusion that
amendments are needed to conform Department of Justice policy to
the constitutional requirement of rational charging decisions.
1.

What Does Equal ProtectionRequire?

First, equal protection imposes constraints only when a prosecutor "knows" of similarly situated offenders who will receive different
treatment as a result of a charging decision. Therefore, one could argue that even if federal prosecutors are bound to obey the rational
relationship component of equal protection, they do not know enough
about cases against offenders prosecuted in state court to trigger a
constitutional obligation to rationally distinguish them from defendants selected for federal prosecution. Second, one might contend that
intentionally random selection of offenders for federal prosecution is
a rational method of classification because it promotes deterrence. If
so, then as long as federal prosecutors do not choose defendants for
improper reasons like race or personal animosity, unprincipled or
285.

See, eg., United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935,936 (9th Cir. 1992) ("On June 14 and

15, 1990, federal agents and local law enforcement officers arrested more than 100 alleged gang
members in South Central Los Angeles. These arrests were part of a publicized, nationwide
effort, dubbed 'Operation Streetsweep,' that resulted in at least 160 arrests in 11 states.");
United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1985) ("This case arose out of one of the New
York City Police Department's 'buy operations-numerous purchases in a targeted area of
small amounts of drugs, supposedly for personal use, by undercover agents, followed by arrests
and federal prosecution of the sellers. The sweep here was 'Operation Pressure Point'; the target
area was the area around Eighth Avenue and 115th Street in Harlem.").
286. Because doctrine does not require prosecutors to explain charging decisions, see supra
note 272 and accompanying text, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the prevalence of
unprincipled charging.
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haphazard selection may be sufficiently random to satisfy equal protection. Because the Department guidelines already prohibit improper reasons, there is no need to add an affirmative obligation to
have rational reasons.
a. What do federal prosecutors "know"?: The Supreme Court
established the equal protection knowledge requirement in Oyler v.
Boles. s7 After Oyler's conviction for second-degree murder, a state
prosecutor charged him as a habitual offender under a statute that
imposed a mandatory life sentence. Oyler claimed that the charging
decision violated equal protection because the prosecutor had not
sought to enhance the sentences of other eligible repeat offenders.
The Court noted that Oyler had not alleged that the prosecutor knew
of the other eligible offenders and determined that this defect was fatal to his equal protection claim.3
At issue here is whether Oyler's knowledge requirement insulates
federal prosecutors from having to rationally distinguish offenders
whom they charge under duplicative federal statutes from those whom
the state prosecutes instead. On one hand, federal prosecutors have
some general awareness that there are apprehended offenders being
prosecuted in state court who are eligible for prosecution under duplicative federal statutes. That is, unlike those who escape prosecution
altogether, offenders charged in state court are in some sense
"known" to federal prosecutors. On the other hand, if federal prosecutors have not considered the merits of the cases against these offenders, they may not "know" about them, just as the Oyler Court
concluded that the prosecutor there did not know about the uncharged but eligible habitual offenders in that case.
287. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
288. See id. at 456. See also Rickett v. Jones, 901 F.2d 1058 (11th Cir. 1990). Rickett challenged a prosecutor's decision to charge him under an Alabama habitual offender sentencing
statute that requires prosecutors to bring charges against all eligible offenders. See id- at 1059.
Rickett claimed that the prosecutor's failure to file identical charges against his codefendant
Battles, who arguably was also eligible for habitual offender sentencing, violated equal protection. See id. The lower court determined that the prosecutor did not charge Battles as a habitual
offender because the prosecutor had neglected to request readily available records that showed
that Battles was eligible for such treatment. See id- at 1061, 1063 n.2 (Johnson, J., concurring).
The appellate court held that the prosecutor's negligent failure to identify Battles as eligible did
not violate Rickett's equal protection rights because Rickett demonstrated the existence of only
one potentially eligible but unselected offender. See id. at 1060-61. The court noted, however,
that "if failure to apply the [habitual offender statute] were to become more than occasional and
random, the federal Constitution might be violated, requiring federal court intervention." Id. at
1061.

HeinOnline -- 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 709 1996-1997

710

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:643

The latter position, denying that federal prosecutors have sufficient knowledge to trigger constitutional concerns, takes too narrow a
view of equal protection. The focus of inquiry should not be limited
to the manner in which federal prosecutors select offenders from the
pool of cases they have already chosen to review, but should also extend to the earlier decision to review some cases and ignore others.
Because federal prosecutors are aware of the larger pool of apprehended offenders, equal protection obligates them to have a rational
basis for distinguishing cases they review from cases they do not. Not
only must federal prosecutors act rationally when they select from
among the pool of offenders whose cases they do review, they also
must act rationally when they choose which apprehended violators of
duplicative federal statutes will make up that pool.2" 9
Even if federal prosecutors have no constitutional obligation to
rationally select the pool of potential federal prosecutees, the Department of Justice should impose such an obligation as a matter of policy.
Adherence to a narrow construction of equal protection would inform
federal prosecutors that they have no duty to consider the problem of
disparate treatment and can avoid equal protection concerns as long
as they remain subjectively ignorant of cases involving similarly situated offenders. A responsible commitment to the principles underlying equal protection should compel the Department to require more
of its prosecutors, mandating that they determine whether their charging practices result in disparate treatment, rather than enabling them
to close their eyes to that probability.
In addition, the Department has publicized its successful efforts
to achieve cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.290 Federal prosecutors often work with their state and
local counterparts, and they routinely bring charges against offenders
289. Justice Marshall made this point in his dissent in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985), in the context of allegations of discriminatory selective prosecution. Marshall wrote: "If
the Government intentionally discriminated in defining the pool of potential prosecutees, it cannot immunize itself from liability merely by showing that it used permissible methods in choosing whom to prosecute from this previously tainted pool." Id. at 630 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
If, as I have contended, equal protection requires rational charging decisions as well as prohibiting discriminatory ones, then Justice Marshall's observation applies with equal force when federal prosecutors determine which offenders' cases they will review for possible federal
prosecution.
290. See, &g., Robert L. Jackson, Violent Crime Down in 1995, Justice Department Reports,
L.A. Tnhms, Sept. 18, 1996, at A14; Justice Dep't Hearing, Federal News Service, Oct. 10, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Justice Dep't Hearing, Federal News Service, Apr. 25, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Transcriptof News Conference,Federal Document Clearinghouse, Inc. NBC Professional, May 13, 1996, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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who have been arrested by local police or joint federal and local task
forces.29 1 It would be inconsistent for the Department to tout these
accomplishments and pursue cases resulting from arrests by local
agencies while denying that it has an obligation to rationally determine which offenders will be prosecuted in which forum. Rather, the
Department should adopt an approach consistent with the spirit of
both equal protection and federal, state, and local cooperation by having a rational and consistent basis for determining which offenders are
prosecuted in state court and which are prosecuted in federal court.
b. Is random selection rational?: If one concludes that random
selection, such as that employed in federal prosecutive policies like
"Federal Day," comports with equal protection, it may follow that intentionally unprincipled selection does as well.2 2 In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,293 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of random selection. Six justices concluded that a
state's termination of an employment discrimination claim because of
a state agency's accidental random scheduling error established a classification that violated the rationality requirement of equal protection.294 The Court, however, has never determined whether
intentional random selection is similarly infirm. 295 Lower courts that
291. See United States v. Davis, 906 F2d 829, 831 (2d Cir. 1990) ("As the challenge facing
the nation's law enforcement authorities has grown in sophistication and complexity, cooperation between federal and local agencies has become increasingly important and increasingly
commonplace."); Curtis, supranote 177, at 89 ("Joint state-federal task forces abound. State law
enforcement officers are encouraged to make referrals for federal prosecution of crimes within
state jurisdiction.").
292. Of course, if unprincipled selection is not purely random, possibilities for abuse exist.
See Frase, supranote 170, at 283 ("Such 'arbitrary' selection raises greater potential risks that the
prosecutor will 'randomly' select his enemies...
293. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
294. Although the majority decided the case on due process grounds, see id. at 433-38, Justice Blackmun, who authored the majority opinion, was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and O'Connor in a concurring opinion finding an equal protection violation. See id. at 438-42.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented from the majority's due process holding, but agreed that
there was an equal protection violation. See id. at 443-44; Rickett v. Jones, 901 F2d 1058,1063 &
n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (Johnson, J., concurring) (describing treatment of equal protection issue in
Logan).
295. A remark in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), suggests that intentional random
selection is constitutional, at least in some contexts. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76 (1971), the
Court determined that a state statute that preferred men to women as administrators of decedents' estates violated equal protection despite the state's contention that it "reduce[d] the
workload of probate courts by eliminating one class of contests." Twelve years later, in Lehr,
while discussing the statute that it had struck down in Reed, the Court intimated that a "coin
flip" would have been a preferable means of reducing the administrative workload of probate
courts. See Lehr, 463 U.S at 265-66 n.24. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 667 (1979)
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have considered the issue in passing have reached contrary conclusions.

96

Some observers contend that purely random selection is con-

sistent with equal protection because all are equally likely to be
selected. 97 Others conclude that random selection is problematic,
and possibly unconstitutional, because the basis for selection has nothing to do with legitimate government objectives.2 98 Arguably, in situations in which the government must selectively prosecute, random
selection is unrelated to any objective that the government seeks to
further.29 9
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (assuming that a random traffic stop by a police officer does not violate equal protection). Even if intentional random selection as a means of selecting estate administrators and motorists subject to traffic stops does not violate equal protection, it does not
necessarily follow that the same is true for random selection for prosecution, a decision with far
higher stakes. See infra notes 302-303 and accompanying text.
296. CompareUnited States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
that "[g]iven the significance of the prosecutor's charging and plea bargaining decisions, it would
offend common notions of justice to have them made on the basis of a dart throw, a coin toss or
some other arbitrary or capricious process" and suggesting that although such decisionmaking
violates due process, separation of powers concerns precludes judicial review), with Futernick v.
Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1059 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 117 S.C. 296 (1996) ("It is clearly
not a violation of equal protection if a local regulator, faced with limited resources, picks people
to regulate in a perfectly random manner."), Esmall v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178-79 (7th Cir.
1995) ("[Random] selective prosecution, although it involves dramatically unequal legal treatment, has no standing in equal protection law."), and United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148,1152
(9th Cir. 1972) (stating that "mere random selection" would be a satisfactory method of selecting
for prosecution among those who failed to complete census forms).
297. See, e.g., RcnARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSiS oF LAw 230 (1992) ("In an
equally significant sense both the criminal justice system that creates low probabilities of apprehension and conviction and the lottery are fair so long as the ex ante costs and benefits are
equalized among the participants."); Note, Equal Protection:A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny,
76 Mica L. REv. 771, 867 n.344 (1978) [hereinafter Closer Scrutiny] ("[W]hen the class is limited by lot, all are 'treated equally' with respect to their chance to win [or lose] the lottery.").
This view requires that one define the government's "treatment" of individuals for purposes of
equal protection analysis as its exposure of them to the potential of benefits or burdens. It
seems more likely that the Court would assess the equality of "treatment" at the point at which
the government actually imposes the benefits or burdens. The opinions of Justices Blackmun and
Powell in Logan, which represented the views of six of the Justices on the Court, see supranotes
293-94 and accompanying text, suggest that the Court would adopt the latter approach. In Logan, all potential employment discrimination claimants were equally likely to be the victim of a
random scheduling error which would terminate their claims. Rather than conclude that equal
potential exposure to such a claim-terminating error satisfied equal protection, the six justices
instead asked whether there was a rational basis for the government to treat Logan differently
than the others by actually terminating his claim and determined that there was not.
298. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36
UCLA L. Rnv. 447, 524-27 (1989); Closer Scrutiny, supra note 297, at 861-68 ("Burdening one
person within the broad class serves the goal as well as burdening another.").
299. The draft lottery, the random selection of jury venires, and social experiments are commonly cited as examples of random selection. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 298, at 527 n.276
(jury selection and draft); Ahkil Reed Amar, Note, ChoosingRepresentatives By Lottery Voting,
93 YALE LJ. 1283,1307 (1984) (referring to selection of jury venires by lottery); Closer Scrutiny,
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However, unlike the idiosyncratic, negligent random selection in
Logan, intentional randomness is not necessarily unrelated to government objectives. Random distribution of burdens or benefits itself
may further objectives that other selection methods cannot achieve.
Indeed, some contend that the imposition of random harsh sentences
is a rational means of maximizing the deterrent effect of limited law
enforcement resources. 00 If this is true, then federal prosecutors may
achieve a similar deterrent effect by selecting offenders for harsher
treatment in federal court in a random or unprincipled manner. 01
Under this view, as long as they do not make charging decisions for
bad reasons, the Constitution does not require that prosecutors have
good ones.
However, the interests at stake in the selective enforcement of
duplicative federal statutes are sufficiently high that the Department
of Justice should refrain from adopting the view that purely random or
unprincipled selection is constitutional or desirable as a means of
making charging decisions. Although random classifications affecting
less important interests may not merit concern, 3 2 random determination of an offender's procedural protections or sentence seems fundamentally unfair, particularly without proof of a tangible deterrent
effect. It is difficult to reconcile the guarantee of equal protection
with the intentional use of a policy that randomly subjects one offender to a small fine and another who is similarly situated to the near
supra note 297, at 863-65. For a discussion of experiments with random leniency, see Peter
Westen, To Lure the TarantulaFrom Its Hole: A Response, 83 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1186, 1196 n.29
(1983).
300. See, eg., Futernick,78 F.3d at 1057 n.8 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[R]andom choice may be one
of the most sensible methods to allocate 'equally' finite enforcement resources.") (emphasis
omitted); Falls v. Town of Dyer, 875 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Government rationally may
decide that imposing stiff penalties on 10% of offenders is the best way to enforce the law
against all."); Beale, supranote 2, at 1003 ("[T]here is an economic argument that the arbitrary
selection of a few cases for harsh sentencing is the most efficient, Le., least expensive, means of
promoting deterrence."). However, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court concluded that random police stops of motorists for license and registration checks were unlikely to
deter unlicensed persons from driving. See id. at 660.
301. Some, including the local district attorney, questioned the efficacy of the random Federal Day program as a deterrent. See Robert M. Morgenthau, We Are Losing the War on Drugs,
N.Y. TIMs, Feb. 16, 1988, at A21 ("If the war on drugs is to succeed, the Federal Government
must give us more than Panglossian rhetoric or showy 'Federal days'-the marching of street
peddlers off to Federal, rather than state, court."); Deborah Squiers, Banker Turned Defender
Manages Legal Aid Unit ForLocal FederalCourts,N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15,1990, at 1 (quoting Federal
Public Defender Leonard Joy as characterizing Federal Day program as "absurd. It makes good
press but I don't think it ever made any dent.").
302. For example, random selection of persons to serve on jury panels is certainly
constitutional.
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certainty of a ten-year term of imprisonment. °3 Even if constitutional
doctrine does not preclude such a practice, the Department of Justice
should as a matter of policy. It would be unthinkable for the Department to propose legislation requiring judges to spin a roulette wheel
to determine criminal defendants' procedural protections and
sentences. The Department should not risk the same result by giving
its prosecutors free reign to make unprincipled charging decisions.
This is not to suggest that the Department of Justice has chosen
to promote random or unprincipled selection. It has not.30 4 However,
by employing guidelines that do not require federal prosecutors to
compare offenders whom they charge with those prosecuted in state
court and that only prohibit federal prosecutors from bringing charges
for bad reasons, the Department allows its prosecutors to ignore similarly situated state-prosecuted offenders and to make selection decisions without good reason.
2. Proposed Changes
Regardless of whether equal protection requires prosecutors to
make rational charging decisions and bars unprincipled classifications,
the Department should be sufficiently concerned with the disparity
wrought by unguided charging discretion to provide additional direction to its prosecutors. 30 5 It could do so by making four changes to the
"Principles of Federal Prosecution."
First, the Department should charge its prosecutors with learning,
as a general matter, the nature and severity of crimes committed by all
known offenders eligible for federal prosecution. Because known offenders typically are prosecuted either in state or federal court, this
303. Although the Selective Service draft lottery also employs random selection to make
choices involving similarly important interests, there may be compelling societal reasons justifying use of such classification in that context, such as "placing a cross section of the community
...on the battlefield." See CloserScrutiny, supranote 297, at 865. In addition, random selection
may be preferable to any other method of selection. In contrast, even if placing a fair cross
section of the community in federal prison were a legitimate governmental aim, random selection for federal prosecution would not further that objective because the sample of offenders
would be skewed by disparities in arrest rates.
304. When Senator Joseph Biden proposed legislation requiring a nationwide Federal Day
program patterned after the random program employed in the Southern District of New York,
the Department of Justice opposed it, although not because of concerns that it would promote
unprincipled disparity. Rather, the Department saw the program as an unjustified congressional
intrusion into federal prosecutors' charging discretion. See Ann Pelham & Richard Connelly,
U.S. Judges Oppose FederalDay Measure, Tax. LAw., May 28, 1990, at 12.
305. For a discussion of the virtues of consistency in prosecutorial decisionmaking, see
Abrams, supra note 28, at 4 n.8.
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would require federal prosecutors to keep abreast of cases involving
state-prosecuted offenders whose conduct makes them eligible for
federal prosecution as well. Individual United States Attorney's Offices could do so by working with local law enforcement agencies or
prosecutors to learn of the types of cases that are referred to state
prosecutors.0 6
Federal prosecutors would not need to conduct detailed review of
the cases against eligible offenders, a task that would deplete precious
federal prosecutive resources. Indeed, the focus should not be on the
strength of the evidence in individual cases, but rather on general
characteristics that could serve to rationally distinguish offenders
prosecuted by the state from those charged in federal court. Such
characteristics might include the quantity of drugs or money involved
in the offense.
Second, the Department should require that individual United
States Attorney's Offices develop and consistently apply internal
prosecutive classification schemes that use particular characteristics of
crimes and criminals in order to distinguish cases that will not be reviewed from cases the federal prosecutors will review to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute. Although the
schemes need not be rigid, exceptions should be tailored to minimize
the possibility of disparate treatment of similarly situated offenders. 0 7
Local prosecutive guidelines are preferable to nationwide legislative
and administrative classification schemes because local guidelines
would allow federal prosecutors to tailor standards to local crime
problems. Although this proposed change is more modest than those
calling for policies limiting federal prosecution to cases that are either
distinctly federal in nature or require federal law enforcement resources, 308 the mandated use of a rational selection scheme may
306. 7The Supreme Court recently determined that information about the existence of similarly situated offenders prosecuted in state court is available to defendants attempting to raise
selective prosecution challenges. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 U.S. 1480, 1489 (1996)
(describing task of proving existence of similarly situated others as not "insuperable" for defendants). Federal prosecutors, who have the benefit of cooperative relationships with state and
local law enforcement agencies, should have ittle or no difficulty obtaining the same
information.

307. For example, a United States Attorney's Office may, as a general matter, review for
prosecution only those cocaine cases that involve possession or distribution of five or more kilograms of cocaine. But the same office may make exceptions for cases involving less than five
kilograms if, for example, there is evidence that an offender employed firearms or violence while
trafficking in drugs, or had prior convictions for drug trafficking.
308. For proposals suggesting that federal prosecution be limited to cases that involve some
distinct or unique federal interest or characteristic, see supra note 28.
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prompt individual United States Attorney's Offices to use federalismbased proposals as models. The Department should also encourage
its prosecutors to work with local prosecutors to develop mutually
agreeable classification schemes allocating federal and state prosecufive resources to maximize the advantages of overlapping jurisdiction
while guaranteeing roughly equal treatment for similarly situated
offenders. 30 9
Third, the Department should prohibit random selection of offenders for federal prosecution. Absent compelling evidence that random selection effectively deters crime, far too much is at stake to
3 10
allow federal prosecutors to select offenders by chance.
Fourth, rather than encourage federal prosecution as a means of
gaining a comparative advantage, the Department should require that
there be some characteristics of a case, other than a mere desire to
avoid state procedural protections and take advantage of federal sentencing doctrines, to warrant federal prosecution. If there are legitimate reasons for prosecuting an offender in federal court independent
of the imposition of harsher treatment, defendants' loss of state court
advantages should not preclude federal prosecution. When federal
prosecution is uniformly advantageous, however, the desire to obtain
a tactical or strategic advantage alone should not suffice. 3 11
In addition, although not mandated by either the letter or the
spirit of equal protection, the Department should require the exercise
309. Presently, United States Attorneys are "urged to cooperate fully with state and local
prosecutors and investigators" in drug cases, DOJ MANUAL, supra note 252, § 9-101.200(F), and
instructed to "meet or confer with state and local prosecutors in connection with referral of
federal cases for prosecution." Id. § 9-101.200 (H). This obligation should be expanded to all
cases involving overlapping federal and state jurisdiction and to require rational determination
of the appropriate forum for prosecution for all such cases. See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: CoCAINE Am FEDERAL SENTENCINO PoucY 6-7 (1997) (recommending "efforts to rationalize" use of federal and state resources to combat drug trafficking
and use).
310. Were there reliable evidence that a prosecutor's ability to give different treatment
to like cases provides a higher level of deterrence and "more bang for the buck" than
would a system of clearly established, uniform sanctions, one could argue that gains in
crime control outweigh the inherent unfairness of unpredictable differentiation. Such
clear gains have not been shown, however, and the burden of persuasion ought to be on
those who advocate a policy that seems dangerously at odds with basic notions of equal
protection....
Vorenberg, supra note 28, at 1550 (footnote omitted).
311. Such a change would make Department policy consistent in capital and noncapital
cases. The United States Attorneys' Manual death penalty guidelines state that "[i]n states where
the imposition of the death penalty is not authorized by law, the fact that the maximum federal
penalty is death is insufficient, standing alone, to show a more substantial interest in federal
prosecution." DOJ MANUAL, supra note 252, § 9-10.000.
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of considerable caution before bringing charges in cases (1) involving
offenders who would have been prosecuted in state court but for their
anticipated or actual assertion of state constitutional or procedural
protections and (2) where federal prosecution will not only have the
effect of circumventing those protections, but will also prejudice the
offenders in other ways, such as the imposition of a longer sentence.
Although the federal government may have a legitimate ground for
prosecuting such cases, particularly when the operation of state constitutional or procedural doctrines requires suppression of critical evidence or precludes state prosecution altogether, the Department
should not tread on the state policies that require these results and
penalize defendants whose state rights are violated without a compelling reason for doing so. It may be appropriate to require both a substantial federal interest in the prosecution and advance approval by a
high-level Department of Justice official to prosecute such cases, as is
required when federal prosecutors seek to bring charges after there
has been a conviction or acquittal in state court.312
IV. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
If the Department of Justice were to do nothing to ensure that its
prosecutors have a rational basis for selecting only some known eligible offenders to be subject to harsh federal doctrines and federal
courts concluded that unprincipled selection is routine, judicial enforcement of the rationality requirement might be appropriate.
Although lower federal courts have almost 313 unanimously refused to
conduct such review,314 the Supreme Court has never foreclosed the
312. In cases involving federal prosecution after a state court acquittal or conviction, the
Department of Justice's "Petite Policy" requires a determination that a "substantial federal interest" was left "demonstrably unvindicated" by the state prosecution or sentence and prior approval by an Assistant Attorney General. See id. §§ 9-2.124(IV)-(V). Because the Petite Policy
applies only if there has been a prior acquittal, conviction, or dismissal on the merits after jeopardy has attached, it does not govern federal prosecutors' decisions to bring charges after pretrial
suppression of evidence or dismissal of charges. See generally Litman & Greenberg, supra note
7, at 75-76. Although Litman and Greenberg believe that the Petite Policy provides "insights"
for the federalization debate, the Department of Justice has not imposed Petite-Policy-like constraints on decisions to prosecute some offenders in federal court when others who have engaged
in similar criminal conduct are prosecuted in state court.
313. An oft-cited and rare exception is United States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D.
Mo. 1969), in which the court held that a prosecution of a private detective, but not government
officials, for illegal wiretapping was irrational and thus violated equal protection. See generally
Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 28, at 665 & n.45 (discussing Robinson).
314. For example, in Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) the court held:
[T]he [only] form of selective prosecution.. .that is actionable under the federal Constitution.. .is where the decision to prosecute is made either in retaliation for the exercise
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possibility of limited judicial oversight. Indeed, in Wade, the Court
apparently reached the opposite conclusion. The Court held not only
that federal prosecutors' refusals to request downward departures for
cooperation must be rational, but that, given a sufficient showing, federal courts have an obligation to determine if the prosecution has
complied with that mandate.1 5 Wade also suggests that its analysis
applies to charging decisions.316
In order to determine why lower federal courts have consistently
reached a different result and to explore whether judicial review to
assess the rationality of charging decisions is ever appropriate, it is
necessary to consider the principal barriers to review. First, courts
commonly invoke the doctrines of "separation of powers" and the
"presumption of regularity" of charging decisions to preclude judicial
review entirely absent proof of improper discrimination. Second, in
part as an outgrowth of these doctrines, courts place evidentiary obstacles in the path of litigants who attempt to gain review of charging
decisions. Third, the deferential nature of rational basis scrutiny may
prompt courts to refuse to conduct review because they perceive it as
a meaningless exercise. Finally, courts may be reluctant to grant the
generally accepted remedy for selective prosecution, dismissal of
charges, because it is too draconian. Examination of these obstacles
of a constitutional right, such as the right to free speech or to the free exercise of
religion, or because of membership in a vulnerable group.
See also Jones v. White, 992 F.2d 1548,1571 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gutierrez, 990 F.2d
472, 475 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fares, 978 F2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992).
315. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992). The Wade Court "agree[d]" that
prosecutorial power to move for a reduced sentence "is subject to constitutional limitations that
district courts can enforce" Id at 185 (emphasis added). The Court further held that "federal
district courts have the authority to review the Government's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy...." Id.
The Wade Court concluded that Wade's showing was insufficient to merit review. Unfortunately, it neglected to explain what a defendant must demonstrate in order to obtain review. See
David Fisher, Note, Fifth Amendment-ProsecutorialDiscretionNot Absolute: Constitutional
Limits on Decision Not to file SubstantialAssistance Motion: Wade v. United States, 212 S. Ct.
1840 (1992), 83 J. Caum. L. & CRMNAorooY 744, 757, 764 (1993). Wade had claimed that the
district court precluded him from showing that rationality review was appropriate because it
erroneously believed that no relief was possible under any circumstances. Thus, he asked the
Court for a remand to prove to the district court that the government had acted arbitrarily or in
bad faith by refusing to move for a reduced sentence because of "'factors that are not rationally
related to any legitimate state objective."' Wade, 504 U.S. at 186 (quoting Wade's reply brief).
The Court rejected that request. It determined that the district court had given Wade an opportunity "to state for the record what evidence he would introduce to support his position." Id. at
184. In response, Wade's attorney only "explained the extent of Wade's assistance to the Government." Id. Although that was a "necessary condition for relief, it [was] not a sufficient one."
Id. As presented, Wade's claim "failed to rise to the level warranting judicial enquiry." Id.
316. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
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reveals that whatever force they may have generally to preclude review of charging decisions is diminished considerably when defendants ask courts to determine only whether a decision to prosecute
under a duplicative federal statute is rationally related to a legitimate
government objective.
A.

DoCrRIn s

PRECLUDING JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Separation of Powers
Lower courts often cite separation of powers concerns to justify
their refusal to review charging decisions absent evidence that the
prosecution is motivated by forbidden factors like race or the exercise
of a constitutional right.3 17 It is noteworthy, however, that the
Supreme Court has never invoked separation of powers concerns to
bar judicial review of prosecutors' charging decisions.3 18 The separation of powers doctrine prevents each branch of government from interfering with the constitutional functions of the coordinate
branches. 319 A forceful statement of the role the doctrine plays in limiting judicial review of executive branch charging decisions appears in
United States v. Redondo-Lemos.3 20 In that case, the court determined that although due process prohibits irrational or arbitrary
charging decisions, separation of powers precludes judicial involvement absent proof of improper discrimination:
Such judicial entanglement in the core decisions of another branch
of government-especially as to those bearing directly and substantially on matters litigated in federal court-is inconsistent with the
division of responsibilities assigned to each branch by the Constitution. The Office of the United States Attorney cannot function as
317. See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725, 730 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 819 (5th Cir. 1979); Gifford, supra note 28, at 663 ("Review [of charging
decisions] is considered inappropriate... because of constitutionally significant separation of
powers considerations."); Hollon, supra note 3, at 522.
318. There is no mention of the separation of powers doctrine in the Supreme Court's selective prosecution decisions. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
319. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe
describes the "model" of "separated and divided powers" as demonstrating
the degree to which various governmental arrangements comport with, or threaten to
undermine, either the independence and integrity of one of the branches or levels of
government, or the ability of each to fulfill its mission in checking the others so as to
preserve the interdependence without which independence can become domination.
Id.
320. 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992).
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prosecutor before the court while also serving under its general supervision. The court, in turn, cannot both supervise the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and act as an impartial arbiter of the cases
presented to it. In the end, the type of intense inquiry that would
enable a court to evaluate whether or not a prosecutor's charging
decision was made in an arbitrary fashion would destroy the very
system of justice it was intended to protect. 32 '
Although these considerations mandate some limitation on judicial oversight of charging decisions, they do not compel complete abdication of review. Indeed, courts do review charging decisions if
there is evidence that they were motivated by racial or other improper
considerations. The resulting inquiry may require intrusive measures,
such as discovery and testimony by executive branch officials, and
remedies, like dismissal, that undercut executive decisions. 22 Similarly, when confronted with evidence that federal legislators have enacted statutory classifications that are not rationally related to
legitimate government objectives, the Supreme Court does not hesitate to review core decisions of a coordinate branch of government
and invalidate the legislation if necessary.
Thus, the question is not whether separation of powers doctrine
bars review entirely, but rather under what circumstances review is
appropriate. Intrusive and stringent oversight of federal prosecutors'
charging decisions obviously threatens executive prerogative, particularly if a defendant can obtain such review without having to make a
considerable threshold showing to demonstrate the need for review.
However, if a federal court is confronted with evidence that federal
prosecutors have selected an offender in an unprincipled manner and
that the charging decision subjects the offender to significantly less
favorable procedural protections and sentencing doctrines than those
the offenders would have received in state court, separation of powers
321. Id. at 1300. Kenneth Culp Davis disputes the claim that separation of powers precludes
federal courts from reviewing prosecutors' discretionary decisions for abuse, arguing that:
This reason is so clearly unsound as to be almost absurd. If separation of powers prevents review of the discretion of executive officers, then more than a hundred Supreme
Court decisions spread over a century and three quarters will have to be found contrary
to the Constitution! If courts could not interfere with abuse of discretion by executive
officers, our fundamental institutions would be altogether different from what they are.
DAViS, supra note 28, at 210.

322. See, eg., United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996); Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598 (1985).
323. See, eg., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding that a
statutory classification in the federal Food Stamp Act violated equal protection because it was
not rationally related to a legitimate government end).
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concerns should not automatically foreclose review, particularly if the
court can resolve the claim by conducting limited review.
Restrained judicial oversight is possible. In an analogous context,
when assessing only the rationality of legislative classifications, courts
conduct remarkably nonintrusive review. Where a statute does not
explicitly set forth a classiflaction scheme, courts will interpret the legislation to ascertain the scheme it creates. 324 Then, the courts will
either make efforts to determine the legislature's actual reasons for
creating the classification scheme, 32 or they will hypothesize possible
reasons for creating such a scheme. 26 Finally, courts will determine
whether these reasons are legitmate327 and whether the classification
scheme rationally furthers them.32s Courts conducting such review do
not require that legislators testify about their motives 329 or present
assumptions upon which the challenged
evidence to support empirical
33 0
rest.
classification schemes
Assessment of the rationality of prosecutors' charging decisions
would require an approach that is only slightly more intrusive.
Although courts can glean legislative classification schemes from the
text of statutes, federal prosecutors' classifications schemes (if they
employ coherent schemes) may not be obvious from individual charging decisions. Thus, in order to enable courts to assess the rationality
of charging decisions, prosecutors must reveal the classification
scheme, if any, that resulted in the challenged selection. Other than
324. See, eg., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (interpreting statute that did not explicitly create classification). At times the classification scheme may be complex. See, eg., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1981).
325. For example, in City of Cleburnev. CleburneLiving Cr., Ina, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the
Court struck down a city ordinance under the equal protection rational relationship test after
rejecting as unpersuasive and impermissible the reasons the city gave for distinguishing between
group homes for retarded persons and other group homes. See id. at 448-50. The Court did not
make any effort to hypothesize possible justifications for the challenged ordinance.
326. See, eg. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (holding that the legislature need not
state a reason for a classification scheme; rather, statutory classification should be upheld if any
conceivable state of facts can provide a rational basis for the scheme).
327. See, eg., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,62-63 (1982) (determining that the state objective of rewarding citizens for past contributions to the state "is not a legitimate state purpose").
328. See United States R.R. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 184 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("When faced with a challenge to a... classification under the rational-basis test, the court
should ask, first, what the purposes of the [classification] are, and, second, whether the classification is rationally related to achievement of those purposes.").
329. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,15 (1992) ("To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause
does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.").
330. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 ("A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence
to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.").
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this requirement, which alone should not preclude review,331 rationality review of charging decisions need not be any more intrusive than
similar review of legislative decisions. Once informed of the classification scheme, courts can determine whether that scheme is rationally
related to legitimate objectives, just as they would with legislative
classifications. 32
Even if no more intrusive than rationality review of legislative
classifications, such oversight of charging decisions probably would be
more frequent. Once courts determine that a legislative classification
is rational, there is no threat of repeated review of that statute. In
contrast, because every offender may challenge his selection for prosecution, there is a danger that requests to review virtually every charging decision will flood the federal courts. Two factors minimize this
danger. First, a defendant would be required to make some threshold
showing to obtain review.333 Second, once courts determine that certain selection criteria are rational, and thus acceptable as a means of
choosing offenders, defendants whose selection satisfied those criteria
would be far less likely to challenge their selection and, if they did,
courts could summarily reject the challenges.
2. The "Presumptionof Regularity"
Courts also invoke the "presumption of regularity" to refrain
from reviewing charging decisions unless offenders establish racial or
other improper discriminatory effect and purpose. 3 4 This doctrine requires that courts presume that prosecutors have discharged their duties properly unless a defendant presents clear evidence of a
constitutional violation. 335 The presumption is based on "a concern
not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive constitutional function" and the "relative competence of prosecutors and
courts. ' 336 As the Court stated in Wayte v. United States:
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and
331. See infra notes 342-46 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
333. See infra notes 358-70 and accompanying text.
334. The Supreme Court did not explicitly apply the doctrine, which requires courts to presume the regularity of official acts absent contrary evidence, to prosecutors' charging decisions
until 1996. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996). On the "presumption of
regularity," see Applegate, supra note 28, at 38.
335. See Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. at 1486.
336. Id.
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the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement
plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the
basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to
chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and
decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine
prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts
3 37
properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.
Assessment of these twin concerns-the cost of judicial inquiry
and the competence of judicial review-reveals that although they
provide some support for requiring offenders who allege discriminatory charging to shoulder the burden of proving purposeful discrimination, they do not justify a blanket refusal to review the rationality of
charging decisions. Even if courts afford prosecutors a presumption
of regularity, a showing that casts significant doubt about the rationality of charging classifications should be sufficient to overcome reluctance and gain some judicial scrutiny.
a. Costs of judicial inquiry: Wayte identifies three costs of judi-

cial inquiry-delay, chilling of prosecutorial decisionmaking, and disclosure of law enforcement policy. None of these concerns merits
complete judicial refusal to assess the rationality of charging decisions.
Delay resulting from inquiry into a charging decision, like delay resulting from any inquiry unrelated to factual guilt, increases inconvenience to witnesses and victims, threatens to cause memories to fade,
burdens prosecutors and court dockets, and prevents the swift imposition of justice without furthering the search for the truth. However,
courts commonly conduct lengthy pretrial inquiries into collateral
matters, such as the legality of police acquisition of evidence. The
avoidance-of-delay justification for judicial deference to charging decisions does not explain why the litigation of equal protection rights is
less worthy than other matters for which delay is tolerated.
In addition, unlike claims of improper discrimination, which invariably require discovery and possibly an evidentiary hearing,338 challenges to the rationality of charging decisions do not necessitate
337. 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (citations omitted).
338. A claimant like Wayte, who makes an affirmative accusation that the government has
chosen to prosecute him for a forbidden reason, is unlikely to be mollified by a prosecutor's
facially neutral explanation for the charging decision. The claimant believes that he knows the
real reason for his selection and will reject the proffered reason as pretextual. Resolution of the
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significant delay. Convinced that the government is treating him differently than others like him, an offender simply seeks to ascertain
why it is doing so. At least initially, he is requesting only that the
prosecution inform the court of the classification scheme that has led
to the disparate treatment 339 and that the court assess its rationality,
not that the court order discovery or an evidentiary hearing.340
Fear of chilling prosecutorial decisionmaking should prompt a
court to hesitate before conducting review only if judicial scrutiny
threatens to deter prosecutors from bringing charges in meritorious
cases. Again, there is a significant difference between claims of improper discriminatory charging and inquiries into the rationality of
claim requires discovery and review of internal government documents to determine whether
the government possesses direct or circumstantial evidence to support the defendant's claim. An
evidentiary hearing may also be necessary to allow examination of government actors to uncover
evidence of illegal discrimination.
Notably, in Wayte, the defendant's "broad request" for discovery led to a district court order
that required both the production of documents and testimony by government witnesses, spawning litigation that the dissent characterized as a "saga," see Wayte, 470 U.S. at 617 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), and justifying the Court's concern about delay. Other cases involving allegations of
improper discriminatory charging in which courts have ordered discovery have produced similar
results. See United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1535 (1995) (Rymer, J., dissenting) ("In
this case alone, locating more than 3,000 files and figuring out which were crack and firearms
prosecutions, the racial identity of each defendant... and the investigating authorities will be a
time-consuming and expensive process"), rev'd, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996); Government's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 23 n.3, Armstrong (No. 95-157) (discussing case in which "more than 1,000
hours of work by attorneys, support personnel, and law enforcement officers were required to
collect data and prepare affidavits in response to a [selective prosecution] discovery motion" and
trial was delayed "by more than four months").
339. After having received a description of that scheme, the defendant can accept it, or
challenge it in a variety of ways, only some of which may ultimately result in the delay necessary
for discovery or an evidentiary hearing. However, unlike an improper discrimination claim, a
rationality inquiry does not necessarily require those time-consuming measures.
340. In a somewhat analogous context, claims of equal protection violations in the exercise
of peremptory challenges during jury selection-so-called Batson objections-the Court has approved a relatively simple and speedy procedure for a trial court to determine whether there has
been a violation without the need for either discovery or an evidentiary hearing. See Purkett v.
Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769,1770-71 (1995) (per curiam). Courts resolve those claims, which can arise
repeatedly during jury selection, based solely on immediate explanations and arguments from
the parties. There is no reason why courts cannot employ a similar procedure to resolve at least
some challenges to charging decisions, particularly rationality challenges. Like Batson claims,
they could be resolved expeditiously with (1) a defendant's showing of prejudicial disparate
treatment, (2) a prosecutor's oral disclosure of the reasons for the selection decision, (3) any
necessary argument from both parties, and (4) a judicial determination as to whether the reason
satisfies the rational relationship component of equal protection. But see Armstrong, 116 S. Ct.
at 1480 (noting that a Batson claim differs from a selective prosecution claim because in former
context, the entire voir dire takes place before the judge to whom the equal protection challenge
is made and the prosecutor need answer only about decisions in that case); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 297 n.17 (1987).
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charging decisions. A judicial determination that a prosecutor has engaged in patently improper conduct, such as bringing charges for racially discriminatory reasons or in retaliation for the exercise of a
constitutional right, can impose a significant stigma. Thus, the threat
that a court will erroneously make such a finding may deter prosecutors from engaging in legitimate conduct. 341 However, the possibility
of a court making an erroneous adverse ruling when conducting the
far less sensitive and more deferential rationality inquiry does not
pose the threat of a similar stigma. Indeed, prosecutors, as well as
other litigants in an adversary system, routinely advance justifications
for their actions.
The fear-of-disclosure-of-enforcement-policy rationale for reluctance to allow judicial inquiry is similarly unpersuasive. 4 2 Even assuming that in-court disclosure of that portion of the prosecution's
classification scheme that led to charges against the complaining offender would reveal the government's overall enforcement policy and
would be disseminated to potential offenders, a43 methods exist to limit
341. Cf. Patrick J. Guinee, Comment, The Trend Toward the Extension ofBatson to GenderBased Peremptory Challenges, 32 Duo. L. REv. 833, 845 (1994) (suggesting that application of
equal protection doctrine to bar racially and sexually discriminatory peremptory challenges has a
"chilling effect").
342. Initially, one might conclude that forced disclosure of enforcement policy promotes
rather than undermines enforcement. To the extent that criminal law is intended to deter prohibited behavior, it is necessary to inform the public about what is criminal. Thus, it may seem
unwise to keep secret that conduct likely to result in prosecution. However, when the government lacks the resources to prosecute all known violations of the criminal law or engages in less
than complete prosecution for other reasons, disclosure of enforcement policy can be counterproductive. Having decided to prosecute some but not all known offenders, the government
may hope to maximize deterrence by keeping secret its selection criteria. Requiring prosecutors
to disclose the criteria may provide potential offenders with sufficient information to structure
their activities so that they can violate the law but avoid prosecution. See Abrams, supra note
28, at 29. Federal prosecutors are loath to disclose their selection criteria for this reason. See,
e.g., Pizzi, supranote 28, at 1343 n.88 (discussing the refusal of an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of Florida to disclose drug quantity guidelines for fear of enabling
smugglers to alter behavior to avoid federal prosecution).
343. It is not always the case that in-court disclosure of the pertinent portions of the
prosecutive charging classification scheme in a single case will reveal the government's enforcement policy in its entirety. Even if it does, it is by no means certain that an in-court statement of
the classification scheme will be disseminated outside of court and will thus undermine enforcement policy. Those who are in court to hear the stated explanation or otherwise learn of it must
be able to grasp its significance and communicate it to other potential offenders accurately.
Only potential offenders who routinely keep abreast of judicial proceedings will be able to determine the contours of an overall enforcement policy as it is revealed on a piecemeal basis in court.
Such offenders may be able to ascertain the policy even without in-court disclosure. Habitual
and sophisticated criminals, or their attorneys, may be students of the patterns of arrests and
charging decisions, and they may be able to determine with some certainty what activity will lead
to prosecution and what will not. Furthermore, even disclosure and effective dissemination of
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disclosure. In response to a showing by a prosecutor that public, incourt disclosure of the basis for prosecution in a particular case may
jeopardize law enforcement efforts, a court could issue a protective
order, allowing the defense attorney alone to learn of the relevant
classification scheme and preventing her from disseminating it.3 44 Alternatively, courts could allow the prosecutor to make an ex parte, in
camera disclosure so that only the court would learn the nature of the
classification that led to the charging decision."a Although such a
procedure would deny both the defendant and his attorney the ability
to argue that the stated classification was irrational, a judge could conduct that inquiry alone. 46 Defendants may not embrace such a procedure, but would most certainly prefer it to a judicial refusal to conduct
rationality inquiry because of concerns about disclosure of enforcement policy.
Finally, the fear-of-disclosure rationale is even less compelling in
the specific context of challenges to prosecution under duplicative federal statutes. Even if judicial inquiry does result in dissemination of
the federal government's enforcement plan, knowledgeable offenders
will not be assured freedom from state prosecution for their criminal
conduct. Thus, depending on offenders' perceptions of the relative
costs of federal and state prosecution, the threat of the latter might
still be sufficient to deter them despite their knowledge of the federal
enforcement policy.
b. Judicialincompetence: Wayte identifies four factors that "are
not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent
to undertake": "the strength of the case, the prosecution's general
enforcement policy may be of little assistance to some offenders because it may not be possible
to structure criminal activity to both avoid prosecution and still profit from the crime. Finally,
disclosure of a charging classification scheme does not bind the prosecutor to a consistent course
of conduct in the future. Indeed, if a prosecutor believes that as a result of disclosure offenders
have altered patterns of criminal activity as a means of avoiding prosecution, nothing prevents
her from changing that policy and prosecuting those who have structured their activity to avoid
being charged.
344. Cf FED. R. Cium. P. 16(d)(1) (allowing protective orders restricting discovery).
345. Cf. United States v. Sal Keung Wong, 886 F.2d 252,256 (9th Cir. 1989) (district court
allowed in camera interview of confidential informant without presence of defendant or
counsel).
346. In cases in which there is a rationality claim rather than a contention that the government has engaged in improper discrimination, it would be easier for the court to conduct review
without benefit of input from the defense. In the former case, unlike the latter, there would be
no need for the court to sift through discovery or other evidence to support allegations of discriminatory impact and intent. Instead, the court could simply assess the rationality of the classification scheme.
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deterrence value, the Government's general enforcement priorities,
and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement
plan." 317 Once again, these factors are not persuasive grounds for a
blanket refusal to forego rationality review of charging decisions.
Wayte's concern about judicial inability to evaluate the strength
of cases is compelling. Prosecutors routinely make charging decisions
based on the strength of evidence, choosing to prosecute some defendants but not others who may appear to be similarly situated based
on assessments of numerous factors including predictions about the
probable outcome of a jury trial, willingness or credibility of witnesses, or likelihood of suppression of evidence-considerations that
are both beyond the expertise of reviewing courts and likely rational.348 However, federal prosecutors enforcing duplicative federal
statutes routinely screen cases for reasons other than the strength of
the evidence. 49 These preliminary screening decisions, if principled,
are likely to be policy-based and are akin to the types of legislative
and administrative decisions that courts routinely subject to equal protection review. There is no need for courts reviewing policy determinations to venture into areas outside of their expertise, like evaluation
of evidence, or second-guess decisions uniquely within the expertise of
prosecutors.3 50
347. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
348. Other considerations also preclude judicial review of prosecutors' strength-of-evidence
determinations. In order to evaluate such a classification, a court would have to compare the
strength of the case in which a defendant has raised a selective prosecution claim with the
strength of potential cases that were not charged. That evaluation, which would necessarily occur before the trial in the case pending in the court and without trial in the uncharged comparison pool cases, would be fact-specific and possibly complex, resting on judgments about witness
credibility, jury reaction to witnesses or evidence, strength of potential defenses, and a myriad of
other factors. Such judgments are uniquely within the expertise of prosecutors. Courts lack not
only the proficiency to make those judgments, particularly without having heard evidence at
trial, but they also do not have access to sufficient information to evaluate them.
Even if a court were equipped to review investigative and prosecutive decisions regarding
the merits of individual cases, the disclosure necessary for a court to conduct that review would
require significant delay and thus would militate against review. See discussion supranotes 33840 and accompanying text. It would also require disclosure of the opinions and conclusions of
investigators and prosecutors about the strength of cases and the credibility of witnesses in both
charged and uncharged cases. In short, it would require intrusive and detailed judicial assessment of investigative and prosecutive decisions, requiring judges to act as both law enforcement
officials and prosecutors and raising separation of powers concerns. See discussion supra Part
IV.A.1.
349. See supra notes 240-246 and accompanying text.
350. For example, a court is as equipped to assess the rationality of a prosecutorial policy to
bring charges only in drug cases involving certain threshold quantities of drugs as it is to review
the rationality of a statute that requires increased penalties in cases involving those qualities.
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Wayte also expresses apprehension about judicial competence to
review "the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's
general enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan."351 Despite the distinction drawn
above between judicial ability to review policy-based decisions and
inability to review evidence-based charging decisions, this passage
suggests that in the context of charging decisions, courts are illequipped to review both. This concern, however, like other concerns
expressed in Wayte, is best understood in the context of claims that the
prosecution is motivated by an improper discriminatory purpose, not
those questioning the rationality of charging decisions.
In order to resolve a claim of discriminatory charging, a court
must consider circumstantial evidence of bad intent, including proof
of an imperfect fit between the selection of the defendant and the
reason for the classification scheme. The existence of a less discriminatory means of achieving the same objective is circumstantial evidence of discriminatory purpose. In addition, it tends to undercut a
finding that the means used to achieve the government's objective are
sufficiently narrowly tailored to that objective to satisfy strict scrutiny.35 By considering such evidence, courts are necessarily secondguessing policy decisions that play a role in charging, hypothesizing
that there may be less discriminatory methods of achieving the same
result.
Examination of the facts in Wayte clarifies the Court's concern
and demonstrates that it is inapplicable when courts assess only the
rationality of charging decisions. In Wayte, the defendant claimed that
the government had prosecuted him for violating the Selective Service
laws only because he was a vocal opponent to draft registration. 5 3
The district court found that "the inference is strong that the Government could have located non-vocal non-registrants, but chose not to"
and ordered discovery.354 In doing so, the district court tacitly questioned the government's selection of vocal registrants to maximize deterrence ("general deterrence value"); the government's decision
whether it would expend the resources necessary to take action
against nonvocal violators as well ("general enforcement priorities");
351.

Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.

352. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (stating that the equal protection
strict scrutiny test includes an inquiry into whether there are other means of achieving legitimate
government objectives that impose less of a burden on constitutionally protected interests).
353. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 604.
354. Id. at 605 (citations omitted).
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and how the government planned to deal with the widespread Selective Service violations generally ("overall enforcement plan"). In
short, the district court exceeded its competence by implying that the
government could and should have prosecuted nonvocal nonregistrants355 Mere rationality review does not require similar intrusive
inquiry into potential hidden motives, consideration of less intrusive
methods of achieving the desired result, or judicial second-guessing of
enforcement policy. In order to conduct rationality review, a court
need only ascertain the portion of the government's classification
scheme that explains the challenged charging decision and determine
if the selection of the defendant for prosecution is both consistent with
that explanation 56 and rationally related to a legitimate objective of
federal law enforcement. Rationality review does not allow a court to
impose its views of better or less discriminatory methods of achieving
the stated governmental objective and thus does not implicate the
problems that Wayte identifies. 5 7
355. See id. at 612-13.
356. Defendants could challenge a prosecutor's explanation by presenting evidence that the
prosecutor's reason for selecting the defendant also applies to at least some unselected offenders
in the comparison pool. Such a showing should serve to undermine a prosecutor's explanation
only if she knew that the comparison pool offenders shared the characteristic used to select the
defendant. Alternatively, a defendant could challenge the explanation by showing that the government had prosecuted offenders who did not satisfy the purported selection criteria.
357. The Wade Court's conclusion that courts can review the rationality of prosecutors' refusals to file sentencing reduction motions to reward defendants for their cooperation, see supra
notes 223-231 and accompanying text, further suggests that the concerns expressed in Wayte are
not meant to foreclose limited rationality review of charging decisions but rather reflect reluctance to impose on prosecutors the discovery, evidentiary hearings, and intense scrutiny necessary to resolve claims of improper discrimination. If the Court is willing to allow judicial inquiry
into the rationality of decisions to move for substantial assistance departures, as Wade seems to
hold, there is no reason why it should be unwilling to do the same with respect to charging
decisions, especially those that are policy-based. Review of a prosecutors' decision whether to
file a "substantial-assistance" departure motion is no less costly or more intrusive than review of
a charging decision. Nor are courts any more capable of conducting that review. Indeed, the
opposite may be true. A prosecutor's decision whether or not to move for a sentencing reduction to reward cooperation requires a detailed and fact-specific inquiry into matters such as the
defendant's role in the offense, the usefulness of information that he has given, his credibility
and candor, the completeness of his information, his culpability relative to that of the people
about whom he has provided information, and expectations of future cooperation-all of which
are matters within the province of the prosecutor. See United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060,
1065 (7th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992)
(listing the following questions as unreviewable for arbitrariness: "How valuable was the assistance? How valuable was this investigation, compared with others that a prosecutor may seek to
encourage by doling out greater rewards for cooperation?"). But cf.Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
ProsecutorialDiscretion,SubstantialAssistance; and the FederalSentencing Guidelines,42 UCLA
L. REv. 105,125 (1994) (giving examples of policy-based substantial assistance practices in some
federal districts). Inquiry into those factors is evidence-based, time-consuming, intrusive, and
beyond the expertise of courts. But see id. at 157-58 (contending that judges are better equipped
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EVIDENTIARY OBSTACLES

Courts frustrate efforts to obtain judicial review of charging decisions by imposing evidentiary hurdles that aggrieved offenders are unable to overcome. Before courts will conduct review or order
requested discovery, 35 8 a claimant must present some evidence of: (1)
discriminatory impact by demonstrating that the prosecutor has
treated him differently than others who appear to be similarly situated
in all relevant respects; 35 9 (2) prosecutorial awareness of the similarly
that the
situated others;360 and (3) discriminatory intent by showing
361
prosecutor has selected him for an impermissible reason.
When an offender challenges a charging decision by a state prosecutor or a federal prosecutor enforcing a nonduplicative federal statute, all three hurdles are often insurmountable regardless of the merit
of the claim. Except for rare crimes that offenders commit publicly,
like violations of Sunday closing laws, most people engaged in criminal conduct attempt to avoid detection. Thus, proof of the existence
of a pool of similarly situated offenders who escaped prosecution will
be nearly impossible unless a defendant conducts some sort of independent criminal investigation. 62 Even if a defendant were able to
identify such a pool of offenders, it is unlikely that he will be able to
prove that the prosecutor was aware of them, preventing the defendant from satisfying the knowledge requirement. Finally, even if the
prosecutor has consciously selected the defendant for an impermissible reason, she almost certainly will have avoided generating any tangible evidence of that intent.3 63 In the event some evidence of bad
intent exists, the prosecutor will have exclusive possession of it.3 6 Because a defendant must present some evidence of both discriminatory
than prosecutors to determine whether a departure is warranted). Indeed, such review could
jeopardize on-going investigations or require comparisons between the defendant and others
who had provided information, potentially jeopardizing the anonymity and safety of
cooperators.
358. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
359. See, eg., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608-09; Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1905).
360. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); supra notes 287-288 and accompanying text.
361. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608-610; supra note 205.
362.

See Givelber, supra note 28, at 94 ("Most

.

. crime is not... publicly obvious, and the

persons alleging denial of equal protection face a considerable burden in even establishing that
the law is knowingly inconsistently applied.").
363. In addition, the prosecutor's decisionmaking may be influenced by unconscious motives. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 205, at 1523-25 (discussing unconscious racism which
will not generate any tangible evidence).
364. See Applegate, supra note 28, at 86.
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impact and discriminatory intent to compel discovery,3 65 he will rarely
be able to gain access to that evidence.
In contrast, when an offender selected for prosecution under a
duplicative federal statute questions the rationality of the selection decision, he has a better chance of surmounting the first two evidentiary
obstacles and the possibility of persuading a court to lower the third.
It is far easier to identify offenders who have been charged in state
court than those who have escaped prosecution altogether. 66 Likewise, because the similarly situated offenders have been identified and
charged in state court, c6mplainants can make a stronger showing that
federal prosecutors are aware of their existence. 67
Finally, courts should not require offenders who only question the
rationality of a charging decision to shoulder the burden of presenting
evidence of the prosecutor's intent. Although courts confronted with
claims of improper discriminatory purpose require defendants, rather
than the prosecution, to come forward with some evidence of the
prosecutor's reasons for selecting them, the same allocation of the
burden when entertaining rationality claims makes little sense.363 Unlike an improper discriminatory motive claimant, a rationality claimant does not profess to know why the prosecution has selected him.
He will have no particularized suspicions to inform efforts to discover
the nature of the classification scheme.3 69 He is as likely to be able to
365. See supra note 272.
366. A defendant would first determine whether the federal statute he is charged under
duplicates some state criminal statute. If so, he could determine, by polling the local defense
bar, or by obtaining-either through voluntary compliance, subpoena, or other court orderfiles or data compilations from state prosecutors or courts to show the existence of a pool of
people who the state prosecuted for the same conduct that led to his federal charges. The Annstrong Court concluded that such a task is "not ... insuperable." United States v. Armstrong,
116 S. Ct. 1480, 1489 (1996).
367. For a fuller discussion of this topic, see supra 287-91 and accompanying text.
368. Some have argued that it also makes little sense to require improper discriminatory
motive claimants to present evidence of the prosecutor's intent because the prosecutor will almost always have exclusive access to that information. See, eg., Applegate, supra note 28, at 8687; Developments, supra note 205, at 1549. Despite the force of those contentions, the requirement is firmly entrenched in cases in which defendants allege their prosecutions are based on
improper discriminatory motives. See, eg., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)
(requiring that defendant "show both that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory
effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose").
369. In contrast, a defendant who alleges an improper motive is likely to have at least some
circumstantial evidence to support his claim-whatever evidence initially raised his suspicions
about the prosecutor's motives. Even if the defendant's evidence is insufficient to prevail, it will
provide some guidance as to how to develop his claim further. See Bubany & Skillem, supra
note 28, at 503-04 ("Absent a suspect criterion such as race, religion, or cultural background, it is
unlikely that the defendant will be able to prove arbitrary action.").
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determine why he has been chosen for federal prosecution when similarly situated others have not as he would be able to determine why he
was struck by lightning during a thunderstorm when others standing
nearby were not. Thus, when confronted with evidence of a comparison pool of disparately treated offenders and prosecutorial awareness
of that pool, there is good reason for courts to require that federal
prosecutors disclose the classification scheme that resulted in the defendant's selection.370

370. Requiring federal prosecutors to explain selection of defendants for prosecution under
these circumstances is consistent with the procedure the Court has mandated for litigating equal
protection objections to peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and its
progeny. See, eg., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding that Batson precludes
gender as well as race discrimination in exercise of peremptory challenges); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (Batson applies to defendants' peremptory challenges); Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400 (1991) (Batson applies even when juror and defendant are different races; safeguards jurors' rights); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (describing application of
test). Those cases hold that once a defendant presents prima facie evidence that a prosecutor has
exercised a peremptory challenge in a racially or sexually discriminatory manner, the trial court
must compel the prosecutor to give a race- or gender-neutral explanation for the challenge. The
trial court then determines whether the explanation is satisfactory. See, eg., Hernandez, 500
U.S. at 358-59. The Batson analogy is compelling because the degree of judicial intrusion is
similar to that proposed here-in both cases, the court requires only an oral explanation justifying the exercise of prosecutorial decision, not discovery or an evidentiary hearing, and resolves
the issue at that time, without unduly delaying the proceedings. If equal protection requires that
a prosecutor faced with prima facie evidence of discrimination explain the reasons for a peremptory challenge in order to avoid denying a potential juror the "opportunity to participate in civic
life," Powers, 499 U.S. at 409, it surely should require as much for a federally-prosecuted defendant who can demonstrate that he is subject to harsher treatment in federal court when others are
not. Although the Batson procedures have been criticized for threatening to turn the "sideshow" of jury selection into "part of the main event," J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), a federal prosecutor's charging decision, which plays a significant role in determining the defendant's constitutional and procedural protections and the length of the sentence he
may receive and serve if convicted, clearly is the main event. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. Thus, upon a showing of prejudicial disparate impact, there is greater reason to
require a prosecutor to explain her charging decision despite any minimal delay or intrusiveness
than there is to compel explanation of the exercise of peremptory challenges.
To be sure, there are significant differences between the Batson context and this one. See
Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1480 (describing some differences between Batson and selective prosecution claims). For example, under Batson, a prima facie showing of discriminatory motive, not
merely prejudicial disparate impact, is necessary to trigger both the prosecutor's duty to explain
and judicial review. However, as Wade makes clear, allegations and proof of improper discrimination are not the sine qua non of judicial review of prosecutorial decisions. See supranotes 22329 and accompanying text. Unlike charging decisions, peremptory challenges need not be rational. See Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995). Thus, the Batson procedures application only to cases of improper discrimination stems from the broad discretion associated with
peremptory challenges, rather than from any general limitation on judicial review of
prosecutorial decisionmaking.

HeinOnline -- 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 732 1996-1997

1997]

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW

Recognition of a judicially enforceable right to rationality review
would provide a defendant subjected to differential treatment as a result of a federal charging decision with two nonexclusive options.
First, he could contest the rationality of the charging decision by
showing disparate impact and prosecutorial awareness of similarly situated others. Such a showing would compel a prosecutor to explain
the charging decision.371 Second, if the defendant believes that the
real reason for prosecution is race, excercise of a constitutional right,
or some other forbidden characteristic, he can seek discovery and an
evidentiary hearing to establish that allegation. However, under prevailing law, he must present some proof of improper motive before a
court will order discovery and conduct review.
C. Tim

DEFERENTIAL NATURE OF RATIONALITY REVIEW

Arguably, recognition and enforcement of a right to rational
charging classifications will do no more than enable federally prosecuted defendants to jump from the frying pan into the fire; that is,
they escape excessive judicial deference to charging decisions only to
confront solicitous rationality review.372 As long as the prosecutor
had some rational method-severity of the crimes committed, a connection to interstate commerce, the investigative agency involved, or
the offender's criminal record-for distinguishing offenders who were
selected from those who were not, charging decisions would withstand
equal protection review. It would be unusual for a court to determine
that a federal prosecutor's charging decision does not satisfy the deferential rationality standard. Federal courts' refusal to conduct rationality review at all may be due in part to their recognition that such
oversight would be a futile gesture and thus unworthy of the costs,
however minimal, review may impose.
Even if rationality review is of doubtful efficacy as a remedy for
aggrieved defendants, judicial enforcement of a right to rational
371. If public disclosure would harm the government's enforcement efforts, the court should
either limit disclosure to the defense attorney alone with a protective order preventing dissemination, or, alternatively, allow for in camera,ex parte disclosure only. See supranotes 344-46 and
accompanying text.
372. One commentator opined that:
[g]enerally speaking, judicial refusal to review the prosecutor's charging decision except
in cases of invidious or bad faith discrimination appears to be inevitable, or at least of
no consequence. As in the case of judicial review of legislation, review of the charging
decision would yield the conclusion that the decision regarding prosecution is in most
instances rationally related to a legitimate law enforcement goal.
Gifford, supra note 28, at 704.
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charging classifications could have a salutary effect on the administration of justice in federal courts. First, it would give unequivocal notice
to federal prosecutors that they have a constitutional obligation to rationally differentiate between those offenders subjected to harsher
treatment in federal court and those who could be but are not. Under
existing law, federal prosecutors may conclude that as long as they are
not motivated by an improper discriminatory purpose, they are free to
select offenders for federal prosecution for any reason or no reason at
all. Certainly decisions that deny the existence of a right to rational
charging classifications altogether3 73 support that conclusion. Cases
that preclude rationality review without affirmatively recognizing the
existence of such a right 374 are similarly flawed. Busy federal prosecutors may overlook the subtle difference between judicial refusal to
recognize a right and judicial refusal to enforce a right. There is a
danger that at least some federal prosecutors haphazardly select a
portion of those to be charged in federal court. If we expect federal
prosecutors, like other governmental actors, to have rational reasons
for treating similarly situated people differently, it makes sense to
clearly state that equal protection imposes such a norm. Current doctrine teaches the opposite lesson.
Second, the threat of judicial inquiry and a requirement that federal prosecutors explain charging decisions when defendants make a
sufficient threshold showing would encourage them to develop and
adhere to rational classification schemes for selecting eligible
offenders.375

373. See cases cited supra note 207.
374. See supra note 208.
375. See Bubany & Skillem, supranote 28, at 505 (judicial review "assists the prosecutor in
developing impartial policies influenced only by matters pertinent to maintaining a just system");
Givelber, supra note 28, at 112 ("the process of analyzing why the law has been selectively enforced should lead the prosecutor to make more thoughtful enforcement decisions").
To say that the Constitution requires federal prosecutors to have a rational classification
scheme does not suggest that the scheme would be judicially enforceable-that is, that departures from the scheme would provide a defendant with a claim for relief. Prosecutors could
justify departures from the scheme as long as the departures were rational. Requiring only that
charging decisions be rational gives prosecutors considerably more flexibility than an approach
that allows court to force them to comply with a set of predetermined prosecutive guidelines.
For a discussion of judicial enforcement of prosecutive guidelines, see Beale, supra note 2, at
1017-18 n.143.
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Third, forcing prosecutors to have good reasons for selection
would have a prophylactic effect, decreasing the possibility that improper discriminatory motives will play some conscious or unconscious role in a federal prosecutor's charging decisions. 76
In addition to prompting federal prosecutors to employ rational
selection schemes, enforcement of a right to rational charging classifications may result in a beneficial modification of current defense practice. In the context of duplicative federal prosecutions, prevailing
selective prosecution doctrine prompts defendants to focus their efforts on a problem that rarely exists-racially discriminatory selection
of offenders-and offers a remedy that is stringent in theory but illusory in practice. At the same time, it draws attention away from the
injustice of dramatic disparities in treatment without good reason.
While defendants engage in wasted efforts to satisfy impossible burdens of proving intentional racial discrimination that probably does
not exist,37 7 there is nothing to prevent the arbitrary imposition of harsher treatment on those unlucky enough to be selected for federal
prosecution. By limiting review to those defendants who allege racial
discrimination or other improper motives, existing doctrine also promotes frivolous claims. Even if a defendant does not believe that discriminatory motives prompted prosecution, he must make those
allegations if he is to have any chance of relief from disparate treatment resulting from federal prosecution.3 78 These claims waste judicial and prosecutorial resources, unfairly subject federal prosecutors
376. "Giving prosecutors the power to invoke or deny punishment at their discretion raises
the prospect that society's most fundamental sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously and that the least favored members of the community-racial and ethnic minorities, social outcasts, the poor-will be treated most harshly." Vorenberg, supra note 28, at 1555. See
generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Sm. L. REv. 633, 657 (1995) (When there are
grounds for believing that decisions may be the "product of bias, self-interest, insufficient reflection, or simply excess haste, requiring decision makers to give reasons may counteract some of
those tendencies.").
377. Notably, the Chief Judge of the Central District of California, the federal district that
spawned claims of discriminatory charging practices in crack cocaine cases, determined that
there was "no evidence that prosecutive decisions by the United States Attorney's Office for the
Central District of California are made on the basis of race." Dan Weikel, Judge Finds No Bias
in Crack Prosecutions,L.A. TmEs, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al. This decision was made despite the fact
that the United States Attorney's Office had never prosecuted a white defendant under the
draconian federal cocaine base laws and had almost exclusively prosecuted black defendants.
See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1495 n.6 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
378. The lead defense attorney in Arnstrong,who alleged purposeful racial discrimination
to support her client's selective prosecution claim, admitted to a reporter that "[w]e don't know
why it's [the large number of black males being prosecuted for crack cocaine trafficking in federal court] happening." David G. Savage, "Selective Prosecution" Case to Be Heard by High
Court, L.A. TimEs, Oct. 31, 1995, at A4. Rather than accuse the prosecutor of intentional racial
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to meritless and damaging accusations, 379 and reduce the chances that
courts will give serious consideration to the rare meritorious claim. If,
instead, defendants who were able to make a sufficient threshold
showing could require a prosecutor to explain the reasons for her
charging decisions, it might decrease the number of unsubstantiated
claims of racially discriminatory selection.
Enforcement of the right may also ease some of the pressure that
federalization imposes on federal dockets. Aware that they will not
be able to selectively subject offenders to harsher treatment without a
reason for doing so, federal prosecutors may be less inclined to prosecute the cases that many courts and commentators believe do not "belong" in federal court-those that are indistinguishable from the
multitude of street-corner drug sales, weapons offenses, robberies,
residential arsons, and petty frauds that are prosecuted daily in state
courts.

38 0

D.

RELUCTANCE TO

DisMiss CHARGES

AS A REMEDY

Finally, federal courts' refusal to review charging decisions may
reflect an aversion to dismissing charges against offenders simply because similarly situated others have not been prosecuted. Courts have
assumed that the remedy for selective prosecution is dismissal;383 yet
the Supreme Court recently stated that it has "never determined
whether dismissal of the indictment, or some other sanction, is the
proper remedy" for selective prosecution.3a If a less draconian remedy was available, courts might be more willing to review charging
decisions.
discrimination, she could only speculate: "I think there is an unconscious racism that is resulting
in the steady stream of young black males going into custody for enormous periods of time." Id.
379. Judicial review "can eliminate ill-founded or random complaints against the prosecutor's office and avoid the aura of suspicion that attaches to unpublished, secret practices."
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 28, at 505.
380. Several observers believe that the availability of longer sentences has prompted federal
prosecutors to bring charges in many cases where there are overlapping state and federal crimes.
See, eg., Beale, supra note 2, at 1004 (stating that "sentencing is probably the most important
factor that motivates prosecutors to bring federal charges when there is dual jurisdiction"); Little, supra note 5, at 1079 & n.240. A requirement that federal prosecutors have an independent
reason for bringing charges may reduce the number of federal prosecutions.
381. See supra note 204.
382. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484 n.2. Although the Supreme Court limited its discussion
to race-based selective prosecution challenges, like the one raised in Armstrong, it follows that
the appropriate remedy for any selective prosecution claim, including one premised on allegations that the decision is not rationally related to a legitimate government objective, remains an
open question.
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Arguably, an aggrieved defendant is only entitled to the same
treatment received by the similarly situated offenders whom he identifies to demonstrate disparate treatment. If a federally prosecuted defendant establishes an equal protection violation by identifying a pool
of offenders who are prosecuted in state court, instead of dismissing
the case, the court could attempt to afford the defendant the benefit
of the state doctrines he would otherwise be denied. 83 For example,
if state law contains no presumptions requiring pretrial detention,
equal protection could preclude a federal court from relying on federally imposed presumptions to detain a defendant. If state law grants
discovery rights to a defendant that are not guaranteed by federal statutes or rules, equal protection could require that the defendant be
afforded equivalent rights. 3 1 If state constitutional law requires suppression of evidence but federal law does not, the federal court could
order suppresion, finding that admission of the evidence would violate
the defendant's equal protection rights. Similarly, a federal court
could find that application of harsh federal sentencing guidelines or
mandatory minimum provisions of federal sentencing statutes violates
equal protection if similarly situated offenders in state court were not
subject to similarly harsh sentences. Unfettered by those restraints on
sentencing discretion, a federal court would be free to sentence an
offender within the statutory maximum sentence in a manner consistent with sentences received and served by offenders prosecuted in
state court.385

383. Not only is such a remedy less draconian than dismissal, it ensures that a defendant will
not "slip through the cracks" and avoid state prosecution because of a federal prosecutor's failure to refer the case to the state after a dismissal. Cf. Frase, supra note 170, at 277-80 (noting
that numerous defendants whose cases federal prosecutors decline because of the availability of
state prosecution are never charged in state court).

384. In Armstrong, the Court held that there is no statutory right to discovery to pursue a
selective prosecution claim. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485. Instead, the Court assumed that

upon a sufficient showing by the defendant, equal protection principles compel discovery to
determine whether there has been an equal protection violation, see id. at 1485-86, an assump-

tion that lower courts have accepted without question. If equal protection can require discovery
to determine whether there has been a constitutional violation absent a statutory mandate, cer-

tainly it can compel discovery to remedy a violation.
385. In other contexts, federal courts approximate how much time a defendant will actually
serve if he receives a particular sentence in state court. See, ag., United States v. Yates, 58 F.3d

542 (10th Cir. 1995) (when determining "reasonable incremental punishment" under § 5G1.3(c)
of the federal sentencing guidelines, for purposes of deciding whether to have federal sentence
run concurrent, consecutive, or partially consecutive to undischarged state sentence, courts
should approximate "real or effective" state sentence, not the sentence actually imposed). At-

tempts to equalize treatment will necessarily be imperfect in many cases.
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Such oversight and remedial action would not unduly constrain
federal prosecutors. It would merely subject them to the same constraints that control other government actors-the equal protection
guarantees believed to be essential in contexts in which far less than
lengthy prison sentences are at stake. Because the remedy for violating an offender's equal protection rights would consist of an effort to
approximate the treatment similarly situated offenders receive in state
court, judicial enforcement of the rationality requirement would, in
essence, leave federal prosecutors' charging discretion untouched.
They would not be denied the opportunity to prosecute defendants,
only the ability to subject them to harsher treatment in cases in which
they lack a rational basis for bringing the federal prosecution. The
availability of appellate review of district court rationality determinations could further ameliorate prosecutors' concerns. 386 It would provide them with a forum in which they could contest adverse
determinations, and it would allow for the development of a common
law of proper reasons for selection for federal prosecution. This precedent would then provide guidance and be binding on lower courts.
The possibility of judicial review of charging decisions leaves a
number of questions for courts to resolve. For example, how much of
a difference between federal and state procedures is sufficient to warrant equal protection review? 7 How many similarly situated offenders are necessary to trigger equal protection concerns? 388 How similar
must offenders be to be "similarly situated? '3 89 How should courts
treat case-specific doctrinal differences between federal and state law,
such as the application of an evidentiary rule that does not necessarily
prejudice defendants but may operate to a defendant's disadvantage
under the facts of a particular case? By requiring its prosecutors to
develop and apply rational classification schemes, the Department of
386. Courts could require that defense efforts to have state doctrines imposed during trial be
raised pretrial to enable prosecutors to appeal adverse decisions. Cf.FED. R. CwM. P. 12(f)
(requiring that certain motions be made before trial); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1996) (allowing interlocutory appeals of pretrial rulings).
387. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,725 (1973)
(minor differences do not establish equal protection violations).
388. See Rickett v. Jones, 901 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 1990) (isolated departure not
enough); Applegate, supra note 28, at 74-75 (one not enough).
389. See United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 744 (4th Cir. 1996) (offenders are similarly
situated "when their circumstances present no distinguishable legitimate prosecutorial factors
that might justify making different prosecutorial decisions with respect to them"). See also Pizzi,
supra note 28, at 1369 (stating that "it is easy to agree that similar offenders should be treated
similarly, but deciding which offenders are 'similar' turns out to be much harder than we thought
it would be").
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Justice could make judicial resolution of these questions unnecessary.
However, if judicial involvement is ultimately needed, these questions
and others should not preclude defendants who are unequally burdened by federal prosecution from receiving the same equal protection guarantees as others on the losing end of government
classifications.
CONCLUSION
The federalization of substantive criminal law and the disparity
between treatment received in federal and state criminal justice systems have created what Professor Sara Sun Beale aptly characterizes
as a "cruel lottery, ' 390 in which some unfortunate offenders are subject to dramatically harsher treatment than similarly situated others.
Equal protection, which requires that government actors have a rational basis for imposing differential treatment-even in contexts in
which there is far less at stake than in the criminal justice systemshould impose the same obligation on prosecutors. It compels federal
prosecutors, whose selection decisions can mean the difference between pretrial release and detention, dismissal and conviction, or a
slap on the wrist and a lengthy prison term, to use principled methods
of determining which eligible offenders will be subject to federal
rather than state prosecution. To ensure rational charging decisions,
the Department of Justice should amend its "Principles of Federal
Prosecution" to require that federal prosecutors not only avoid bad
reasons for making charging decisions, but that they have good ones
for treating federally prosecuted offenders differently than those
charged in state court.
If faced with evidence that arbitrary selection is routine and unchecked by administrative policy, courts should reconsider their reluctance to review charging decisions absent proof of improper
discrimination. Considerations that counsel judicial restraint are not
convincing barriers to limited judicial oversight of the rationality of
federal prosecutors' decisions to bring charges under duplicative federal statutes. Although such review would rarely result in a finding of
an equal protection violation and the need to grant a remedy, it would
prompt federal prosecutors to make principled selection decisions.

390. See Beale, supra note 2, at 997.
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